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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
There are seven different officer accession programs for Marine Corps officers: 
(1) the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA); (2) the Naval Reserve Officers Training Course 
(NROTC); (3) the Platoon Leader Course (PLC); (4) the Officer Candidate Course 
(OCC); (5) the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP); (6) 
the Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP); and, (7) the Meritorious Commissioning 
Program (MCP). The last three programs (MECEP, ECP, and MCP) are Fleet Accession 
Programs designed for qualified enlistees. Since these three programs comprise a 
relatively small percentage of all accessions, only eight percent of TBS classes for fiscal 
years 1980-1999, these programs are generally classified as one group by researchers, 
leaving five major accession programs. 
One hypothesis is that significant differences among the graduates of the five 
major accession programs arise as a result of the differences in the degree of exposure to 
military culture. The USNA provides a long and intensive acculturation program prior to 
entry into the military, whereas NROTC falls somewhere between USNA and OCC in 
terms of exposure to military culture. At the other end of the spectrum, OCC and PLC 
provide only 10 weeks of training. One testable hypothesis is that longer and more 
intensive training yields better military acculturation, resulting in better officer 
performance. Prior researchers have used success at TBS, augmentation, retention and 
promotion to field grades as measures of officer career performance.  
Prior studies on the effects of accession programs on the performance of Marine 
Corps officers find conflicting results. North and Smith (December, 1993) find USNA 
and ECP program participants have the best success at TBS, whereas ROTC and MECEP 
participants have a higher probability of promotion to major. In his study on the effect of 
graduate education on retention and promotion, Branigan (2001) compares three 
accession programs: USNA, NROTC and others. His multivariate models of O-5 
promotion reveal that officers from “other” commissioning sources have a higher 
probability of promotion compared to USNA and NROTC graduates.     
2 
Multivariate models of officer performance have used explanatory variables that 
can be grouped into three categories: personal characteristics, cognitive human capital 
and affective skills. Although the variables categorized as personal background and 
affective skills are widely agreed upon, researchers have used several different variables 
for cognitive skills. General Classification Test (GCT) test scores, college GPA, college 
major and graduate education are some of the variables that are believed to be good 
proxies for cognitive abilities.  
In some prior studies, a performance index derived from officer fitness reports has 
been used as a proxy for the cognitive abilities of officers. However, using a performance 
index as an explanatory variable in promotion models has yielded inconsistent results. 
Estridge (1995) finds that when a performance index is included in promotion models, 
the sign or magnitude of accession source coefficients changes. His O-4 promotion model 
shows that there is a strong positive effect of USNA graduation on the promotion 
probability after fitness report performance is held constant. On the other hand, Wielsma 
(1996) finds negative associations between promotion to O-4 and USNA and ROTC 
graduates. His models also find a surprising (and implausible) negative sign for the 
coefficient of the performance index variable, which means that officers with higher 
performance scores are associated with a lower chance of promotion. Finally, Branigan 
(2001) used a performance index to examine the effect of graduate education on 
promotion. The performance index in his promotion model reveals a consistently positive 
effect, as one would expect. He also finds that USNA and NROTC graduates are less 
likely to promote to O-5, compared to other accession program graduates, but the 
accession program variables are not statistically significant.  
B. PURPOSE  
The purpose of this thesis is to identify and evaluate the factors affecting career 
development of U.S. Marine Corps officers. The analysis will include an evaluation of 
fitness reports, performance at The Basic School (TBS), retention to 10 years of 
commissioning service (YCS) and promotion to O-4 and O-5 ranks. The primary goal of 
this study is to explain the effect of major officer accession sources on the careers of 




C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• Do officers from some accession programs perform better than others at 
TBS?  
• Are there significant differences among officers from various accession 
programs in terms of retention to 10 YCS?  
• Are there observable differences between the fitness reports of Marine 
officers who leave before the O-4 promotion point compared to those of 
officers who stay?  
• Do officers from some accession programs have a better promotion chance 
to the O-4 and O-5 grades?  
• Are there significant differences among officers from various accession 
programs in terms of their fitness report scores? 
D.  BENEFITS OF THE STUDY  
This study will attempt to examine officer accession programs and their effect on 
officer performance. In addition to commonly used performance measures like success at 
TBS, retention and promotion, fitness report evaluations of officers will also be examined 
as a performance variable. Depending on the results of the study, the Marine Corps may 
find it useful to further examine its accession programs. The Marine Corps might also be 
interested to reexamine the new performance evaluation system that was introduced in 
1999 if the study finds the current system cannot differentiate between performances of 
officers as desired or significant signs of grade creep over time are observed. 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
The study will include an overview of current Marine Corps officer accession 
programs and the Marine Corps’ promotion and performance evaluation systems. Data 
sets that are used in the statistical analysis are based on the Marine Corps Commissioned 
Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) data file, and Marine Corps officer fitness report 
data files. The MCCOAC data file includes records of Marine officers for the fiscal year 
1980-1999 cohorts. The combined, event-based data set includes variables taken from 
TBS files and Headquarters Master Files (HMF). It includes information on augmentation 
outcomes, MOS, promotion, and separation (Quester and Hiatt, 2001). It includes 
information on Marine officers in these 20 cohorts who started at TBS. The record for 
each person ends at separation or at the last update on 30 September 2000.  
4 
The analysis will use all 20 years of officer accession data in estimating the TBS 
performance models. Fiscal year (FY) 1980-1990 cohort data will be analyzed in the 
retention and O-4 promotion models, while FY 1980-1983 cohort data will be used in the 
O-5 promotion models. The fitness report analysis will create two different performance 
indexes from the fitness reports data sets: one for the period before the performance 
evaluation system changed in 1999 and one for the period after. The study will analyze 
these indexes as dependent variables in multivariate performance models. 
Officer accession programs will be the focus of analyses. Since MCCOAC data 
have limited information on prior enlisted service, education level and college major 
codes of officers, some of these variables will be obtained from DMDC cohort data and 
merged with the MCCOAC data set. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY  
The study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II provides an overview of the 
accession function and Marine Corps officer accession programs. This chapter also 
describes the Basic School (TBS), and the Marine Corps’ promotion and performance 
evaluation systems. Chapter III reviews prior studies that have analyzed officer 
performance. These studies and their results are summarized in Chapter III under three 
topics: TBS performance, retention, and promotion. Chapter IV introduces the three data 
sets used in the study and explains how the data sets are merged and new variables are 
created for the purpose of the study. Chapter IV also gives some preliminary descriptive 
statistical analysis on the focus variables. The methodology and the models used in the 
analyses are discussed in Chapter V. Chapter VI presents empirical results from the 
models and includes explanations of the findings. Finally, Chapter VII summarizes the 
study, presents the conclusions and recommendations. 
5 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE U.S. MARINE CORPS’ ACCESSION 
PROGRAMS AND PROMOTION AND PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION SYSTEMS  
This chapter describes the Marine Corps’ personnel system and the career 
development of Marine officers. Officer accession programs are critical to career 
development as they impact different skills, aptitudes and training. The Basic School 
(TBS) at Quantico, Virginia is the only training program across the four services that 
provide all officers, regardless of occupational specialty, with identical training. This 
training plays an important role in each officer’s future careers. This chapter also reviews 
the Marine Corps’ officer promotion and performance evaluation systems.  
A. ACCESSION 
An officer career management system is comprised of four basic personnel 
functions: accessing, developing, promoting and transitioning (Thie and Brown, 1994). 
Depending on the policy decisions, alternative designs in each personnel function can 
create different career management systems to achieve different objectives. Thie et al. 
(2001) define all aspects of each of the four personnel functions in officer career 
management systems. They further detail these aspects by connecting them to alternatives 
made possible by applying different designs to each aspect.  
Table 1.1 shows that the four personnel functions have 17 aspects, and each 
aspect has various alternatives (a total of 58 alternatives). For the scope of this study, I 









Table 1.1. Functions, Aspects and Alternatives Considered. 
Function Aspects Alternatives 
Accessing Entry Point Lateral from civilian 
  Lateral from military 
  Year 0                
 Initial Tenure 2 Years 
  4 Years  
  6 Years   
 Pre-entry acculturation None 
  Educational, high-intensity, short 
  Educational, low-intensity, long 
  Educational, high-intensity, long 
  Experiential, medium intensity, medium 
 Amount of obligated service 0.5 year   
 for education, training 1 year 
  1.5 years 
  2 years 
Developing Career selection point None 
  5-10 years 
  8-10 years 
  > 10 years 
 Effect of nonselection Separation 
  Migration to new skills   
 Average assignment length Decrease by two-thirds of average 
  Decrease by one-third of average 
  Current length 
  Increase by one-third of average 
  Increase by two-thirds of average 
 Military and civilian education Current amount 
  2 years more 
  2 years less      
Promoting Promotion zone Time in service 
  Time in grade 
  Combination 
 Length of zone Narrow (1-2 years) 
  Broad (3-8 years) 
  Open 
 Opportunity Fixed 
  Selective (Based on requirements) 
 Nature of continuation Guaranteed 
  Based on requirements  
Transitioning Vesting point 4-9 years 
  10-15 years 
  20 years  
 Transitional ability of the system Tenure 
  Voluntary separation incentives 
  Neither tenure nor incentives 
 Maximum Career length 30 years 
  35 years 
  40                
 Separation rates in first 10 years High 
  Medium 
  Low  
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Table 1.1. Functions, Aspects and Alternatives Considered (cont.). 
Function Aspects Alternatives 
Transitioning Retirement annuity point 15 years 
  20 years 
  25 years 
  30 years 
  35 years    
From: Thie et al., 2001, p. 19. 
 
1. Aspects and Alternatives of Accession Function 
Accessing is a vital personnel function and plays an important role in future 
composition of the officer corps. Accessing relates to how officers enter the system and 
has four design factors policy makers can change: pre-entry acculturation, entry point, 
initial tenure, and amount of obligated service. Before categorizing Marine Corps 
accession programs created via alternatives of each aspect, I will review these aspects and 
define what Thie et al. (2001) mean by each of them. 
a. Pre-Entry Acculturation 
Acculturation is the process designed to familiarize individuals with 
military standards and make them fit into military life as best as possible. Alternatives in 
pre-entry acculturation are possible in two dimensions of the aspect: duration and 
intensity. Table 1.2 explains the alternatives of acculturation that a new officer will be 
exposed to before entry, which range from no pre-entry acculturation to long-duration 
and high intensity. 
 
Table 1.2. Pre-Entry Acculturation and Alternatives. 
No. Alternative Explanation 
1. No Pre-Entry Acculturation Officers enter without any prior acculturation 
2. Educational, short, high intensity  Educational in nature, short duration, high 
intensity  
3. Educational, long, low intensity Educational in nature, long duration, low 
intensity  
4. Educational, long, high intensity Educational in nature, long duration, high 
intensity 






b. Entry Point  
Entry point refers to where, when and in what way an individual can join 
the service. Table 1.1 shows three alternatives for entry point aspect of the accession 
function. The first alternative is lateral entry from civilian life that credits experience in 
the private sector. The second alternative is lateral entry from the services or active duty 
credits for prior military experience. The third alternative is entry at the beginning of a 
career with no credit for prior experience. 
c. Amount of Obligated Service  
Thie et al. (2001) describe this aspect as the time officers should serve on 
active duty for the services to recoup pre-commissioning human capital investments in 
training or education. As an example, obligated Service for USNA graduates is five years 
on active duty, while NROTC non-scholarship participants serve at least three and a half 
years on active duty.  
d. Initial Tenure  
A critical aspect of accession is initial tenure, which is the amount of time 
an individual may serve prior to possible involuntary separation by the Services. Tenure 
can be limited for entry positions with or without an expectation of continuing into a 
career track. Unlike alternatives that use years for initial tenure in Table 1.1, I will prefer 
commissioning type to denote whether an accession program provides its graduates with 
a regular or reserve commission. Prior to 1996 about 50 percent of officers received 
regular commissions (as cited in Rostker at al., 1993, p. 11). However, in 1992 “… The 
1992 National Defense Authorization Act mandated that all officers commissioned after 
September 1996 must enter active duty with reserve commissions and then pass through 
the augmentation process before receiving admission to the regular officer corps” (Hosek 
et al., 2001). Since that time, officers regardless of their commissioning source first 
receive reserve commission and then receive a regular commission upon promotion to O-
3 or via an augmentation board.  
e. Entry Ability 
This aspect of accession is related to minimum requirements needed for 
entry (Thie et al., 1994). I will focus only on the academic requirements for entry into 
each program. Academic requirements for entry are generally defined in terms of 
9 
accepted minimum aptitude battery test scores. The primary tests used by the Services for 
such purposes are the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT), the American College Test (ACT) 
and the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT.)1 The alternatives derived by variations 
in each aspect of accessing function to classify the Marine Corps officer accession 
programs in this study are summarized in Table 1.3 below.  
 
Table 1.3. Accessing Function, Aspects and Available Alternatives. 
Aspect Alternatives 
    No Pre-Entry Acculturation 
    Educational, short, high intensity  
    Educational, long, low intensity 
    Educational, long, high intensity 
 
     Pre-Entry Acculturation 
    Experiential, short, high intensity 
    Lateral entry from civilian life 
    Lateral entry from Services or active duty 
 
     Entry Point 
    Year 0 
     Amount of Obligated Service     Number of Years in Active-duty or Active Reserve Force 
    Regular Commission 
     Initial Tenure 
    Reserve Commission 
     Entry Ability     Minimum SAT / ACT/ ASVAB EL score 
 
2. The Marine Corps Officer Accession Programs 
Each of the seven different accession programs of the Corps is unique in terms of 
its candidate pool, acculturation process and length. ECP, MECEP and MCP programs 
are developed to allow fleet (enlisted) accessions to Marine Corps. O’Brien (2002) and 
Finley (2002) explain each program in detail in their theses. I will replicate dominant 
features of each program and use a different classification method to emphasize the 
differences among them. 
a. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) 
The Naval Academy is a four-year undergraduate college that prepares 
professional officers with a Bachelor of Science degree prior to entry into the Navy or the 
Marine Corps.  Engineering and Weapons, Mathematics and Science, Humanities and 
                                                 
1  A subtest of ASVAB called Electrical Composite is used for this purpose. The Marine Corps EL 
score is derived by summing Arithmetic Reasoning, Mathematics Knowledge, Electronics Information, and 
General Science  subsets (Mishoe, 2000, p. 46).   
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Social Sciences are the three divisions within which midshipmen choose one of the 
eighteen different majors available at USNA. 
USNA is open to all civilian high school graduates and enlisted members 
of the Navy and the Marine Corps. Regular and reserve enlisted members of the Navy 
and USMC compete for 170 appointments allotted to enlisted applicants (Mishoe, 2000). 
In terms of competitiveness USNA is highly selective and its engineering programs rank 
top amongst other U.S. colleges. Each year approximately 10,000 applicants seek 
admission into USNA and accepted class size is about 1,200. To evaluate applicants the 
USNA admission board uses a whole person multiple that incorporates seven different 
success qualities; SAT scores comprise 36 percent of the multiple (Fitzpatrick, 2001). 
Enlisted applicants should achieve at least 1050 combined SAT (or equivalent ACT) 
score whereas there is no minimum SAT score requirement for other applicants. 
However, considering the number of applicants, higher SAT scores merit higher chances 
for receiving nomination and better candidate multiple scores.2 Average combined SAT 
score for USNA class years of 1990-1999 was 1231 (Mishoe, 2000).  
Midshipmen receive both academic education and military training during 
their four years at USNA. Training at the Naval Academy starts with a seven-week 
indoctrination program called Plebe Summer. At the end of each year are various summer 
training programs designed to increase midshipmen’s general and tactical military skills, 
experiences, and leadership abilities. The Marine Corps can select up to 16 2/3 percent of 
the graduating class from the Naval Academy based on a 1964 Memorandum of 
Agreement between the Navy and USMC (O’Brien, 2002). Midshipmen who select to 
join the Marine Corps attend a four-week Leatherneck Training Program conducted by 
Naval Academy staff at The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia. For USNA graduates, 
the minimum service obligation is 5 years in active duty and 3 years in a reserve status.  
b. Naval Reserve Officer Training Course (NROTC)   
The NROTC Marine option is the second program shared with the Navy, 
which allows a maximum percentage of 16 2/3 of all NROTC attendants. The NROTC 
program provides scholarship or non-scholarship options at more than 65 NROTC units 
                                                 
2  Each applicant must receive a nomination from various political sponsors, such as the President, the 
Vice-President, members of Congress or the Secretary of the Navy. 
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at selected colleges and universities for undergraduate students to pursue careers as 
commissioned officers in the USMC. NROTC is also open to eligible active duty enlisted 
Marines. Non-scholarship program (college program) participants receive uniforms and a 
small stipend during their last two years at college. If they accept a commission these 
officers incur eight years of military service obligations, at least three and a half of which 
must be on active duty. Scholarship program participants receive full tuition, all college 
educational fees, uniforms, a stipend for textbooks, and monthly allowance. Similarly, 
these midshipmen incur eight years of military service obligation, four of which must be 
served on active duty (NROTC Web Site, December 2002). Minimum qualifying score 
on Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) for the Marine Option NROTC program is a 
composite score of 1000.  Selection for the Marine option program occurs during the 
junior or senior college year. 
In addition to their academic courses, NROTC midshipmen receive 
military training from three sources. First, they attend naval science classes such as 
leadership, navigation etc. on campus in addition to their regular academic course load. 
ROTC unit plans training throughout the year and Marine Corps operational forces 
provide practical training during summers. Finally, Marine option midshipmen attend a 
six-week screening and evaluation program called “Bulldog” at Officer Candidate 
School. 
c. Platoon Leader Course (PLC) 
The PLC program is open to all college students attending accredited 
colleges and universities. Eligible college students can enroll in the program during any 
consecutive years of their college education. The program is designed to provide college 
students with an opportunity to join the Marine Corps without interrupting their course of 
academic study.  
To be eligible for the program, college students should complete at least 
one academic term with an average GPA of “C” (2.0 on a 4.0 scale). The military training 
is limited to two 6-week summer Officer Candidate School (OCS) training sessions for 
students who enroll as college freshmen or sophomores. Members who enroll during or 
after their junior year of college attend a single 10-week OCS training session. PLC 
participants are not obliged to serve on active duty until they graduate. Upon receiving a 
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reserve commission, graduates incur eight years minimum service obligation in the 
Marine Corps Reserve. Although varying with the contract type, at least 3 years of this 
eight-year period should be served on active duty.   
d. Officer Candidate Course (OCC) 
OCC is a commissioning program open to seniors and graduates of 
accredited colleges and universities. The main difference between PLC and OCC is the 
year of college the applicant is in at the time of application. Individuals accepted into the 
program attend a 10-week training session at OCS. Participants receive a reserve 
commission as a second lieutenant in the USMC upon successful completion of training 
and report to The Basic School for initial officer training. Minimum service requirement 
is the same as PLC program; again, active duty service is generally three years, as 
specified in service agreements. 
e. Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP) 
ECP allows qualified and selected Marines serving on active duty and in 
the Marine Corps Active Reserve to apply for assignment to Officer Candidate School. 
The program provides enlisted Marines who currently have a four-year degree with the 
opportunity to move into the officer corps. Upon successful completion of OCS, Marines 
are commissioned as a second lieutenant. Officers are required to serve at least eight 
years in the Marine Corps Reserve from the date of commissioning. Any portion of this 
eight-year period not served in active duty is served on inactive duty as a member of the 
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. 
f. Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECEP) 
MECEP is designed to provide outstanding active duty enlisted Marines 
the opportunity to become officers. The program allows qualified Marines to attend 
colleges with an NROTC unit on campus as a full time student. E-4s and above in the top 
50 percent of their class can apply if they achieve a minimum combined SAT score of 
1000 with a minimum SAT verbal score of 400. Participating Marines receive full pay 
and allowances during the program and remain eligible for promotion in their MOS. 
Meeting the costs of tuition, books, housing and living expenses is each Marine’s 
responsibility during education. MECEP students participate in training with their college 
NROTC unit and also attend the same six-week “Bulldog” program at TBS as NRTOC 
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midshipmen attend. Upon assignment to a college, enlisted Marines must agree to reenlist 
to have 6 years of obligated service in the Regular Marine Corps. Candidates are 
appointed as second lieutenants after they successfully graduate from college, complete 
bulldog course at OCS and MECEP on-campus training. Minimum service requirement is 
four years as commissioned officers for program graduates.  
g. Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP) 
The program creates an opportunity for highly qualified enlisted Marines 
in the Regular and Active Reserve programs who do not possess a baccalaureate degree 
to become officers. The process starts by the nomination of commanding officers and 
proceeds through a selection board to determine eligible Marines. To be eligible, in 
addition to having a high school diploma and a minimum combined SAT score of 1000 
(or ACT equivalent), applicants must have satisfactorily earned an associate’s degree or 
completed at least 75 hours of college work at a regionally accredited college or 
university. Upon selection, Marines receive orders to report for a 10–week Officer 
Candidate Course at OCS. Candidates who successfully complete OCS are appointed to 
the grade of second lieutenant in the Marine Corps Reserve. Officers commissioned 
through the MCP must pursue their four-year baccalaureate degree during their initial 
service to be competitive for future promotion. The minimum obligated service 
requirement is the same as that in ECP program, which is at least eight years in the 
Marine Corps Reserve from the date of commissioning. 
3. Classification of Accession Programs 
Having explained the accessing function and described Marine Corps officer 
accession programs, it is now possible to classify each of the seven commissioning 
programs in terms of their specific features with one of the alternatives in Table 1.3. 








Table 1.4. Officer Accession Programs and Accessing Function Aspects. 
Accession Program  Pre-Entry 
Acculturation 
Entry Point Obligated 
Service 
Initial Tenure a Entry Ability 
USNA Educational, long, 
high intensity 
- Year 0  
- Lateral entry 
from active duty 
5 Years in 
active-duty, 
Total 8 Yrs.
Regular Commission Whole Person 
Multiple 
NROTC -Educational, long, 
low intensity 
 
- Year 0  
- Lateral entry 
from active duty 









- ACT: 45 
- EL : 115 
PLC Short, high 
intensity 





 First term 
college GPA 
completion 
with at least  
C grade. 
OCC Short, high 
intensity 
Year 0 3 Years in 
active-duty, 
total 8 years
Reserve Commission College 
Graduation 
ECP Experiential, short, 
high intensity,  
Lateral Entry 
from Active duty
8 years in 
MC reserve 
Reserve Commission College 
Graduation 




4 years in 
active-duty 
Regular Commission - SAT: 1000   
- ACT: 45 
- EL: 115 




8 years in 
MC reserve 
Reserve Commission Associate’s 
Degree or at 
least 75 hrs. 
College work, 
- SAT: 1000 
- CT: 45 
- EL: 115 
a After 1996 all officers receive reserve commissions. 
As Table 1.4 illustrates, the three sources (USNA, NROTC, and MECEP) are 
designed to provide long pre-entry acculturation in “officership” to ensure a better fit 
between the individual and the needs of the Marine Corps. PLC, OCC and ECP programs 
are designed to answer officer requirements, which are not met by the former three 
programs, in a quick way, hence Thie et al. (1994) refer to them as “shorter response 
programs.” Relying heavily on having a college degree as the primary indication of 
potential for being officer, these programs provide the minimum screening and 
acculturation to enable these individuals to meet junior officer needs. Other alternatives 
like ECP and MCP depend on acculturation provided during prior enlisted service, and to 
some extent values it more than the prerequisite of possessing a college degree (as in 
MCP).  
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4. Trends in Accession Program Participation 
Table 1.5 illustrates the commissioning source for entry cohorts between 1980-
1999. Since the number of midshipmen to be selected into the Marine Corps is limited to 
16 2/3 percent of each USNA and NROTC class, percentage changes in these two 
programs do not reflect the USMC’s preferences for these programs over time. The PLC 
and OCC programs comprise approximately 50-60 percent of each entry cohort. The 
fluctuations in yield percentages of OCC  (from 9.3 percent in 1988 to 25.18 percent in 
1989) explain its shorter response attribute and its goal of making up for shortfalls in 
officer accessions from the primary programs. The only noticeable trend among programs 
is observed for MECEP that has consistently increased over time. The increase is a signal 
of the Marine Corps’ preference for officers with prior service. It appears that individuals 
with prior service acculturate well and provide potential career officers. 
 



















1980 (1514) 13.14 18.30 31.18 20.67 1.52 3.96 0.2 0 11.03 
1981(1449) 9.25 18.63 36.37 21.81 2.69 4.35 0.14 0 6.76 
1982 (1641) 8.53 14.99 36.14 32.72 2.68 3.84 0 0 1.10 
1983(2089) 8.76 13.45 36.57 34.94 2.01 3.45 0 0 0.81 
1984 (1540) 10.58 18.83 50.97 15.13 1.95 2.34 0 0 0.19 
1985(1361) 12.64 20.65 43.94 15.50 2.94 4.19 0 0 0.15 
1986 (1352) 12.50 22.49 42.23 14.28 2.59 5.55 0 0 0.37 
1987(1642) 10.78 20.71 35.93 25.64 2.86 3.41 0 0 0.67 
1988 (1372) 13.05 25.66 46.57 9.33 3.28 1.82 0 0 0.29 
1989(1497) 7.55 23.85 35.80 25.18 3.94 2.87 0 0 0.80 
1990 (1210) 7.77 24.96 40.91 19.26 3.88 2.81 0 0 0.41 
1991(1326) 7.32 23.00 35.52 28.28 3.39 2.04 0 0 0.45 
1992 (1344) 10.79 20.76 26.34 33.78 4.99 2.53 0.15 0 0.67 
1993(1199) 12.68 19.10 39.87 20.02 4.67 2.34 0.58 0 0.75 
1994 (1205) 18.76 18.26 41.0 12.86 3.24 2.66 0.50 1.83 0.91 
1995(1251) 9.67 14.39 39.65 26.70 4.16 3.52 0.80 1.12 0 
1996 (1408) 11.58 14.63 31.82 26.07 5.33 6.53 2.63 0.92 0.50 
1997(1217) 12.49 12.24 29.91 33.36 3.29 4.77 2.88 1.07 0 
1998 (1380) 10.80 12.32 20.51 40.14 7.61 3.91 4.42 0.29 0 
1999 (1061) 12.06 14.99 13.67 39.30 10.18 4.81 4.43 0.57 0 
Average 11.04 18.61 35.75 24.75 3.86 3.59 0.84 0.29 1.29 
 
  From: Derived from MCCOAC data set .  
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B.  THE BASIC SCHOOL (TBS) 
After earning a commission via one of the above seven programs, all Marine 
officers attend TBS at Quantico, Virginia. The six-month intensive training curriculum 
aims to develop officers in five areas: leader/commander, decision maker, communicator, 
warfighter/executor, life-long learner. The mission of TBS is        
…to educate newly commissioned officers in the high standards of 
professional knowledge, esprit de corps, and leadership required to be 
prepared for duty as a company grade officer in the operating forces, with 
particular emphasis on duties, responsibilities and warfighting skills 
required of a rifle platoon commander (TBS Order P5000.2D, 2001 as 
cited in Finley, 2002, p. 26).  
TBS has six companies that train classes of 220-250 officers consecutively with 
two-month lapses around the year. A seventh company exists for warrant officer training. 
Each company is commanded by a major and has six platoons with captains as platoon 
leaders. All of the seven company commanders report to TBS Command Element, which 
is commanded by a lieutenant colonel. The Instruction Battalion supports training, 
provides expertise and demonstrates leadership in all phases of the course to educate and 
train the Marine Corps’ newest officers (TBS Web Site, 20 December 2002). 
Instruction at TBS is introduced to officers with blocks that build upon one 
another. The instruction begins in the classroom environment and follows in sand table 
exercises and field applications. Classroom training comprises 60 percent of the total 
1563 instruction hours, and 633 hours (40 percent) are devoted to field training (TBS 
Command Brief, TBS Web Site, 11 December 2002). 
Leadership, academics and military skills comprise the three evaluation criteria in 
which officers must achieve “course mastery” to be able to graduate and report to 
Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schools. An average of 75 percent is required to 
pass each skill area.  
Leadership evaluations are the responsibility of company staff. Staff platoon 
commanders receive feedback from assistant instructors and submit their evaluations 
during the 12th and 22nd weeks of instruction. Peer rankings also play an important role 
in leadership evaluations. The TBS testing officer of TBS determines each company’s 
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overall leadership ranking by weighting staff evaluations and peer rankings by 90 percent 
and 10 percent, respectively.  
The second criterion, military skills, evaluates each officer’s warfighting abilities 
and is based on practical application events. Fitness reports, land navigation, rifle and 
pistol qualifications are some of the 17 graded military skills that comprise the overall 
military skills grade of officers (Finley, 2002). 
The academics portion of evaluations examines each officer’s understanding of 
doctrines, procedures and concepts. The evaluations are via written tests conducted in the 
classroom environment. Twelve different evaluative exams are used to assess officers in 
academics.  
Upon conclusion of training, officers have a separate GPA from each of the three 
evaluation criteria and are sorted and assigned a TBS class rank according to an overall 
GPA, which is calculated by weighting the three separate performance grades. 
Leadership grades contribute 36 percent weight while the military skills and academics 
are each weighted 32 percent.  
TBS instruction has a significant role in a Marine officer’s future career in three 
ways.  First, depending on the overall class rank at TBS, Headquarters Marine Corps 
assigns a lineal rank for all Marines in the active-duty list.3 Lineal precedence is 
important for a Marine officer as Marine Corps Bulletin 1400 explains “Initial 
assignment and maintenance of lineal precedence affects each officer’s seniority, 
provides the sole basis for determining an officer’s eligibility for promotion, and drives 
the timing of the officer’s promotion once selected.”  
Second, TBS assigns MOSs to lieutenants that will impact a Marine officer’s 
future career directly. MOS assignment is based on a quality-spread approach that 
ensures that every occupational field receives a fair share of the most competitive 
lieutenants. MOS selection process is completed at approximately the 14th training week 
                                                 
3 “The Officer Lineal Precedence System is a part of the Marine Corps Promotion System and was 
established to maintain the current lineal and promotion history of all officers in the U.S. Marine Corps and 
U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. … Permanent precedence is assigned according to overall class average at 
TBS for all officers who were commissioned since 15 September 1981. … Once established, lineal 
precedence is normally only changed by promotion or appointment to the next higher grade.” (MC Bulletin 
1400, July 2002)  
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of the course. Again, overall class standing is the measure of competitiveness and one-
third of the quotas for each MOS are obtained from the top, middle and the bottom thirds 
of each company (MOS Selection Booklet, Virginia Tech Naval ROTC Web Site, 2002).  
Finally, the overall success of officers at TBS has predictive value in terms of 
retention and promotion in the forthcoming years. Prior studies find that officers with 
higher class standings are more likely to stay to the O-4 promotion point and to be 
promoted to O-4 (Wielsma, 1996). 
C.  MARINE CORPS PROMOTION SYSTEM 
1. Significance of Promotion in the Military 
Two policy choices influence and determine career patterns in organizations: 
entry point and basis of leaving. People either enter the organization at the beginning of 
the career path (closed organization) or they can enter at any point along the career (open 
organization). In terms of leaving, people either leave at their choice (natural attrition) or 
the organizations decide who will leave (forced attrition). In the military, forced attrition 
has been primarily implemented through the promotion system (Thie et al., 1994).  Like 
the other three Services, the Marine Corps uses an up-or-out career flow structure. The 
up-or-out system provides incentives for continued performance and allows the Services 
to retain their best personnel. Specific to this structure is forced or induced attrition, 
which has been tied to promotion (failure to promote) at certain career points. 
The military is unique in being the only institution in which the officer profession 
can be practiced. Put another way, an officer has to stay in the military to be able to 
perform his or her profession. Unlike the profession of a doctor that can be practiced at 
one hospital or another, the profession of arms can only be practiced in the military. 
Thus, under forced attrition, an individual’s profession ends when his service ends. From 
this perspective, the promotion system in the military is not only related to movement to 
higher grades, but also sets the foundation for continuation of one’s profession. Rostker 
et al. explain how DOPMA was designed to combine the retention and promotion 
functions. 
The “up” portion of the “up-or-out” system provides that, in general, 
officers move through the system in “cohorts” originally determined by 
the year of commissioning, and compete for promotion to the next higher 
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grade against other members of the group at set years-of-service (YOS) 
points. The “out” portion of the “up-or-out” system provides that “officers 
twice passed over for promotion, after a certain number of years, 
depending upon their particular grade, are to be separated from active 
service, and if eligible retired.” There are, however, exceptions to the 
mandatory separation rules. DOPMA provides for selective continuation 
on active duty of officers who have twice failed selection for promotion. It 
was Congress’s expectation that O-4s who failed to be selected to the next 
higher grade would be permitted to remain on active duty until they were 
eligible to retire at 20 years of service. (Rostker et al., 1993, p. 12) 
The promotion system uses a “fully qualified” approach for first lieutenant and 
captain selections. Promotion to O-4 and above is on the basis of “best qualified.” The 
Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) establishes a standard for 
career progression and an officer management system built around a uniform application 
of how military officers should be trained, appointed, promoted, separated, and retired. 
DOPMA aligns the procedures among the four services and sets promotion percentages 
for each grade (Hosek et al., 2001). The promotion opportunity to each grade and the 
cumulative probability of promotion to each grade for the original cohort (derived from 
DOPMA) are presented in Table 1.6. 
 
Table 1.6. DOPMA Model of Officer Careers. 
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Cumulative Probability to 



















2 x nonselect & separation or may be 
allowed to stay on active duty until 









2 x nonselect & separation or may be 
allowed to stay until 24 YOS; normal 









30% of 2X nonselectees can be retired 









Normal retirement at 30 YOS, but 30% 




a ( )# of officers authorized to be selectedPromotion Opportunity = # of officers in the in-zone  (See MCO P1400.31B, 2001, p. 1-4).  
b More than 30 percent of both O-5 and O-6 officers can retire early if considered more than once prior to 
reaching mandatory retirement.   
 
From: Rostker et al., 1993, p. 14. 
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2. Promotion to Higher Grades 
Promotion to O-2 is nearly automatic as most officers are still serving their initial 
service obligation at this promotion point. Most of the officers who leave during the first 
two years fail in basic military or occupational training.   
Officers, depending on their accession programs, generally complete their initial 
service obligation as O-3s level and about one-third of each cohort voluntarily leaves at 
this point. Compared to O-2, promotion to O-3 and above is designed to be more 
challenging and involves a competitive promotion board review. However, as Table 1.6 
illustrates, promotion opportunity to O-3 is high (95 percent). Considering the separation 
rate at this point, promotion to O-3 is nearly automatic for the survivors. Promotion to O-
4 and above is completely different as it is the first truly competitive promotion.  
Promotion to major, which occurs roughly at 10 years of service, can be viewed 
as a career selection point. Almost 50 percent of the officers from the same 
commissioning year make it to 10 YOS (Quester and Hiatt, 2001). Of the surviving 
officers, about 20 percent will not be selected. Of those not-selected, the officers who 
have at least 18 active-duty YOS (including prior enlisted service) are allowed to 
continue until retirement (Section 573, Chapter 36, Title10 U.S. Code). In recent years, 
however, the Marine Corps began to use selective continuation authority, as allowed by 
DOPMA and encouraged by the Congress, to keep majors with at least 15 YOS who are 
passed over twice (at the O-5 board) until the 20-year retirement point.4 Continuation 
decisions are taken by continuation boards, which are composed of the same members of 
each promotion board upon conclusion of the selection process. 
Achieving more senior ranks (O-5 and higher) is highly competitive and also 
based on professional credentials. Promotion opportunity to O-5 is much smaller -70 
percent- as compared with that of junior ranks. Second, officers reaching O-5 also receive 
eligibility for retirement at 20 YOS if not promoted to higher grades. To increase their 
chances of promotion to O-5, officers must have excellent records of performance. 
Having served in challenging and key positions is as meaningful as having a good record 
of success. On the other hand, differences among military occupation specialty (MOS) 
                                                 
4  The House Report 3296-1462 notes “It is the committee’s strongest desire that …only in unusual 
circumstances would this authority not be fully utilized” (as cited in Rostker et al., 1993, p. 13). 
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groups become significant, as senior billets in non-combat MOSs are limited. However, 
the Marine Corps does not use “promotion by MOS.”  
The Marine Corps Promotion Manual explains the requirements for active duty 
officers to be eligible for promotion to higher grades. The minimum requirements include 
being on the active duty-list, having completed the minimum time-in-grade and being 
identified in the Promotion Plan for an opportunity for selection. The Performance 
Evaluation System (PES) asserts the significance of fitness reports. Fitness reports are 
“the primary means of evaluating a Marine’s performance.” However, neither these 
minimum requirements nor fitness reports tell eligible officers much about what counts 
favorably for higher promotion probabilities and what credentials the board members 
weigh more heavily. Experiences by the Board members who have served on prior 
promotion boards are highly valued by junior Marine officers. 
3. The Marine Corps Selection Process 
Title 10 United States Code (USC) provides for a single promotion process for all 
officers on the Active Duty List (ADL), regardless of their service branch.5 
Commissioned officers are recommended for promotion by their commanders, and are 
selected by centralized (service-wide) promotion boards, based on the officers' promotion 
records. Promotion board deliberations are based on three types of information sources: 
official military personnel file (OMPF); written communications by eligible officers; and 
discrepancy notes. OMPF is the primary source of information and contains fitness 
reports, awards, any reports of punishment or admonishments, any military and civilian 
credentials and other information. Finally, files include a recent photograph of the 
individual, which is used to evaluate military bearing.  
Instructions about the composition and proceedings of each promotion board are 
released by “precept” which constitutes the legal document ordering a selection board to 
convene. The precept is a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the president of the 
board. The precept appoints the president and members of the boards. To protect the 
members from improper influence, the precept is not released until the Board actually 
                                                 
5 Each Service maintains a single list of officers who are on active duty in the order of seniority of the 
grade in which they are serving on active duty. Warrant officers and officers described in Section 641 of 
Title 10 USC are kept on separate active-duty lists (U.S. Code Title 10, Chapter 36, Section 620). 
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convenes (MCO 1400.31B, 2000). Precepts include information that the Secretary of the 
Navy deems important for selection of officers to the next grade, but should not convey 
information on particular officers (SECNAVINST 1420.1A, 1991). The precepts should, 
however, include guidelines on the needs of the Service for officers having particular 
skills. Additionally, precepts ensure that appropriate consideration is given to joint officer 
management and minority status issues (DODINST 1320.14, 1996). 
An exception to excluding information on particular officers is the inclusion of 
“skill guidance” in the precepts. The Marine Corps Promotion Manual defines a skill 
shortage as “any MOS that is 85 percent or less of the staffing goal for the grade being 
considered for selection.” Hence, information on officers in such groups is generally 
furnished to boards by their MOS group codes. Another guideline covers the issue of 
joint officer management. Chapter 38 USC, Title 10 defines joint officer management. As 
detailed in CJCSI 1330.02A (1997), officers serving in or who have served on the Joint 
Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense Staff or in Other Joint Duty (these positions are 
defined by law) are expected to be selected for promotion at a rate not less than the rate 
for officers in the Marine Corps who are serving on or who have served on their Service’s 
Headquarters staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is charged by law to ensure that the 
boards act consistently with the guidelines. Another important evaluation guideline 
addresses the effect of marital status.  Department of Defense (DOD) Instruction asserts 
that the employment, education, or volunteer service of a spouse should have no effect on 
the promotion opportunities of that member. Finally, precepts also set equal opportunity 
guidelines in accordance with DoD Directive 1320.12. 
A group of officers who compete amongst themselves is referred to as a “cohort.” 
Cohorts are determined according to the Five-Year Officer Promotion Plan of the Marine 
Corps. The plan contains selection opportunities, zone sizes, numbers authorized to select 
and any guidance for each grade and competitive category as approved by the Secretary 
of the Navy. The promotion plan is released at least 30 days prior to the convening date 
of a selection board. Although officers compete within their cohort regardless of their 
MOS group, competition is limited to officers in the same “category” only. The Marine 
Corps has five different groups of officers called competitive categories: “unrestricted,” 
“restricted (limited duty officers),” “warrant/chief warrant officers,” “specialist officers” 
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and “active reserve officers” (MCO P1400.31B, 2000). Each category possesses disparate 
career paths and related skills. Unrestricted officers fill the majority of billets in the 
Marine Corps and comprise the major focus of the Marine Corps promotion system.  The 
unrestricted officer promotion process is focused on the selection of officers for 
promotion who have “the potential to carry out the duties and responsibilities of the next 
higher grade” (Vasquez and Williams, 2001). 
The third document in the promotion process is the convening message. The 
Commandant of the Marine Corps provides a general written notice for each grade, which 
is transmitted by a standard naval message (MARADMIN) to all eligible officers. At a 
minimum, this message includes convening date of the board, the name and date of rank 
of the senior and junior officer in the “in-zone” and “below-zone” populations, and other 
administrative notices. DOPMA system not only provides a standard career progression 
for officers, but also provides for early and late promotion (Rostker et al., 1993). In 
simplest terms, each selection board considers officers in three cohorts.  The issue of this 
message groups all eligible officers to be considered by promotion boards in three 
categories: above, below and in-zone.  
The Marine Corps promotion Manual (MCO P1400.31B, 2000) defines 
promotion zone by   “… eligibility category consisting of officers from the most senior to 
the most junior officer eligible for consideration before a selection board in the same 
grade and competitive category.” For Marine Corps promotions to major through colonel, 
officers compete both below-the-promotion zone, as well as in- and above-the-promotion 
zone. 
Above-zone: Officers in this zone have been previously considered in the in-zone 
population, but were not selected for promotion by the board.  
In-zone: Officers in this zone comprise the primary eligible population for 
consideration by the selection board. 
Below-zone: Below-zone officers are junior to other officers in the promotion 
zone. If not selected, these officers do not incur a failure of selection. This group is a 
rough estimate of the following year’s in-zone population. Title 10, USC limits the 
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number of below-zone officers that can be selected to 10 percent of the “authorized to 
select number.”6   
Once the board convenes and begins its sessions, all eligible officers are assigned 
randomly to each board member. Board members review their in-zone cases to have an 
understanding of the competitiveness of the in-zone population. Members review all 
above- and below-zone cases upon completion of in-zone cases. During the first session 
called “in-out session,” board members brief all above-zone and below-zone cases and 
the board decides if an eligible officer’s record is competitive enough to merit being a 
“premier” case. Premier cases are briefed and voted with the in-zone officers’ cases. The 
criterion to be a premier case is to get at least one affirmative vote from any member of 
the selection board. 
Once all premier cases are determined, in addition to the in-zone group, each 
eligible officer receives a full brief by the member assigned. These briefs usually take 5-8 
minutes depending on the number of eligible officers. After all cases have been briefed to 
the board, the voting process begins and each member cast his or her vote “yes” to select 
or “no” to pass. The number of “yes” votes a member can cast cannot exceed the number 
of officers authorized to select (MCO P1400.31B, 2000). 
One of the last actions of the promotion board is to confirm that the below-zone 
select records are indeed better quality records than the in- and above-zone non-select 
records, since below-zone promotions come at the expense of the in- and above-zone 
officers. The entire board compares the lowest below-zone select record to the highest 
scoring for in-zone or above-zone non-select record. A majority of the board members 
must agree that the below-zone record is better than the in-zone or above-zone record for 
the officer from below-zone to “displace” the in- or above-zone officer. If it is not better, 
that in-zone or above-zone officer becomes a select and the below-zone officer becomes 
a non-select. 
 
                                                 
6 Each selection board is authorized to select to the next higher grade a specific number of officers. 
Officer accessions, attrition, requirements, Congressional and secretarial authorizations, and budgetary 
constraints impact the “authorized to select number”. For each unrestricted and Reserve board this number 
will fluctuate or float until the day the board convenes. (MCO 1410.31B, 2000) 
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D. MARINE CORPS PERFORMANCE EVALUATION SYSTEM (PES) 
As in the other three Services, the Marine Corps uses written performance 
evaluations to evaluate its personnel. These written performance reports are called 
“fitness reports,” or “fitreps.” The system is used for all personnel in grades of sergeant 
through major general and provides for periodic reporting, recording and analysis of the 
performance and professional character of Marines. The Marine Corps Performance 
Evaluation System defines the fitness report as the “…primary means for evaluating a 
Marine’s performance to support the Commandant’s effort to select the best qualified 
personnel for promotion, augmentation, resident schooling, command and duty 
assignments “ (MCO 1610.7E, 1998).  
Two officers are authorized to report on each Marine: a reporting senior (RS) and 
a reviewing officer (RO). The RS is the first commissioned officer (or civilian GS-
9/equivalent or above) in the reporting chain that is senior to the Marine and in the best 
position to evaluate the Marine’s performance and character. The RO is the first 
commissioned officer (or civilian GS-10/ equivalent or above) senior in grade to the RS 
and responsible for the supervision of the RS. A third officer sighting is required if the 
report is “adverse” in nature. The third officer sighter is normally the reporting senior of 
the RO. General or flag officers should sight all adverse officer reports.7 
During the past 50 years the Marine Corps has modified the fitness report form 
several times to achieve more accurate assessment and reporting of Marines’ 
performances. Two most recent report forms are described in the following sections since 
some parts of the statistical analyses in Chapter V involve data from fitness reports. 
1. Performance Evaluation System Before 1999  
There are 11 occasions when a fitness report submission is required for a Marine. 
These occasions ensure that a continuous chain of performance evaluation record is 
generated. Continuous reporting also reduces situations where a Marine works with two 
different reporting seniors but gets evaluated only by the last one. The primary fitness 
report occasion is ‘annual,’ which requires fitness reports for all marines but lieutenants. 
First and second lieutenants receive semi-annual reports. Other occasions that require 
                                                 
7  The duties and responsibilities of a third officer sighter involve adverse fitness reports. (See MCO 
P1610.7e , December 1998, p. 2-6). 
26 
fitness reports include change of grade, or change of duty or reporting senior.  Marines 
also receive a fitness report when they are assigned temporary duties in excess of 30 
days. This is the only exception to the policy of requiring a minimum of 90 days of 
observation (30 days for lieutenants). Finally, a fitness report is submitted in unusual 
cases like desertion, missing in action, end of service or directed by the Commandant of 
the Marine Corps. To keep an ongoing evaluation cycle all reports cover the period since 
the last fitness report was submitted regardless of the occasion. Hence, all reports are 
equally important.  
Appendix A contains a copy of a fitness report form used prior to 1999. The 
report format consists of two pages that include four sections (A to D) and conclude with 
reporting and reviewing officer certification parts. Section A includes descriptive 
information that covers current duty, personal information on the Marine and RS, type 
and occasion of report, period covered by the report, Marine’s rifle, pistol and physical 
qualifications and finally three duty preferences by the Marine for his/her next 
assignment.  
Section B includes nine items (items 12-20) for RS to assess the performance of a 
Marine during the reporting period. Item 12 is checked to denote the report is 
“unobserved,” which is required because of insufficient observation time or when another 
report is due for less than 90 days. Item 13 has seven factors to allow evaluation of the 
Marine’s duty performance. Item 14 includes 14 factors for evaluation of professional 
qualities and characteristics of the Marine. These (21) traits have a six-point scale for 
marking: unsatisfactory, below average, average, above average, excellent and 
outstanding. Item 15, Potential and Preference Factors, allows the RS to assess the 
Marine in relation to all Marines of the same grade for whom the evaluator is the RS at 
the time of the report, regardless whether these officers receive fitness reports from the 
RS at this time or not. Item 15 does not provide an average of the marks in items 13 and 
14, but rather reflects the relative assessment of the Marine compared to his or her 
counterparts in the unit. Unlike a six-scaled measurement in items 13 and 14, ten scales 
are possible for item 15 with the inclusion of “below average–average, average–above 
average, above average-excellent, excellent-outstanding” marks. Item 16 reflects the RS’s 
choice on “having the Marine under his or her command during service in war.” This 
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allows the RS to evaluate the Marine on a four-point range starting with “prefer not” and 
reaching “particularly desire” options. Item 17 includes options to denote information on 
the Marine if he or she has been the subject of any commendatory, adverse or disciplinary 
action reports during the Fitrep period. Item 18 explains the frequency and degree of 
observation of the Marine’s performance by the RS. Item 19 reflects the opinion of the 
RS on promotability of the Marine. Although there are two options to express opinion 
either in favor or against promotion, a third option is possible for the RS to nominate the 
Marine for accelerated promotion by leaving both marks unchecked. Such a mark sends a 
signal to the promotion board and may be significant for rendering the Marine a premier 
case for below-zone promotion. In item 20, the RS either concurs with the Marine’s three 
duty preferences or recommends a different duty assignment. 
As Appendix A illustrates, Section C allows for narrative and perceptive insights 
into the Marine’s duty preferences, performance, character and overall value. The RS is 
restricted to the space provided in Section C unless the report is adverse or includes 
accelerated promotion remarks. The reporting senior has to include mandatory 
explanatory comments in this section for certain marks in Section B such as not 
observed/extended or combat reports, commendatory or additional duty marks that need 
to be clarified by further explanations. 
Section D certifies the correctness and impartiality of the report by the RS. This 
section allows the “Marine Reported On” (MRO) to write statements to argue the 
remarks by RS if the report is determined to be adverse.8 On the second page, the 
reporting senior completes certification by listing all Marines of the same grade as the 
MRO who were under his or her command at reporting date. If the RS marked the Marine 
as “outstanding” in item 15 a, the RS enters the numerical ranking of the Marine 
compared to others only in the outstanding category.   
The last part of the second page of Fitness report form in Appendix A is allotted 
for RO certification. The RO has four options depending on his or her opportunity to 
observe the Marine. If the RO does not concur with the reporting senior’s mark in item 
                                                 
8 An adverse report includes at least one of the following marks: show failure of marksmanship or PFT 
in item 5a, marks less than average in items 13,14 or 15a, an entry of “prefer not” in item 16, an entry of 
“yes” in items 17b and c, an entry of  “no” in item 19. 
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15a (General Value to the Service) then he or she can enter a new evaluation here. The 
RO also has to add remarks in the space provided if he or she does not concur with the 
RS and marks the fourth comment, or believes that there is inconsistency between 
Section B and C remarks of the RS. The RO also write comments if accelerated 
promotion is recommended for the Marine. 
2. Performance Evaluation System After 1999 
The current performance evaluation system in effect since January 1999 was 
designed to remedy inflated grading that could not be prevented by subsequent minor 
adjustments to the prior fitness report, and “reset the system by introducing a new 
performance evaluation tool” (Hosek et al., 2001, p. 18). A copy of the new fitness report 
is contained in Appendix B.  
To ensure a realistic evaluation of Marines the new PES assigns the responsibility 
of a fair evaluation system to each of the three persons involved in the fitness report. 
Firstly, reporting seniors are cautioned by including the following instruction under RS’s 
role: “Inflated markings, patronizing comments, and other techniques designed to game 
the system and give the MRO an undeserved advantage over contemporaries are acts of 
misplaced loyalty and ultimately hurt the institution” (MCO P1610.7E, 1998, p. 2-4). 
Secondly, the RO is held responsible for eliminating inflated report submissions: “ROs 
will not concur with inflated reports. …ROs will direct RSs to clarify or modify reports 
that… appear to contain inflated marks…” (MCO P1610.7E, 1998, p.2-5). Finally, the 
MRO is given a responsibility of maintaining accurate fitreps, by adding a new 
performance trait to the format that measures the extent to which an officer, as a reporting 
official, conducted or required others to conduct accurate and timely evaluations 
(Appendix B Fitness report, Section H). 
The new fitness report system keeps intact almost all the administrative 
procedures and standards that guide the preparation and submission of reports. The new 
format includes a seven-point grade structure, a reduced role for narrative comments, 
relative value approach to fitness reports, and voids relative comparisons among peers by 
the RS. The following paragraphs discuss each section of the new format in Appendix B. 
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The new format facilitates documentation of critical information under 12 
subtopics; A through L. Section A includes administrative information as the prior format 
did. Items 12, 17, 19 that took place in evaluative traits section B of the old format is 
incorporated in section A as items 5, 6 and 7.  However, there is an important difference 
between the two formats on the meaning of the “Adverse” option. “Adverse,” as used in 
item 17 of the old report was meant to show that adverse material or incident reports were 
received by the RS during the reporting period from outside the reporting chain. Item 6 
(that corresponds to item 17 of the old format) uses “derogatory material” option for this 
purpose. “Adverse” as an option under item 5 of the new report is an easy way of 
showing that the contents of the report constitute an adverse evaluation of the MRO, 
which gives him/her the right to write statements to argue against the evaluation. In the 
old report, Marines were supposed to check all marks and comments on themselves to 
decide if there was anything that made the report adverse. 
Section B includes billet description and scope of duties that form the basis for the 
evaluation. Section C contains information on what the Marine accomplished during the 
reporting period. The new PES allows the Marine to provide input via a report called 
“MRO worksheet.” The worksheet allows the MRO to provide a summary of 
accomplishments that he or she believes to be significant during reporting period.  
Sections D through I include 14 attributes that form the cross section of the areas 
to evaluate officers that the Marine Corps deems most significant. The attributes defined 
under each section are “Mission Accomplishment, Individual Character, Leadership, 
Intellect and Wisdom, and Fulfillment of Evaluation Responsibilities. Collectively, these 
attributes provide a clear picture of the Marine’s demonstrated capacities, abilities, and 
character” (MCO 1610.7E, 1998). 
The seven markings of “A” to “H” correspond to three descriptions under each 
trait to help the RS’s reasoning in making the appropriate selection. An “A” grade is the 
lowest possible and indicates an unsatisfactory evaluation. It renders the entire report 
adverse. “F” and “G” grades, on the other hand, are the highest possible and express 
distinguished performance. All three markings demand justification by the RS in the 
space provided under each section. An unobserved marking is also possible for each trait 
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if the reporting period cannot form an accurate assessment. Section H merits special 
consideration in the new fitness report as its inclusion is aimed to ensure that reporting 
officials act in accordance with the objectives of PES by submitting accurate, timely and 
uninflated evaluations. As the last page of Appendix B shows, Section I provides the RS 
a location for entering mandatory, directed and additional comments that allows a more 
comprehensive performance and character evaluation. Section J gives the document legal 
standing and includes signatures of the RS and the Marine. If the report is adverse the 
Marine may opt for making a statement by adding an addendum page.  
Section K is the part that formalizes the reviewing officer’s involvement in the 
report. The RO indicates in item 1 of Section K whether he or she has had sufficient 
knowledge and observation of the Marine or not. In item 2, the RO expresses an opinion 
on the RS’s evaluation of the Marine by concurring or not concurring with the remarks. 
Item 3 provides the RO an opportunity to compare the Marine to all Marines of the same 
grade whose professional abilities are known to the RO. The RO uses a Christmas tree to 
make such a comparison and puts the Marine into one of the eight possible categories. 
Again, an unsatisfactory marking by the RO tenders the report adverse. 
Reporting senior and reviewing officer profiles and relative value of the reports 
are some of the novelties introduced by the new PES. A profile is a snapshot of the RS’s 
and RO’s rating history, and includes information on the number of reports written, the 
fitness report averages for each grade, and the highest and lowest averages submitted by 
the RS and RO. The profiles aid in maintaining the integrity of the Performance 
Evaluation System and provide an evaluation of the Marines in RS and RO duties. These 
profiles are kept by HQMC and used to evaluate performance of Marines as RS and RO 
in terms of submitting accurate, uninflated and timely reports. HQMC uses these profiles 
to identify RSs whose profiles indicate noncompliance with the objectives of the 
Performance Evaluation System.  
Finally, the relative value of a report reflects how the average of the observed 
attributes of an individual report compares to both the RS’s average and highest value of 
all reports written by the RS on Marines at the same grade. Relative value is computed by 
HQMC using 14 attributes (sections D to H) on the report once a reporting senior has 
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written at least three observed fitreps. Relative values are converted to a scale ranging 
between 80 and 100 and displayed on the Master Brief Sheets of Marines and kept in 
their official military personnel files. 
E.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
A Marine officer’s career begins with The Basic School. However, officer 
accession programs instill military culture, discipline and norms in individuals by varying 
degrees. Each accession program is unique and acculturates in different lengths and 
intensity. Although the accession program ends upon the commissioning of a graduate, 
the program may affect each graduate’s entire career.  
The promotion system has a highly significant role in the future career of officers. 
In addition to defining rules for selecting the most qualified officers for higher grades, the 
promotion system sets the foundation for continuation in the military profession. The 
Performance Evaluation System is the only tool for the Marine Corps to formally 
evaluate Marine officers. The new PES is designed to do this job more efficiently and 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior studies on officer performance have focused on various performance 
measures. Some studies have examined a set of performance measures that covered an 
entire period in an officers’ career, whereas others have focused on performance 
measured at one point of time. In this chapter, I will review some of these studies under 
three Marine officer performance criteria: performance at TBS; retention; and, 
promotion. Most of these prior studies have used various officer data sets. In the review, I 
will provide a summary of each study and include information on the focus of the 
research, the type of data and models used, the dependent and explanatory variables, and 
the results. 
A. PERFORMANCE AT TBS 
1. Study by North and Smith (December, 1993) 
In 1993, Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) published two studies that examined 
performance differences between white and minority junior officers. North and Smith 
looked at completion of Officer Candidate School, the possibility of commissioning, and 
performance at TBS in their second study (December, 1993). Their first study 
(November, 1993) is reviewed in the “Promotion” section of this chapter. 
North and Smith use a data set compiled from Automated Recruit Management 
System (ARMS), TBS, and Headquarters Master File (HMF). The merged file includes 
information on all officer accessions between FY 1988-1991. The sample contains 3,749 
records for officers from four fiscal year cohorts. Success at OCS is defined as 
completion of the course, while TBS overall class rank is used to evaluate success at 
TBS. The study also analyzes separate TBS class ranks in academics, leadership, and 
military skills.  
The dependent variable, overall class rank at TBS, was standardized for variations 
in class sizes. The class-standing percentile was included as a continuous variable in 
some models. Models of success at TBS include explanatory variables in five categories: 
(1) demographics; (2) educational background; (3) physical fitness and mental aptitude 
test scores; (4) exposure to the Marine Corps; and, (5) dummy variables for fiscal years. 
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The fiscal year dummies capture other unobserved factors across years. Exposure to the 
Marine Corps was modeled by dummy variables for prior enlisted service and officer 
accession program.  
North and Smith applied ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to explain the 
variation in the dependent variable. The first regression model explained 17 percent of 
the variation in the overall success at TBS. The results of the study reveal that ECP and 
USNA graduates are associated with higher overall class rank at TBS (compared to 
NROTC); the difference in class rank is 13 and seven percentage points for ECP and 
USNA graduates, respectively. On the other hand, the TBS class standing of OCC and 
PLC graduates is 10 to 11 percentage points below that of NROTC graduates.  Another 
significant predictor of success is prior Marine experience, which is associated with nine 
percentage points higher class standing at TBS. “Other service experience” is found to be 
statistically insignificant. Other significant variables that positively affect overall TBS 
class rank are SAT score, science and technical college majors, being married, aviation 
and law program participants. On the other hand, variables that are significantly 
associated with lower overall TBS success rate are minority status and being female.  
2. Study by Finley (2002) 
Finley (2002) examines the performance of Naval Academy graduates at TBS and 
focuses on the effects of different Marine-specific summer training programs required of 
Naval Academy graduates over time. Finley uses data on 1,655 male graduates from the 
Naval Academy classes of 1988 to 1999. Like the North and Smith study, overall class 
rank percentile is used as the dependent variable. 
Although the study focuses on USNA graduates only, it provides insight into the 
determinants of success at TBS. In his models, Finley includes demographic variables 
(age, race), academic background (academic major, Naval Academy order of merit), 
exposure to Marine Corps (prior enlisted service, whether parents served in the military 
or the Marine Corps), and other USNA-specific background characteristics as 
explanatory variables. 
The OLS regression models explain 39 to 43 percent of the variation in the TBS 
class rank. In the first model, which adds order of merit to other covariates, officers with 
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Marine prior enlisted service, technical major and higher order of merit percentiles are 
found to have higher probabilities of success at TBS. Finley finds that prior Marine Corps 
enlisted service is a strong predictor in both of his TBS performance models and prior 
enlisted Marines have 10.5 percentile points higher overall class ranking at TBS. Being in 
any minority group or having non-Marine prior enlisted service are associated with lower 
TBS class standing.  
B.  RETENTION  
Retention is defined as an individual officer’s voluntary decision to remain on 
active duty beyond his/her initial service obligation. Retention is a common success 
measure to evaluate the effectiveness of officer accession programs. The literature shows 
that commissioning source is a significant predictor of retention in the Marine Corps. 
Prior researchers have included retention models in their studies for two purposes: (1) as 
a success measure in officer career; and, (2) to correct for sample selection bias in 
promotion models.  
As a success measure, retention relates to human capital investment by the 
military: the longer an officer stays in the service, the greater the return on 
precommissioning training investments by the military. Since one goal is to increase the 
quality of the officer corps while reducing accession costs, it is critical to find the 
determinants of retention behavior. In such studies, retention is measured at certain points 
of an officer’s career; however, the point is to predict voluntary decisions. Hence, these 
studies remove from the sample all officers who leave for involuntary reasons such as for 
not being selected for augmentation or promotion to junior ranks, for failing basic 
professional courses or for health problems.  
On the other hand, sample selection bias is an issue in models of promotion to   
O-4 or higher. Sample selection bias occurs if the officers who leave before a promotion 
board are not a random sample of the original cohort. Put another way, if the promotion 
probabilities of those who leave (if they stayed) are more than or less than those of 
officers who stay, then the promotion model suffers from sample selection bias. To 
correct for such a problem, two techniques (bivariate probit with sample selection and 
Heckman two-step procedure) have been used. Both procedures involve a two-step 
procedure in which the first step involves estimating the determinants of survival. 
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Different from the retention definition, survival is preferred for such uses, as it does not 
differentiate between voluntary or involuntary leaving decisions. Survival models are not 
used to evaluate predicted retention effects of variables like commissioning source, but 
for the purpose of providing an identifying instrument in the main outcome (promotion) 
model. (See Wooldridge, 1999, pp. 557- 563). In the following paragraphs, I will review 
three studies where retention is studied for the first purpose, as a performance measure.  
1. Study by Hosek et al. (2001) 
In their study “Minority and Gender Differences in Officer Career Progression,” 
Hosek et al. investigate minority and female officers’ career development across the four 
Services. The focus of the study is to detect whether there are differences in accession, 
retention and promotion among officers in different racial, ethnic and gender groups. The 
study analyzes career progression as a series of retention and promotion outcomes. 
Retention models examine retention between O-1 and O-5 ranks. The section below 
discusses the models of retention to O-3 and O-4. The promotion models in the Hosek et 
al. study are reviewed below in the “promotion” section of this chapter.  
The data set used in the Hosek et al. study includes more than 76,000 officers who 
were commissioned in all four Services in one of the seven accession fiscal years 
beginning in 1967 and ending in 1991 (1967, 1970, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1987, 1991). The 
records for officers in professional occupations like medical, legal, and religious are 
removed from the file.  
Each retention outcome is defined and estimated conditional on survival to each 
career point. For example, retention during O-3 analyzes only those officers who made 
O-3. Other than the minority and gender variables, prior enlisted service, military service, 
accession source and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) variables are included in 
retention models. Accession sources are grouped into five major groups: Service 
Academies, ROTC scholarship, ROTC regular (non-scholarship,) OCS (OCC and PLC 
are grouped into this variable) and direct appointment. The retention model during O-3 
analyzes 25,028 officers from the 1977 and 1980 cohorts, whereas the sample size falls to 
17,556 in analyzing retention during O-4 for officers from the FY 1967, 1970 and, 1977 
cohorts.  
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In general, the retention models reveal that black male or female officers are more 
likely to stay in the service compared to white male officers except for retention at O-4, 
whereas white women are less likely to stay in the service compared to white male 
officers. The retention models reveal inconsistent outcomes at O-3 and O-4 grades in 
terms of the effects of accession source. At O-3, officers from ROTC non-scholarship 
program have the highest retention probability compared to Service Academies. 
Surprisingly, the O-3 retention model reveals that the four accession programs are 
positively associated with retention compared to Service Academies with the declining 
order of magnitude as follows: (1) ROTC regular; (2) Direct Appointment; (3) OCS; and, 
(4) ROTC scholarship. 
The O-4 retention model reveals that officers commissioned via ROTC regular or 
scholarship options are three to six percentage points more likely than Academy 
graduates to remain in service until the lieutenant colonel (O-5) promotion board. Other 
commissioning programs were negatively associated with retention during O-4 grade 
compared to Service Academies.  
Since the data set included observations from the four Services, the models 
included Service dummy variables. The Marine Corps is negatively associated with 
retention compared to Army in both retention models. In the O-3 retention model, the 
predicted retention rate for the Marine Corps is estimated to be the lowest among the four 
services. The coefficient for the Marine Corps is again negative in the O-4 retention 
model, but it is not statistically significant. Another significant predictor of retention at 
both ranks is prior enlisted service. However, the O-3 retention model reveals that 
officers with prior enlisted service are 14 percentage points more likely to stay compared 
to peers with no prior service, whereas the O-4 retention model finds that these officers 
are 16 percentage points less likely to stay in service until the O-5 promotion board.  The 
finding is not surprising when we consider that most of these officers reach the eligibility 
for retirement after making O-4.  
2. Study by North and Goldhaber (1995) 
This CNA study examined the extent and causes of racial-ethnic and gender 
differences in success throughout the careers of Marine officers. North and Goldhaber 
analyze three measures of success in a Marine officer’s career: (1) augmentation; (2) 
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promotion; and (3) retention. The retention models will be reviewed in the following 
paragraphs, while promotion to O-4 and O-5 models will be summarized in the 
promotion section of this chapter. The study uses an HMF longitudinal data file that is 
created by merging HMF file with TBS file and adding information from FY 1987 
through 1993 augmentation and promotion boards.  
To analyze retention, two models are used: retention to seven years of 
commissioned service (YCS) and retention from 7 YCS to 11 YCS. Again, officers who 
left involuntarily because of non-selection for promotion or augmentation are excluded 
from the sample. 2,818 observations from FY 1985-1987 cohorts are used in the retention 
to 7 YCS model, while 2,396 records are used in the 7 to 11 YCS retention model for FY 
1980-1983 cohorts.  
The dependent variable in the retention models is a dichotomous variable (1 if the 
officer voluntarily survives, 0 otherwise,) and logistic regression is used in the statistical 
analysis. Although the study focuses on minority and gender variables, marital status, 
physical fitness test score, GCT score, three performance measures at TBS (leadership, 
military, and academic class rank percentiles), college major MOS type, prior military 
service, and commissioning source (USNA, NROTC, OCC, PLC, MECEP, and ECP) are 
other covariates in the retention models.  
The survival to 7 YCS model explains 33 percent of the variation in retention and 
shows that  “… significant differences in retention are not by racial background or 
gender, but by commissioning source, occupational type, marital status, GCT score, and 
TBS leadership class rank” (North and Goldhaber, 1995, p. 52). The regression estimates 
also show that nearly all officers from the Naval Academy, NROTC and ECP voluntarily 
survive to 7 YCS. On the other hand, only about 80 percent of MECEP officers and fewer 
than 70 percent of OCC and PLC officers survive to the same point.   
The 7 to 11 YCS retention model explains 12 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable, and reveals that male officers are 20 percent more likely to remain 
than female officers. Other variables that are positively associated with survival are TBS 
leadership class rank, MOS type and two commissioning programs. The results reveal 
that of the officers who stayed to 7 YCS point, those from MECEP and OCC are more 
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than 10 percentage points more likely to remain in service to 11 YCS compared to those 
from USNA. The model estimates no significant difference between USNA and the other 
three commissioning sources (NROTC, ECP, and PLC.)  Finally, the results of both 
models indicate that TBS leadership class rank percentile is a very strong predictor of 
retention, whereas TBS academic and military skills class rank percentile variables do not 
explain retention significantly. The predicted retention rate to 7 YCS for Marines having 
the lowest TBS leadership class rank percentile is 15 percentage points less than those 
who rank at the top of their class. The difference between the same groups is 13 
percentage points for retention to 11 YCS. 
3. Study by O’Brien (2002) 
O’Brien examines the Marine Corps officer accession programs and analyzes 
their impact on retention in his thesis. He looks at two milestones during careers of 
officer: (1) retention to the 10th year of service and (2) retention until retirement 
eligibility. O’Brien uses the Marine Corps Commissioned Officer Accession Career 
(MCCOAC) data file for his quantitative analysis. The study analyzes 5,712 male Marine 
officers from FY 1980, 1983, 1986, and 1989 TBS cohorts in the 10-year retention 
analysis. Women and MCP participant officers are excluded because of their insufficient 
sample sizes. Explanatory variables are grouped under four categories: demographic, 
TBS, commissioning source, and service background information.  
Using logistic regression techniques, O’Brien finds that four of the six accession 
programs, marital status, MOS group, and TBS graduation group (TBS thirds) are 
statistically significant in explaining officer retention until 10th year of service. The 
regression estimates indicate that the PLC and OCC programs are negatively associated 
with 10-year officer retention, whereas the MECEP program has a positive and 
significant association with retention (compared to USNA).   
The study validates the North and Goldhaber study (1995) by indicating the 
importance of TBS performance on officer retention. The 10-year retention model results 
show that Marines who graduate in the top third group of their classes at TBS are more 
likely to stay until both the 10th year and the retirement eligibility point compared to the 
middle third group of officers. Finally, married officers and officers in the combat MOS 
40 
group are more likely to stay to 10 YCS than those who are not married and those in the 
combat service support group, respectively.     
C. PROMOTION  
Many prior researches have studied officer promotion in the military as a 
conventional measure of performance. In such studies, the dependent variable is usually a 
binary variable that equals 1 if the individual officer is promoted to the grade the study 
analyzes.9 Depending on the size of the data file, promotion to O-2 through O-6 grades 
has been included in promotion models, although O-3, O-4, and O-5 promotion models 
are the most common. Promotion models have included a vast array of variables on the 
right hand side of the equations. However, focus variables normally include one of the 
following three: (1) minority or gender; (2) postgraduate education; (3) performance 
evaluation scores. All studies, on the other hand, have included prior enlisted service and 
officer accession programs to incorporate the degree of military exposure into the 
models. This section reviews prior promotion studies that use one of the focus variables 
listed above. 
1.  Study by North and Smith (November, 1993) 
The first study that focuses on minority and gender variables in promotion models 
is the North and Smith (1993) study introduced under the “Performance at TBS” section 
of this chapter. The authors used the TBS longitudinal file that includes records of FY 
1980 through 1991 officer cohorts.  The data file was merged with Marine Corps FY 
1984-1993 captain and FY 1992-1993 major promotion board results that included 
officers who were in-zone for promotion to O-3 and O-4.  
The promotion models include demographic characteristics (race, gender, age and 
marital status at accession, GCT score, engineering college major, years of service, prior 
military service), MOS type (four groups), accession sources (USNA, NROTC, 
PLC/OCC, MECEP, ECP, other sources) and promotion board year information as 
                                                 
9 In the literature, the promotion variable is generally defined in two different ways depending on the 
data set collected by the researchers. The first definition is via use of in-zone promotion board results and 
dependent variable ‘select’ is assigned 1 if the individual is promoted from the in-zone population. These 
studies omit above- or below-zone promotions which, the researchers find, do not bias the coefficients. The 
second group uses longitudinal data sets and defines promotion looking at the separation data file or the 
latest current record in HMF at the data collection date. Then, the ‘select’ or ‘promote’ dependent variable 
is assigned 1 if the individual officer has promoted to the relevant grade. 
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explanatory variables. The O-3 promotion model analyzes 10,836 officers, while 1094 
records were used for the O-4 promotion analysis. 
The O-3 promotion model results show that USNA has the largest positive effect 
on promotion; NROTC, and ECP follow USNA as the middle group; PLC/OCC, MECEP 
and other accession sources have the lowest promotion rates. The O-4 promotion model 
reveals somewhat similar results: PLC/OCC and ECP are associated with lower 
promotion probabilities compared with other four accession sources. The regression 
results also show that being married at the accession point increases promotion to O-3 
and O-4. In both models, GCT score, prior military service (Marine Corps or other 
service) and gender are found to be insignificant factors in explaining promotion. 
However, officers from minority groups are estimated to have lower O-3 promotion rates 
compared to whites, whereas race/ethnicity is insignificant in the O-4 promotion model.  
To correct for sample selection bias the authors used a bivariate probit model with 
sample selection correction. In this technique, the first equation explains survival to be in 
zone for promotion to each grade (O-3 or O-4). Then, the ‘rho’ factor derived from the 
survival models is included in the promotion models; ‘rho’ estimates the correlation 
between the error terms in the survival and promotion models. The estimated rho term is 
significant and positive in both models, indicating that the results of single-stage probit 
promotion models to captain and major would provide biased results. A positive rho term 
also shows that officers who did not stay to the promotion point would have a lower 
predicted promotion rate had they remained in service. 
2. Study by North and Goldhaber (1995)  
In the promotion models of their study, North and Goldhaber analyze promotion 
to captain, major and lieutenant colonel promotion board results for FY 1987 through 
1993 (for promotion to major they used the FY 1989-1993 board results). For the purpose 
of this study, I will review the promotion models for major and lieutenant colonel. 
The promotion to major (O-4) model includes 2,894 observations for officers 
commissioned between FY 1977 and 1982 who were considered in-zone at the FY 1989 
through 1993 O-4 promotion boards. The model includes personal characteristics (race, 
gender, FCT score, marital status at 10 YCS, prior enlisted service,) commissioning 
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source (USNA, NROTC, PLC, OCC, MECEP, ECP, other commissioning source), 
academic and leadership class rank percentiles, MOS type group, and whether the 
officer’s occupation is in short supply (as stated in the precept for the promotion board). 
The authors use both simple probit and bivariate probit (with sample selection) to 
estimate promotion.  
The models explain six percent of the variation in promotion to major variable. 
Three factors are founds to be significant predictors of promotion: racial-ethnic 
background, TBS leadership class rank percentile, and MOS type. The models reveal that 
TBS leadership performance is the most important predictor of promotion to major. The 
predicted promotion probability of a captain with the highest leadership percentile is 35 
percentage points higher than a captain with the lowest percentile. The predicted 
promotion probability between the top and bottom performers in academics is 10 
percentage points. The only significant accession sources are ECP and “other sources,” 
which are negatively associated with promotion (compared to USNA). However, after 
controlling for commissioning sources, prior military service is not significant.  Black 
officers are less likely to be promoted, all else equal. Married officers at 10 years of 
commissioned service are more likely to be promoted. Finally, the rho term is not 
significant in the bivariate probit model, indicating that there is no sample selection bias 
in simple probit coefficients.  
The O-5 promotion (lieutenant colonel) model analyzes 1,769 individuals from 
FY 1971 through late 1970s. Simple probit regression is used because of missing 
information at the accession point. The model explains 10 % of the variation in 
promotion to lieutenant colonel. Including the same variables used in the major 
promotion model, the simple probit regression reveals that two types of variables have a 
significant impact on promotion to O-5. First, as in the major promotion model, TBS 
performance, especially leadership class rank percentile, positively and significantly 
impacts promotion to O-5 probability. Second, all commissioning sources, except 
NROTC, are negatively associated with promotion compared to USNA.  Officers from 
the Naval Academy and NROTC have predicted promotion rates that are 30 percentage 
points higher than those from ECP and more than 40 percentage points higher than 
officers from MECEP. Officers with prior military service who graduated from MECEP 
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and ECP programs may be eligible for retirement at this point. The authors comment that 
this may lower these officers’ motivation or it may affect the promotion board members’ 
decision. Unlike the O-4 promotion results, race and gender variables are not significant 
in the O-5 promotion model.  
The authors conclude that after controlling for officer characteristics, occupation, 
and commissioning source, many of the differences related to race disappear. Only 
“other” minorities (other than Black and Hispanic) have significantly lower augmentation 
rates compared to whites. Both blacks and other minorities have lower O-3 promotion 
probabilities, and blacks have lower O-4 promotion probabilities. The study finds no 
statistical differences between minority and majority groups in promotion to lieutenant 
colonel or in retention. 
3. Study by Hosek et al. (2001) 
The retention models of the study by Hosek et. al were introduced above in the 
retention section. The promotion models of the study examine promotion to O-2 through 
O-6 using a joint data file (including the four Services). The O-4 and O-5 promotion 
models are reviewed below.  
Promotion models include minority and gender variables, prior enlisted service, 
service branch (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps), accession source (Service 
Academies, ROTC scholarship, ROTC regular (non-scholarship), OCS, and direct 
appointment), and MOS dummy variables. The O-4 promotion model analyzes 16,176 
individuals from FY 1977 and 1980 cohorts. The logistic regression estimates of O-4 
promotion shows that all accession sources are negatively associated with promotion 
probabilities compared to service academies, all else being constant. However, the 
coefficient for ROTC scholarship is not significant, meaning that there is no significant 
difference between ROTC scholarship and academy graduates. On the other hand, OCS 
(includes OCC and PLC in the study) has the highest negative coefficient, and the 
predicted promotion rates for OCS graduates is almost 10 percentage points less than 
officers from the service academies. Minorities, the FY 1980 cohort, engineering and 
administration MOS groups are other variables that have lower promotion probabilities in 
the O-4 promotion model. Prior enlisted service and the Marine Corps are not statistically 
significant.   
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The O-5 promotion model analyzes 10,619 officers from FY 1967 and FY 1970 
cohorts. The logistic regression estimates find results in terms of the signs and 
significance of the explanatory variables that are similar to the O-4 promotion model. 
Again, except for the NROTC scholarship program, the other three accession sources in 
the model are negatively associated with promotion to O-5 compared to service 
academies. Graduates of OCS and direct commissioning programs have a 15 percentage 
points lower predicted promotion probabilities to O-5 compared to service academies, all 
else equal. The results also show that officers with prior enlisted service, black officers, 
and officers with engineering and administration MOSs are less likely to be promoted to 
O-5.  
Having focused on minority and gender differences in the military services, the 
study concludes that after controlling for prior enlisted service, accession program, MOS 
type, military service and cohort group, black men and women are more likely to stay in 
the service between promotions, but are less likely to be promoted throughout their 
careers. 
The following four studies also examined officer promotion in the Marine Corps. 
Unlike the CNA and RAND studies, though, these studies evaluate only promotion as a 
performance measure at certain career points, rather than throughout the career. However, 
common to all four studies is the inclusion of an index derived from fitness report records 
of officers. The definition of the Performance Index (PI) varies among the studies, but its 
inclusion as an explanatory variable in promotion models generally improves the 
significance of other variables.  
In his “Analysis of Promotion Data for Junior Navy and Marine Corps Officers,” 
Mehay (1995) studies various indicators of early career experiences and performance for 
junior Navy and Marine Corps officers. The study focuses on Unrestricted Line (URL) 
Navy officer communities and on differences between minority and majority officers. In 
the Marine Corps promotion analysis, the author analyzes promotion to O-4 using a data 
file consisting of Marine Corps O-4 promotion board results for FY 1993 and 1994. The 
promotion data file is then merged with OMF and master brief sheet data file to 
incorporate personal information and performance evaluations. 
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The USMC promotion model includes minority status, postgraduate degree, 
personal decorations, commissioning type (reserve or regular), accession source (USNA, 
NROTC, OCS, MECEP), the Performance Index (PI), MOS type, and GCT scores as 
explanatory variables. Mehay creates a Performance Index using the master brief sheet 
record, which provides a summary of a Marine’s performance evaluation records and is 
used in the personnel management process. Seven performance traits under section B, 
item 13 of performance characteristics, and 14 quality blocks under section B, item 14 of 
professional qualities in fitness report are assigned values from a low of 1 to a high of 6. 
Total scores of item 13 and 14 are divided by the number of observed marks, and one 
score for each quality measure (13 and 14) is obtained. Summing these two scores 
provides the performance index score, which ranges from 1 to 12. The Performance 
Index is broken into three groups to show top, medium, and low performance groups, and 
then incorporated into the promotion model as three binary variables. Another 
performance indicator, number of personal decorations, is derived from Master Brief 
Sheet records.  
Using 1,477 observations, the probit promotion model reveals that inclusion of 
performance evaluations into the promotion model renders black and USNA 
commissioning program binary variables insignificant, which are significant before such 
inclusion. Performance Index coefficients show consistent and significant positive effect 
on promotion. Mehay indicates the role of indirect association between minority and 
performance index. Cautioning that the result is based on promotion to one grade, and 
includes promotion outcomes for only two years, Mehay explains this indirect association 
…lower promotion outcome is due almost entirely to these differences in 
background characteristics, such as GCT scores, or to prior performance, 
such as the fitness report performance index, rather than to differences 
associated directly with race  (Mehay, 1995, p. 27) . 
Using another model for Navy URL officers that includes a similar Performance Index as 
a dependent variable, he shows that the negative association between minority and 
performance index is significant even after adjusting for other background variables 
(GPA, technical major, MOS Type.) He concludes that promotion models that omit 
variables correlated with minority status (but that include minority variables) will suffer 
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from omitted variable bias. In such cases, since the correlation between minority status 
and performance index is negative, the coefficients of the minority variable will be biased 
downward. 
Estridge (1995) focuses on the effect of postgraduate education from Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS) on promotion to major and lieutenant colonel in the Marine 
Corps. He merges Marine Corps FY 1993 and 1994 O-4 and O-5 promotion board data 
with OMF and master brief sheet data. “Captains in-zone for promotion to O-4 data file” 
includes 1,521 records, whereas “majors in-zone for promotion to O-5 data set” has 1,453 
records. 
As defined in the CNA study (November, 1993), Estridge assigns the “promoted” 
variable 1 if the individual was promoted in the in-zone group and omits below- and 
above-zone promotions. Multivariate logistic regression is used to examine the impact of 
graduate education at NPS, and includes gender, race, commissioning type, 
commissioning source, MOS type, GCT score, awards, performance index and graduate 
education as explanatory variables. He uses a performance index incorporating 
performance and quality marks from fitreps, as Mehay does, in which he categorizes 
officers into high, medium and low performance groups. 
The results of the regression models show that the Performance Index, GCT 
score, personal decorations, pilot and service support MOS types, and regular 
commissions all positively impact promotion to O-4. NPS graduates have promotion rates 
that are 15 percentage points higher than non-NPS graduates. In terms of accession 
sources, USNA is positively associated with promotion compared to OCC/PLC 
programs, while NROTC and other commissioning sources are negatively associated.  
The O-5 promotion models delineate similar results in terms of performance 
index, NPS graduates, and rewards. NPS graduates have a six-percentage point greater 
likelihood of selection to O-5 than other majors who did not graduate from NPS. In 
addition to USNA, NROTC graduates also have higher promotion probabilities to O-5 
compared to OCC/PLC graduates. However, the regression models that do not include 
the Performance Index variable show conflicting results.  In these models, Estridge finds 
that OCC/PLC is correlated with higher promotion rates compared to USNA, NROTC, 
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and other sources, which is exactly opposite to what Mehay’s O-4 promotion model 
finds. The promotion to O-5 model also finds that the differences between accession 
programs increase after the Performance Index is omitted from the model.10  However, in 
both models the Performance Index variables yield consistent and significant coefficients. 
Estridge asserts that the strongest and most consistent indicator of selection is above-
average performance.  
Lastly, the studies by Wielsma (1996) and Branigan (2001) attempted to analyze 
the factors associated with promotion to O-4 and O-5, respectively. Focusing on the 
effect of graduate education like Estridge, both studies include a Performance Index into 
their promotion models, although the way PI is created is different in the two studies. 
Also, both studies acknowledge the importance of possible sample selection bias in 
promotion models, and apply statistical techniques to correct it, which was omitted in 
Estridge study. 
Wielsma uses DMDC data merged with Marine Corps fitness report file, HMF, 
and official military personnel files (OMPF) for 1,087 Marine officers who accessed 
during FY 1980. He includes explanatory variables under four groups: performance 
measures - average performance index; cognitive skills - GCT, TBS class rank, graduate 
degree; affective traits -commissioning source, MOS type, commissioning type; and, 
demographic traits - age at entry, race, gender, and military skills. The Performance 
Index definition differs from that in the Mehay and Estridge studies in two ways. First, in 
addition to 21 professional characteristics in section B of fitness report, he includes item 
15 grades on “General Value to the Service.” Second, he uses a different scale to convert 
performance markings into numeric values. The individual scores of the 22 quality 
markings are summed, and the total is divided by the number of observed marks to obtain 
an average performance score that ranges between 0 to 9.  
Wielsma uses the Heckman two-stage regression technique to correct possible 
sample selection bias. In the first stage of Heckman procedure, he uses a simple probit 
model to analyze retention to O-4 promotion board point for 1,087 officers representing 
all accessions in FY1980 cohort. In the second stage, he uses OLS regression keeping 
                                                 
10 Also, note that Estridge does not include standard errors or t-statistics of regression coefficients. 
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only 455 individuals who remained in service till the promotion board convening date. 
He includes all variables from the first stage retention model except for the 
unemployment rate, which serves as an instrumental variable. The Inverse Mills ratio is 
derived from the retention model and included in the promotion model (See Wooldridge 
1999, p. 561). 
The results of the OLS second stage promotion model show that ROTC, USNA 
and enlisted commissioning program graduates are less likely to be promoted than PLC 
program graduates. The model also finds a confounding negative coefficient for a 
graduate degree, marital status, and average performance index variables, which means 
married officers, officers with graduate degree or a higher performance index are less 
likely to be promoted to O-4. The sign of the inverse Mills ratio is negative, and it is 
statistically significant. This suggests that officers leaving before O-4 promotion board 
point have lower promotion probabilities, and do not constitute a random sample of 
surviving officers. 
Finally, Branigan (2001) conducts a study similar to Wielsma’s, but he analyzes 
promotion to O-5. He uses Marine Corps FY 1998-2001 O-5 promotion board results for 
1,627 Marine officers commissioned in FY 1980 through 1984. The size of the entry 
cohort is 6,507. To address sample selection bias in the promotion model Branigan uses 
both the two-stage Heckman procedure and the bivariate probit model with sample 
selection. He uses the same categorization for explanatory variables as Wilesma; 
however, he groups all accession sources into only three categories: USNA, NROTC, and 
others. The performance index is defined similar to that in the Wielsma study, but he uses 
21 performance and leadership trait grades from fitreps received at the ranks of O-1 
through O-3.  
In the first stages of the two-step models, Branigan includes the unemployment 
rate as an instrumental variable. The dependent variable in these models is either graduate 
education or survival to O-5 promotion point (at roughly 16 years of service) and sample 
size is 6,507. In the second stage, he estimates promotion probabilities for 1,627 
surviving officers, incorporating the “rho” or the “inverse Mills ratio” variables from the 
first stage models. 
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The results of his bivariate probit model with sample selection for the joint 
probability of survival and promotion show that graduate degree, personal awards, 
performance index, commissioning age, and aviation related MOSs are significant 
variables that positively impact promotion to O-5, whereas the effect of being male is 
negative. The results of the model do not find any significant difference among the three 
accession sources. 
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature review finds that different performance measures are used to 
evaluate officer career development. Of these measures, performance at TBS, retention 
and promotion are conventional success measures used widely by previous researchers. 
On the other hand, prior studies have focused on one of the three explanatory variables in 
their models: minority and gender, graduate education, performance index. The 
professional research institutes, like CNA or RAND, have generally studied the effects of 
gender and minority variables on the selected performance criteria, whereas individual 
researchers chose graduate education or the performance index as focus variables. In 
almost all studies, however, prior enlisted service and officer accession programs have 
been consistently included in models to reflect the effects of military acculturation.  
The literature finds that performance at TBS is a very significant predictor of both 
retention and promotion of Marine officers. The only study that examines TBS 
performance where all accession programs are included is by North and Smith 
(December, 1993). They find that ECP and USNA are the two accession sources that 
positively impact success at TBS.  Prior Marine Corps enlisted experience is the other 
predictor of success, which is positively associated with higher overall success rates. 
In terms of retention and promotion success factors, the results of prior regression 
estimates do not favor any specific accession program consistently. It is also noteworthy 
to say that retention is measured at different times of an officer’s career; hence, 
comparing outcomes is not possible. However, the literature finds strong and positive 
correlation between success at TBS and later retention. As the North and Goldhaber study 
(1995) explains, overall leadership GPA is an important predictor of retention. Another 
important predictor of retention is prior enlisted service. Officers with prior enlisted 
experience are more likely to stay until the retirement eligibility point, which entails at 
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least 10 years of service as an officer. Prior service impacts retention behavior negatively 
after this point, which corresponds to retention to lieutenant colonel board.      
Finally, promotion models reveal that accession program and TBS performance 
are significant promotion determinants. Some studies favor USNA and NROTC 
programs as predictors that positively impact promotion to O-4 and O-5 grades. Adding a 
Performance Index based on fitness reports into promotion models increase the 
explanatory power of the models, but may yield inconsistent coefficients for other 
variables like accession program or graduate degree. 
What can be inferred from these studies is that USMC officers having greater 
military exposure before commissioning are expected to be more successful at TBS. 
Furthermore, TBS performance is a very strong predictor of retention and promotion, 
bringing in an indirect effect of military exposure on these career success outcomes. 
Moreover, a Performance Index based on fitness reports is very significant in explaining 
retention and promotion. However, no study has studied the effect of military exposure 
before commissioning on the performance index itself, i.e., using the performance index 
as a dependent variable.  
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IV. DATA AND PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
This chapter describes the data and the samples used in the statistical analyses, 
provides descriptions of the dependent and explanatory variables used in the models, and 
presents basic descriptive statistics. The purpose of the preliminary analysis is to evaluate 
the seven Marine Corps accession programs in terms of five performance measures: 
performance at TBS; retention to 10 YCS; promotion to O-4 and O-5; and a Performance 
Index based on officer fitness reports.  
A. DATA 
The officer career models use three different data sets: (1) the Marine Corps 
Commissioned Officer Accession Career (MCCOAC) data file; (2) the old fitness report 
file; and, (3) the new fitness report file. The data sets are merged matching the SSNs of 
each individual.  Some variables that are missing in these files are obtained from DMDC 
and Marine Corps Headquarters.  
1. MCCOAC Data Set  
Prepared by CNA, the MCCOAC file is an event-based file derived from 
longitudinal officer data sets. It includes 28,058 observations from cohorts for FY 1980 





























Figure 4.1. Cohort Size by Year. 
 
Information on TBS students contains GPA and class standings for academic, 
military and leadership performance as well as an overall GPA and class standing. Other 
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TBS information includes three PMOS preferences by officers at TBS, class size, and 
TBS fiscal year. Demographic information comes either from the first HMF file when an 
individual is recorded as an officer or from the last HMF record at an enlisted rank. 
Segments from HMF file include augmentation and promotion information. Such 
information provides date of action, reporting unit and monitored command codes, 
geographic location, and rifle, pistol and PFT qualification. Individual information that 
may change over time such as marital status, number of dependents, pay grade, and MOS 
are also updated at augmentation and at each grade between O-1 and O-5. Since the 
MCCOAC uses HMF to obtain promotion information, promotion records do not include 
below- and above-zone promotions as well as in-zone promotions. The last HMF records 
as of 30 September 2000 or separation records from the ARSTAT file provide the last 
career point at which each individual is observed.  
Since CNA could not obtain HMF records before 1985, the MCCOAC file is 
missing some demographic and accession source information on officers who left the 
Marine Corps before the first HMF began in 1985. For example, TBS military GPA and 
class standing information are missing for TBS classes of FY 1980 through 1982  (4,089 
observations).  However, CNA recovered some of this missing information from another 
data set (Quester and Hiatt, 2001).  
2. Old Fitness Report Data File 
The old fitness report file includes information on more than 1.3 million fitness 
reports submitted between 1951 and 1998. Figure 4.2 presents the distribution of these 
records across the submission years. The data set includes 48,306 Marine officers in 
grades O-1 to O-8. The file provides information on reporting senior (RS) markings for 
the 20 items in section B of fitness report (See Appendix A, Old Fitness Report). Each 
observation also contains information on the Marine Reported On (MRO), the reporting 
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Figure 4.2. The Distribution of Old Fitness Reports Across Years. 
 
3. New Fitness Report Data File 
The new fitness report file includes information derived from 52,366 fitness 
reports submitted between 1998 and 2001. Figure 4.3 presents the distribution of these 
records across the four submission years. Since the new fitness report was officially in 
effect after 1999, only 57 new fitreps were submitted in 1998. The end date of the file is 
August 2001. The file includes fitness report evaluations of the 17,436 Marine officers 
between O-1 through O-6 grades. It provides reporting senior evaluations on 14 traits in 
Section D through Section H of the new fitreps. (See Appendix B, New Fitness Report). 
Each observation also provides information on MRO, RS, and RO. Each officer in the 
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Figure 4.3. The Number of New Fitness Reports Across Years. 
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B. SAMPLES USED IN STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Each performance model uses a different officer sample. There are two main 
reasons why sample sizes differ across models. First, each performance measure 
examines the officer’s career at a different point of time. As of 30 September 2000, some 
cohorts in the data set had not reached the career stage covered by a given performance 
measure. For example, while 28,058 observations were available with TBS information, 
only 6,693 observations were available for analysis at the O-5 promotion point. Figure 
4.4 gives a general idea of which cohorts are available for each performance model. 
Second, not all observations have valid records for all the variables contained in the data 
set. Therefore, observations with missing values for the variables used in each model are 
also deleted.  
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Figure 4.4. YCS by Commissioning FY Cohorts. 
Each sample is described below, followed by the introduction of the variables used in the 
analyses.  
1. The Sample for the TBS Performance Model 
The analysis of TBS performance uses observations from the 20 cohorts 
commissioned between 1980 and 1999. The initial sample includes 28,058 observations 
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for officers who attended TBS during these years. The MCCOAC file categorizes 
accession programs into eight categories, the eighth being “other accession programs.” 
For the purpose of the study, 72 officers in the “other” category are deleted. As table 4.1 
illustrates, 355 observations were deleted because of missing accession source record; 82 
observations were deleted because their overall class standing ranks exceeded their class 
sizes, which presumably is because the officers were set back to the following class. 
Finally, 17 observations are deleted due to missing values for the other explanatory 
variables. However, the sample size falls to 23,440 in analyzing TBS Military class rank 
because 4,403 observations (TBS FY 1980 to 1982 cohorts) are missing military overall 
class rank information in the MCCOAC file.  
 
Table 4.1. The Sample for TBS Performance Models. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Entry 
Cohort 
TBS FY 1980-1999 Cohort 28,058 100.00 
- “Other Commissioning Sources” deleted        72 0.26 
- Cases missing “Commissioning Source” deleted      355 1.27 
- Cases having class standing values greater than the 
class size deleted 
       82 0.29 
- Cases missing other data used in the models deleted.        17 0.06 
  The analysis sample size 27,532 98.13 
 
2. The Sample for the 10 YCS Retention Model 
The 10 YCS retention model analyzes officers who accessed between FY 1980 
and 1990. Table 4.2 explains the steps taken to create the analysis data set. The initial 
sample consists of 16,667 cases. First, 320 observations are deleted because they are 
either missing commissioning source data or graduated from ‘other sources; 8,649 
observations left the military before reaching the 120 months of commissioning service 
point.  Since retention is defined as “the voluntary survival behavior of an individual 
officer after initial service obligation,” 2,609 officers who left involuntarily because of 
health problems, failure in basic training, or failure of promotion to O-2 and O-3 are 
deleted. The 34 observations with class ranks greater than the class sizes and five 
observations from the MCP program are deleted, as are 478 observations with missing 




Table 4.2. The Sample for the 10 YCS Retention Model. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Entry 
Cohort 
 FY 1980-1990 Cohort 16,667 100.00 
- Cases missing “Commissioning Source” deleted      320 1.92 
- Officers who left involuntarily deleted    2,609 15.65 
- Cases having class standing values greater than the 
class size deleted. 
        34  0.20 
- Insufficient number of MCP participants deleted           5   0.03 
- Cases missing other data used in the models deleted       478 2.87 
The analysis sample size   13,222 79.32 
 
3. The Sample for the O-4 Promotion Model 
The promotion to O-4 analysis includes the same 11 cohorts accessed between FY 
1980 and 1990 that were used in the retention sample. Table 4.3 explains the observations 
deleted from the original sample. 320 observations were deleted due to missing 
commissioning source data, as were 56 observations with class standing values greater 
than their class sizes, and five officers from the MCP program. After another 661 
observations are deleted because of other missing information, the final data set included 
15,627 officers who graduated from six accession programs.  
The MCCOAC file does not include promotion board results. However, the data 
set includes “time_O4” variable, which defines the number of months to O-4 date of 
rank. It is possible to determine the O-4 promotion cycle of each cohort using this 
variable. Over the years, the promotion time to O-4 fell from 144 months to 113 months. 
Using “time_O4” for each cohort, time to O-4 board is calculated by subtracting a 
reasonable period from the time that the first group of each cohort promoted to O-4 (to 
reflect the time between the convening date of the promotion board and promotion of the 
first group of officers considered by the board). This calculation shows that 7,281 officers 
out of 15,627 survived to the O-4 board. Of these 7,281 officers, 5,351 were promoted to 




Table 4.3. The Sample for the O-4 Promotion Model. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Entry 
Cohort 
FY 1980-1990 Cohort 16,667 100.00 
- Cases missing “Commissioning Source” deleted      320 1.92 
- Cases having class standing values greater than the 
class size deleted. 
       56 0.34 
- Insufficient number of MCP participants omitted          5     0.03        
- Cases missing other data used in the models 
deleted. 
     661 3.97 
  The first-step survival analysis sample size 15,627 93.76 
 Officers who survived to O-4 Board   7,281 43.69     
The second-step promotion analysis sample size   7,281  
 Officers who are promoted to O-4   5,351 32.11        
 
4. The Sample for the O-5 Promotion Model 
As Figure 4.4 above illustrated, only officers accessed between FY 1980 and 1983 
are included in the O-5 promotion analysis. Table 4.4 below explains which observations 
were deleted from the original sample. The first-step survival analysis sample consists of 
5,954 cases.  The survivors are calculated in the same way as survivors to the O-4 board, 
but using the “time_O5” variable. Over the years, time to O-5 promotion fell from 207 
months for the FY 1980 cohort to 198 months for the FY 1983 cohort. The calculation 
yields 1,785 survivors to the O-5 promotion board. Of these, 1,206 Marines are promoted 
to O-5. The overall promotion rate is 18.02 percent for the entry cohort.   
 
Table 4.4. The Sample for the O-5 Promotion Model. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Entry 
Cohort 
FY 1980-1983 Cohort   6,693 100.00 
- Cases missing “Commissioning Source” deleted      290 4.33 
- Cases having class standing values greater than the 
class size deleted. 
       49 0.73 
- Insufficient number of MCP participants omitted         5      0.0075            
- Cases missing other data used in the models 
deleted. 
     408 6.10 
The first-step survival analysis sample size   5,954 88.96 
 Officers who survived to O-5 Board   1,785 26.67     
The second-step promotion analysis sample size   1,785  
 Officers who are promoted to O-5   1,206 18.02        
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5. The Samples for the Performance Index (PI) Models 
Since the old and the new fitness reports are different in terms of both the traits 
used in evaluations and the grading scale, two different indexes are created.  The creation 
of the Performance Index variable is explained in the “variable introduction” section of 
this chapter. The PI models analyze fitreps received at each grade from second lieutenant 
(O1) through major (O4), because higher-ranking officers are expected to have better 
fitreps. Table 4.5 explains the sample sizes for each model. Each sample includes the 
officer’s Performance Index averages derived from his/her fitness reports at each grade 
and other explanatory variables that are matched with SSNs.  
 
Table 4.5. The Sample Sizes for the Old Fitrep PI Models. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Total Cases 
O-1 Performance Index Sample    
FY 1980-1997 Cohort size 25,617 100.0 
Number of observations matched with observed fitness reports  20,994 81.87 
The analysis sample size 19,559 76.35 
O-2 Performance Index Sample   
FY 1980-1995 Cohort size 22,992  
Number of officers who made O-2 in FY 1980 –1995 cohorts 22,393 100.00 
Number of observations matched with observed fitness reports 22,069 98.47 
The analysis sample size 21,261 94.95 
O-3 Performance Index Sample   
FY 1980-1990 Cohort size 16,347  
Number of officers who made O-3 in FY 1980 - 1990 cohorts 11,966 100.00 
Number of observations matched with observed fitness reports 10,616 88.72 
The analysis sample size 10,507 87.81 
O-4 Performance Index Model    
FY 1980-1983 Cohort size    6,693  
Number of officers who made O-4 in FY 1980 - 1983 cohorts    2,016 100.00 
Number of observations matched with observed fitness reports    1,954 96.92 
The analysis sample size    1,950 96.73 
 
The new fitness report data include the majority of the fitreps submitted in 1999 
and 2000. It is not possible to create the Performance Index in a way that covers certain 
periods before any promotion point as is done with the old fitreps. Some cohorts were O-
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2 during this period, whereas others were O-5’s. Therefore, the new fitrep sample 
includes observations from all cohorts who were on active duty between 1998 and 2001, 
and received a performance evaluation via the new fitreps. The models use the average 
Performance Index at each grade (O-1 through O-4) during this period. Table 4.6 
explains the sample size for each model. The analysis sample sizes are fewer than the 
number of observations matched because of missing records for the explanatory variables 
used in the models.  
 
Table 4.6. The Sample Sizes for the New Fitrep PI Models. 
Explanation Number Percent of the Total Cases 
O-1Performance Index Sample    
Number of observations having observed O-1 fitreps  2,346 100.00 
Number of individuals matched with observed fitness reports 2,151 91.69 
The analysis sample size 1,906 81.25 
O-2 Performance Index Sample   
Number of observations having observed O-2 fitreps  3,806 100.00 
Number of individuals matched with observed fitness reports 3,700 97.22 
The analysis sample size 3,527 92.67 
O-3 Performance Index Sample   
Number of observations having observed O-3 fitreps  5,798 100.00 
Number of individuals matched with observed fitness reports 5,477 94.46 
The analysis sample size 5,317 91.70 
O-4 Performance Index Model    
Number of observations having observed O-4 fitreps     4,620 100.00 
Number of individuals matched with observed fitness reports    4,349 94.13 
The analysis sample size   4,311 93.31 
 
C. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
The performance models include one or more dependent variables used in the 
statistical analysis. For each model, description of the dependent variables is presented 
separately in the following section. The explanatory variables are discussed as a group in 
the next section. Depending on the performance measure used, the models will include all 
or some of the selected explanatory variables. 
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1. The Dependent Variables  
a. The TBS Performance Model 
The TBS performance models analyze four different success measures at 
TBS: overall, academic, military, and leadership class standings. As explained in the TBS 
section of Chapter II, overall class standing includes the academic, military and 
leadership evaluation criteria. To adjust for the differences in class size, class-standing 
percentiles are calculated:   
Class Standing Percentile = (1- (Class Standing/ Class Size)) *100 
Class standing percentile is a continuous variable with a range between 0 and 100. Higher 
numbers indicate a higher class standing. Table 4.7 summarizes definitions of the TBS 
performance variables. 
 
Table 4.7. Dependent Variables Used in the TBS Models. 
Variable Description Variable Name Variable Type Range 
TBS Overall Class Standing Percentile TBSperc Continuous 0-100 
TBS Academic Class Standing Percentile TBSacperc Continuous 0-100 
TBS Military Class Standing Percentile TBSmilperc Continuous 0-100 
TBS Leadership Class Standing Percentile TBSleadperc Continuous 0-100 
 
b. The 10 YCS Retention Model 
The dependent variable used in the retention model is a dichotomous 
variable to represent whether the officer remained in the Marine Corps until the 10th year 
of service. This variable is obtained using “num_mon” variable in the MCCOAC file, 
which shows the number of months served since the date of commissioning. As Table 4.8 
shows, after omitting the observations that left involuntarily, the “Retained_10YCS” 
dependent variable equals ‘1’ if the observation has more than 119 months of 
commissioning service and ‘0’ otherwise.    
 
Table 4.8. Dependent Variables Used in the 10 YCS Retention Model. 
Variable Description Variable Name Variable Type Range 
Retention to 10 YCS Retained_10YCS Binary = 1 if ‘num_mon’ ≥ 120 = 0 otherwise  
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c. The O-4 and O-5 Promotion Models 
Two major outcomes are analyzed in the probit regression with sample 
selection models, which involves a two-step procedure. The first is a binary variable for 
survival to promotion board (O-4 or O-5) and is used in the first stage survival model. As 
Table 4.9 explains, the dependent variable ‘survive’ equals 1 if the officer stays long 
enough to be considered by the relevant promotion board. The second binary variable 
defines the promotion outcome and is used in the second stage promotion model, which 
also incorporates a ‘rho’ term from the first stage model. 
 
Table 4.9. The Dependent Variables Used in the Promotion Models. 
Variable Description Variable Name Variable Type Range 
Survival to O-4 Board Survived_O4Brd Binary 
= 1 if ‘num_mon’ ≥  the earliest 
‘time_O4’ for the FY cohort. 
=  0 otherwise  
Promotion to O-4 Prom_O4 Binary 
= 1 if ‘time_O-4’ ≥ the earliest 
‘time_O4’ for the FY cohort. 
=  0 otherwise  
Survival to O-5 Board Survived_O5Brd Binary 
= 1 if ‘num_mon’ ≥ the earliest 
‘time_O5’ for the FY cohort. 
=  0 otherwise  
Promotion to O-5 Prom_O5 Binary 
= 1 if ‘time_O-5’ ≥ the earliest 
‘time_O5’ for the FY cohort. 
= 0 otherwise  
 
d. The Performance Index (PI) 
Two different Performance Indexes are analyzed in the models, one based 
on the old fitreps, the other based on the new fitreps. Other than the number of traits used 
in the calculation of the indexes, the creation process follows the same steps for both 
PI’s, as illustrated in Figure 4.5. PI is created using 21 traits in the old fitrep and 14 traits 
in the new fitrep. First, each marking is given a number depending on the evaluation. 
Then, all numbers are summed and divided by the number of rated attributes. This gives 
the PI for one fitrep. Because individuals have more than one fitrep at each grade, 











    
 
Figure 4.5. Steps in Calculation of Performance Index. 
 
Table 4.10 summarizes the dependent PI variables obtained via the 
process described in Figure 4.5.  
 
Table 4.10. The Dependent Variables Used in the PI Models. 
Variable Description Variable Name 
Variable 
Type Range 
Performance Index for O-1 Grade (Old Fitrep) O1PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-2 Grade (Old Fitrep) O2PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-3 Grade (Old Fitrep) O3PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-4 Grade (Old Fitrep) O4PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-1 Grade (New Fitrep) NewO1PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-2 Grade (New Fitrep) NewO2PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-3 Grade (New Fitrep) NewO3PI Continuous 0-100 
Performance Index for O-4 Grade (New Fitrep) NewO4PI Continuous 0-100 
 
2. The Explanatory Variables  
The explanatory variables used in the performance models are grouped into three 
distinct categories: personal characteristics; cognitive human capital; and, affective skills. 
Table 4.11 provides the variable name and description of the variables used in the 
models. TBS percentiles are also included as the explanatory variables because these 





score of all fitreps
received at each grade  
(O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4)
Calculate the average
score for each fitrep 
Convert the scores  
for each rank to a 
100-point scale
Convert Grades to Numbers: 
 Old Fitreps 
 (Unsatisfactory,…., Outstanding)  (1 to 6)
 New Fitreps 
(A through G)   (1 to 7)
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Table 4.11. Independent Variable Descriptions. 
 









Marital Status at accession 
Marital Status at O-2 grade 
Marital Status at O-3 grade 










= 1 if married 


















= 1 if white, = 0 otherwise 
= 1 if African American, = 0 
otherwise 
= 1 if Hispanic, = 0 otherwise 









= 1 if female 
= 0 otherwise 
Commissioning Age Comm_age Continuous   21 - 34 
Cognitive Human Capital    
GCT Group: 
















= 1 if in top third GCT group,    
= 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in middle third GCT 
group,    = 0 otherwise 
= 1 if in bottom third GCT 
group,    = 0 otherwise 
TBS Percentile: 
TBS Overall Class Standing Perc. 
TBS Academic Class Standing Perc. 
TBS Leadership Class Standing Perc. 










0 - 100 
0 - 100 
0 - 100 
0 - 100 
Affective Traits    

















= 1 if MOS is Combat Arms 
= 1 if MOS is Ground Support 
= 1 if MOS is Service  
= 1 if an Aviator 
= 1 if MOS is Aviation 
Support 
 
Prior Enlisted Service; 






= 1 if four years active 




Table 4.11. Independent Variable Descriptions (cont.) 
Variable Description 






Commissioning Source;  
United States Naval Academy  
Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps 
Program  
Platoon Leaders Course Program 
Officer Candidate Course Program 
Marine Enlisted Commissioning 
Education Program  
Enlisted Commissioning Program 

















= 1 if comm. source is USNA 
= 1 if comm. source is NROTC 
 
= 1 if comm. source is PLC 
= 1 if comm. source is OCC 
= 1 if comm. source is MECEP 
 
= 1 if comm. source is ECP 
= 1 if comm. source is MCP 
Duty Type being reported in fitrep; 








Qualification for Promotion; 



































































= 1 if there is at least one 
observed joint duty fitrep 
received at O-4 grade 
 
= 1 if there is at least one 
observed combat-duty fitrep 
received at each grade 
 
 
= 1 if there is at least one fitrep 
that includes ‘not recommended 
for promotion’ marking at 
grades O-1 through O-3. 
 
= 1 if there is at least one fitrep 
that includes ‘not recommended 
for promotion’ marking at 
grades O-1 through O-4. 
 
= 1 if there is at least one fitrep 
that includes ‘accelerated 
promotion’ recommendation at 
grades O-1 through O-3. 
 
= 1 if there is at least one fitrep 
that includes ‘accelerated 
promotion’ recommendation at 
grades O-1 through O-4. 
 Fiscal Year Dummy Variables    
 Commissioning Fiscal Year Cohort FRXX Binary = 1 for each Commissioning 
Fiscal Year  




D. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
This section provides basic statistics on the performance measures before 
developing multivariate models. Each subsection provides the number of observations, 
the mean, and the standard deviation for all the performance measure variables. For 
binary variables like ‘promotion to O-4’ the mean value shows the percentage of 
observations for which the variable has a value of 1. The tables also include results of 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests that assess differences in means among the accession 
sources. In all tests, the null hypothesis is that there is no difference in group means.  
Rejection of the null indicates significant difference in means among the accession 
sources. 
1. TBS Performance  
Table 4.12 compares means of the four TBS performance measures. The overall 
class ranks equal 50 because all of the class ranks are standardized by converting to 
percentiles. The p-values from the ANOVA tests indicate that the means on the 
performance measures are significantly different across commissioning sources. Officers 
commissioned from the three enlisted commissioning programs (MECEP, MCP, and 
ECP) have significantly higher overall class rank percentiles compared to direct entrants. 
NROTC and USNA follow these three programs as the middle group, while OCC and 
PLC program graduates have the lowest class rank of the seven commissioning sources.  
 
Table 4.12. TBS Class Standing Percentile by Commissioning Source. 




































































































































2. Retention to 10 YCS 
Table 4.13 compares mean retention rates among the six commissioning sources. 
The overall 10-year retention rate is 0.553, indicating that of the 13,222 officers 
analyzed, 7,305 officers voluntarily remained in service for at least 10 years. The 
difference in means among the commissioning sources is significant based on the 
ANOVA test. Almost 73 percent of ECP participants and 86 percent of MECEP 
participants voluntarily stay in service at least for 10 years. Officers from USNA, 
NROTC, and PLC have retention rates between 54 and 56 percent. OCC graduates, on 
the other hand, have the lowest retention rate, 50.3 percent.  
 
Table 4.13. Retention to 10 YCS rates by Commissioning Source. 
Commissioning Source N Mean Std. Dev. F Value P-Value 
Overall 13,222 0.553 0.497  
USNA   1,494 0.562 0.496 
NROTC   2,841 0.553 0.497 
PLC   5,099 0.537 0.499 
OCC   2,906 0.503       0.50 
MECEP      407 0.860 0.347 
ECP      475 0.728 0.445 
 
 





3. Promotion to O-4 
Table 4.14 compares O-4 promotion rates among the officer groups from six 
commissioning sources. The overall promotion rate is 0.735, which means that of the 
7,281 officers who stayed in service long enough to be considered by O-4 promotion 
boards, 5,351 officers promoted. The p-value from ANOVA test reveals that the 
difference in promotion rates among the groups is significant. Unlike in the previous two 
performance measures, OCC graduates have the highest promotion rates. In addition, 
Tukey’s test is conducted to find which group is significantly different because the mean 
values are very close. Tukey’s test reveals that the only statistically significant difference 





Table 4.14. O-4 Promotion Rates by Commissioning Source. 
Commissioning Source N Mean Std. Dev. F Value P- Value 
Overall   7,281 0.735 0.441  
USNA      821 0.720 0.431 
NROTC   1,568 0.711 0.453 
PLC   2,762 0.735 0.441 
OCC   1,444 0.771 0.421 
MECEP      348 0.733 0.443 










4. Promotion to O-5 
Table 4.15 presents O-5 promotion rates by commissioning source. The overall 
promotion rate is 0.676, which is based on the 1,206 officers who made O-5 out of 1,785 
who remained in service to be considered by O-5 promotion boards. The null hypothesis 
that mean promotion is the same for all groups is rejected at the 5-percent or better 
significance levels based on ANOVA test.  USNA and NROTC officers have the highest 
promotion rates at 0.75 and 0.72, respectively. The promotion rates for PLC and OCC 
graduates are 8-10 percentage points lower than USNA graduates, respectively. MECEP 
and ECP officers have the lowest promotion rates.   
 
Table 4.15. O-5 Promotion Rates by Commissioning Source. 
Commissioning Source N Mean Std. Dev. F Value P -Value 
Overall 1,785 0.676 0.468   
USNA  182 0.747 0.436 
NROTC  311 0.717 0.451 
PLC   632 0.671 0.470 
OCC  529 0.652 0.477 
MECEP   34 0.589 0.500 








    0.035 
 
5. Performance Index  (PI) 
a. PI Based on Old Fitreps 
Table 4.16 includes average PI at O-1 through O-4 grades for the six 
officer groups, as well as the overall mean PI values. It is worth noting, first, that the old 
fitreps were highly inflated. All four PI mean values are greater than 96. Second, 
although the grades are inflated and the distribution of PI is very narrow, the p-values 
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from the ANOVA tests show that there are still significant differences among the six 
officer groups.  
In the first three samples for grades O-1 through O-3, MECEP (and MCP if 
observed) graduates have the highest mean PI values. This is consistent with the 
preliminary results in the TBS and 10-year retention comparisons. However, MECEP 
graduates have the lowest O4 PI. Officers from the third enlisted commissioning program 
(ECP) reveal a decreasing performance over the years relative to their performance at 
TBS. ECP graduates have the third highest mean O-1 PI after MECEP and MCP officers, 
as in the TBS and retention comparisons. However, ECP officers also fall behind USNA 
and NROTC graduates after O-1. ECP graduates have the second lowest mean O4 PI 
before MECEP graduates. Unlike ECP officers, OCC and PLC graduates have the lowest 
two mean PI scores at O-1 through O-3, similar to their performance at TBS. However, 
OCC graduates obtain the highest mean O-4 PI after USNA graduates. Surprisingly, in 
spite of having the lowest O-2 and O-3 PI, OCC graduates’ O-4 promotion rate is higher 
than those of the other five groups. Finally, USNA and NROTC graduates have average 
PI scores that place them in the middle group –below MECEP, and MCP if observed at 
grades O-1 through O-3. USNA graduates have the highest mean PI as O-4’s.   
 
Table 4.16. Performance Index by Commissioning Source. 















































































39.45 < 0.001 
















29.71 < 0.001 
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15.13 < 0.001 
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b. PI Based on New Fitreps 
Table 4.17 includes average PI and standard deviations at O-1 through O-4 
grades for the six officer groups, as well as the overall mean PI and standard deviations. 
Overall PI means and standard deviations at each grade show that PI derived from the 
new fitreps has a more normal distribution. Average O-2 PI is nearly 49, which is very 
close to a mean value of 50 in a sample with a range of 0 to 100. In addition, the 
difference in mean PI’s among the commissioning sources is significant at all grades, and 
the null hypothesis is rejected at 1 % significance level in ANOVA test. Although the 
average O-1 PI is nearly 18 points lower than O-4 PI, such a an increase over time is 
expected considering that high-ranking officers undergo a competitive selection process 
that picks the best qualified ones from each cohort.  
MECEP and MCP –when observed– officers are the top performers at O-1 
through O-3 grades. ECP graduates fall into the middle group as junior officers; however 
they have the lowest O-4 PI average. PLC and OCC officers steadily have either the 
lowest PI averages or one level above the lowest average. NROTC graduates have an 
increasing trend over years, whereas USNA graduates are the top performers at O-4 
grade. 
 
Table 4.17. Performance Index by Commissioning Source. 















































































  9.37 < 0.001 
















16.58 < 0.001 
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27.07 < 0.001 
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  4.44  0.0005 
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Since the Marine Corps introduced the new fitness report system in 1999 
to combat grade inflation it is instructive to determine if this goal has been met. As 
Figure 4.3 illustrated above in the data section, there are very few fitreps in the new fitrep 
data set submitted in 1998 and 2001. Therefore, I had to limit the analysis to two years: 
1999 and 2000. For this purpose, the data set is first partitioned into subsets by grades. 
Then, each subset is further divided into two years. For example, two O-1 PI data sets are 
created; one contains observed O-1 fitreps submitted in 1999, the other in 2000. The 
same process is repeated for grades O-2 through O-4. 
Two different t-tests are conducted to test differences in means for the two 
years: the t-test for difference in means in two different samples and the t-test for paired 
comparisons. The first t-test was performed to compare the PI distribution between two 
years. Table 4.18 includes grade, year, number of observations, difference in means, and 
significance level for both tests. The number of observations in the first test (column 3) is 
greater than the number in the second test (column 6) because some observations 
received fitreps at one grade in 1999, but did not have a fitrep in 2000, or vice versa. 
Both tests, however, reveal that the average PI increased in 2000 relative to 1999. For 
example, the first t-test reveals that the mean O-3 PI in 2000 was 1.65 points higher than 
that in 1999, whereas the paired t-test finds that PI averages in 2000 were 3.02 points 
higher than in 1999 for the same 2,103 officers. The results indicate that the new fitness 
report system is also subject to inflation. Even in two years, the average PI increased 
between 0.8 and 2.35 percentage points. The new fitrep system may suffer from the 















Table 4.18. Difference in Means in PI Over Two Years. 
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2.35 0.05 1,918 2.80 <0.001
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the three data files used in the analyses: the MCCOAC 
file; the old fitrep data file; and, the new fitrep data file. 12 different officer samples 
including sample sizes between 27,532 and 1,783 are used for the five performance 
models. TBS models analyze overall, academic, military, and leadership class standing 
percentiles at TBS, while retention and promotion models use dichotomous dependent 
variables. The fifth model analyzes a Performance Index derived separately from the old 
and new fitreps. For each fitrep data set –old and new– a different PI is calculated for 
each grade between O-1 and O-4. Finally, preliminary analysis involves an analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) to determine if there are significant differences among the six 
commissioning sources on the five performance measures. In all tests, the null hypothesis 
(that there is no significant difference in group means) is rejected at the 5-percent or 
better significance levels (difference in O-4 PI means is significant at the 10-percent 
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V.  MODELS 
The previous chapter found significant differences in mean performance levels 
among commissioning sources. This chapter specifies multivariate models that include 
other covariates to explain the variation in the five performance variables. All models 
include dummy variables for each commissioning program, which comprise the focus 
variables. Other explanatory variables selected from personal characteristics, cognitive 
human capital and affective traits categories described above in Table 4.11 are included 
in each specification. Each section justifies the model specification and establishes the 
hypothesized relationships.  
A. PERFORMANCE AT TBS MODEL  
1. Model Specification 
The TBS model specification is based on variables found to be significant in 
previous studies (North and Smith, 1993; Finley, 2002). Table 5.1 displays the model 
specifications used in the OLS regressions. The second model adds GCT information to 
the first specification. Although GCT scores are missing for 1,551 observations, GCT is 
included to represent cognitive abilities because the MCCOAC file does not provide SAT 
scores. North and Smith (1993) differentiate between ‘Prior Marine’ and ‘Prior Other 
Service’ enlisted experience, and finds that the former has a very significant association 
with success at TBS, whereas the latter is insignificant. However, the prior enlisted 
service information obtained from Marine Corps Headquarters only shows whether or not 
each observation has four years of enlisted service before commissioning and does not 
identify branch of Service. College major codes that North and Smith (1993) find 
significant in explaining success at TBS are not included since no major code is specified 
for more than 6,000 observations in the MCCOAC file. Finally, commissioning options 
represent program types that each commissioning program provides its participants with 





Table 5.1. OLS Multivariate Regression Model Specifications for TBS Performance. 
  1.  TBS Overall Class Rank / TBS Academic Class Rank / TBS Military Class Rank / 
TBS Leadership Class Rank = ƒ (Marital Status, Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity 
Group, Commissioning Options, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source) 
  2.  TBS Overall Class Rank / TBS Academic Class Rank / TBS Military Class Rank / 
TBS Leadership Class Rank = ƒ (Marital Status, Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity 
Group, Commissioning Options, GCT Thirds, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning 
Source) 
 
2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
Table 5.2 lists the explanatory variables and their hypothesized relationship to 
performance at TBS. The primary assumption is that commissioning programs that 
provide longer and more intensive pre-commissioning acculturation or that credit enlisted 
service experience will be associated with better performance. Therefore, OCC and PLC 
programs are expected to have a negative association with TBS class rank, whereas 
MECEP, ECP and MCP graduates and those with prior enlisted experience expected to 
be associated with better performance at TBS (relative to USNA). Married and older 
officers are more responsible and have more work force experience and, therefore, are 
expected to be positively associated with performance at TBS. Officers from the aviation 
and law programs are expected to have higher class ranks at TBS relative to officers in 
ground or other programs (based on source of entry) because aviation and law programs 
are highly competitive. Based on previous studies (North and Smith, 1993), individuals 
from minority groups are not expected to perform well at TBS.  Finally, the model also 
assumes that higher GCT positively affects success at TBS.   
 
Table 5.2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on TBS Class Rank. 
Variable Name Expected Sign 
Personal Characteristics  
    Married at Accession         +         (Compared to not married) 
    Commissioning Age         + 
    Female          -          (Compared to male) 
    White                      Base Ethnicity Group 
    African American         -  
    Hispanic         - 




Table 5.2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on TBS Class Rank 
(cont.) 
Cognitive Human Capital  
    Bottom Third                       Base GCT third group 
    Middle Third          + 
    Top Third         + 
Affective Traits  
    Ground Option                        Base Commissioning Option  
    Aviation Option          + 
    Law Option         + 
    Prior Enlisted Service          +         (Compared to no prior enlisted experience) 
    USNA                       Base Commissioning Source 
    NROTC           ?   
    PLC          - 
    OCC          - 
    MECEP           + 
    ECP          + 
    MCP          + 
 
B. 10 YCS RETENTION MODEL 
1. Model Specification 
The model specification is based on the models used by North and Goldhaber 
(1995) and Hosek et al. (2001). Table 5.3 summarizes the model specification. The model 
is estimated as a non-linear logit equation. The second model adds the TBS overall class 
standing percentile and MOS types to the first specification. The TBS overall class rank 
is included as it is highly correlated with success rates: “Our most robust finding is that 
higher TBS leadership class rank is associated with higher success rates, regardless of the 
measure” (North and Goldhaber, 1995, p. 59). However, rather than leadership percentile, 
overall class rank percentile is included in the specification. Another variable that prior 
studies find significant in explaining retention is MOS, and it is also added to the second 
specification.  
Table 5.3. Logit Retention to 10 YCS Model Specifications. 
    1.  Retained_10YCS = ƒ (Marital Status, Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity 
Group, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year) 
    2.  Retained_10YCS = ƒ (Marital Status, Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity 
Group, TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile, MOS Group, Prior Enlisted Service, 
Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year) 
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2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
The hypothesized effects of the explanatory variables are the same as in the TBS 
model except for African American, PLC and OCC variables. Hosek et al. (2001) find 
that black men and women are more likely to stay voluntarily (compared to white men), 
hence the sign for African American is positive. Since their accession programs provide 
shorter pre-commissioning military training, OCC and PLC graduates are assumed to 
have a lower taste for the military, and are expected to leave earlier. On the other hand, 
officers from enlisted commissioning programs and prior enlisted officers are expected to 
have a positive association with retention (see O’Brien, 2002). Finally, the model expects 
that aviation and aviation support MOSs will be associated with higher retention rates as 
various incentive pay programs are offered to both MOSs to increase retention. Table 5.4 
summarizes the hypothesized effects of the explanatory variables. 
 
Table 5.4. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on 10 YCS Retention. 
Variable Name Expected Sign 
Personal Characteristics  
    Married at accession          +    (Compared to not married) 
    Commissioning Age          + 
    Female           -    (Compared to male) 
    White                 Base Ethnicity Group 
    African American          +  
    Hispanic           ? 
    Other Race           ? 
Cognitive Human Capital  
    TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile           +  
Affective Traits  
    Prior Enlisted Service           +  (Compared to no prior enlisted experience)  
    USNA                Base Commissioning Source 
    NROTC           ?   
    PLC          - 
    OCC          - 
    MECEP           + 
    ECP          + 
    MCP          + 
    Combat MOS               Base MOS Group   
    Ground Support MOS          ? 
    Service MOS          ? 
    Aviation MOS         + 
    Aviation Support MOS         + 
Commissioning Fiscal Year          ? 
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C. O-4 AND O-5 PROMOTION MODELS 
1. Model Specification 
The promotion models use both simple probit and ‘bivariate probit with sample 
selection,’ as explained in the previous chapter. Bowman and Mehay (1999) use bivariate 
probit in their “Graduate education and employee performance” study, and focus on the 
effect of Master’s degree on Navy officers’ O-4 promotion. To correct for possible 
sample selection bias in the O-4 promotion models the authors first estimate a probit 
model to obtain the determinants of graduate school attendance.  Bowman and Mehay 
include sub-specialties, college performance variables (other than GPA), and preference 
for graduate education as instrumental variables in the first-stage. They explain that “…a 
large part of the promotion effects in the single-stage models are explained by the 
selection of more able officers into graduate education program.” Similarly, the 
promotion models below analyze two major outcomes in the bivariate probit, which 
involves a two-step procedure. The first-stage model estimates survival to promotion 
board (O-4 or O-5), while the second-stage model analyzes promotion. 
The survival model uses a similar specification to the promotion models. 
However, there are a few differences. First, the explanatory variables in the second-stage 
promotion model should be a subset of the explanatory variables in the first stage 
retention model (See Wooldridge, 1999, p. 562). Three variables are used as instrumental 
variables that are not included in the promotion models: commissioning age; 
recommendation for accelerated promotion; and, not recommendation for promotion.11 
Put another way, these variables are assumed to be exogenous in the promotion 
equations. Second, the content of marital status and MOS group variables change 
slightly. Rather than marital status at accession, marital status at O-3 and O-4 grades are 
included in the O-4 and O-5 promotion models, respectively.  Finally, the promotion 
models incorporate a ‘rho’ term obtained from the first stage retention model to estimate 
the covariance between the error terms in the survival and promotion equations. As in the 
previous retention model, the second promotion model adds TBS overall class rank 
                                                 
11 Derived from the fitreps, the ‘accpromo’ variable represents recommendation for early promotion, 
and equals 1 if there is at least one such fitrep received between the commissioning date and the promotion 
point of an individual, whereas ‘nopromote’ variable represents  ‘not recommended for promotion’ 
marking, and equals 1 if there is at least one such fitrep received by the individual through his or her career 
(see Table 4.11). 
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percentile and MOS group variables. Tables 5.5A and 5.5B summarize the model 
specifications of the bivariate probits.   
 
Table 5.5A. Bivariate Probit First-Stage Survival to O-4 and O-5 Board Models. 
          
       Survived_O-4Brd= ƒ (Marital Status at   Accession, Commissioning Age, Gender, 
Ethnicity Group, Nopromote_O1O3, Accpromo_O1O3, TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile, MOS Group, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning 
Fiscal Year) 
 
       Survived_O-5Brd= ƒ (Marital Status at Accession, Commissioning Age, Gender, 
Ethnicity Group, Nopromote_O1O4, Accpromo_O1O4, TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile, MOS Group, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning 
Fiscal Year) 
 
Table 5.5B. Bivariate Probit Second-Stage O-4 and O-5 Promotion  Model 
Specifications. 
        
    1.  Prom_O4 / Prom_O5 = ƒ (Marital status at O-3/O-4, Gender, Ethnicity Group, Prior 
Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year, rho) 
    2.  Prom_O4 / Prom_O5 = ƒ (Marital status at O-3/O-4, Gender, Ethnicity Group, TBS   
Overall Class Rank Percentile, MOS Group, Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning 
Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year, rho) 
 
2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
The hypothesized effects of the explanatory variables on actual promotion 
outcomes are shown in Table 5.6. Different from the hypothesized effects on retention, 
the models assume no clear relationship between minority status and promotion. As 
Mehay (1995) finds there is no direct statistically significant relationship between 
race/ethnicity and promotion after background characteristics are controlled. Officers 
from enlisted commissioning programs and prior enlisted officers are assumed to have 
higher promotion rate to O-4. However, the model assumes that these officers have lower 
O-5 promotion probabilities:  
With additional years of service, prior enlisted officers may be eligible for 
retirement when up for promotion. This may affect their motivation or it 
may affect the promotion board member’s decision. Promotion board 
members may not want to take a chance on an officer who may retire 
(North and Goldhaber, 1995, pp. 40-41).  
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Officers from the aviation and aviation support MOS groups are assumed to have higher 
promotion rates considering the relatively larger requirements at field grades in these two 
MOS groups. Finally, the models assume that the sign of the rho term will be negative 
since the officers who leave earlier are expected to have lower O-4 and O-5 promotion 
probabilities. 
 
Table 5.6. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on O-4 and O-5 
Promotion. 
Variable Name Expected Sign Explanation 
 O-4 O-5  
Personal Characteristics    
  Married at O-3/ O-4 + +         (Compared to not married) 
Female ? ?        (Compared to male) 
  White Base Ethnicity Group 
  African American ? ?  
  Hispanic  ? ?  
  Other Race  ? ?  
Cognitive Human Capital    
 TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile  + +  
Affective Traits     
   Prior Enlisted Service      + - (Compared to no prior enlisted experience) 
   USNA Base Commissioning Source 
   NROTC      ? ?  
    PLC     ? ?  
    OCC     ? ?  
    MECEP      + -  
    ECP     + -  
    MCP     + -  
    Combat MOS Base MOS Group 
    Ground Support MOS     ? ?  
    Service MOS     ? ?  
    Aviation MOS     + +  
    Aviation Support MOS     + +  
Commissioning Fiscal Year      ? ?  
 rho     - -  
 
D. PERFORMANCE INDEX MODELS  
1. Model Specification 
Two different PI variables are obtained from old and new fitreps for each grade 
between O-1 and O-4. However, both PI models use the same model specification 
(except for the O3 and O4 PI’s based on the old fitreps. As Table 5.7 shows, the second 
80 
model adds TBS overall class rank percentile and MOS group variables. ‘Combat’ and 
‘Joint’ are binary variables and denote the duty type (See Table 4.11 of Chapter IV). The 
‘Joint’ variable is included only in the O4 PI model because junior officers do not usually 
serve in joint positions.  
 
Table 5.7. OLS Performance Index (PI) Model Specifications. 
   1. O1PI / O2PI / O3PI / O4PI =ƒ (Marital Status (at O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4), 
Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity Group, Combat (O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4), Joint_O-4 
(O4PI model only), Prior Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning 
Fiscal Year) 
   2. O1PI / O2PI / O3PI / O4PI = ƒ (Marital Status (at O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4), 
Commissioning Age, Gender, Ethnicity Group, Combat (O-1, O-2, O-3, O-4), Joint_O-4 
(O4PI model only), TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile, MOS Group, Prior Enlisted 
Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year) 
 
A two-step Heckman procedure also is used to estimate O3 and O4 PI from old 
fitreps. The first step includes a simple probit model to estimate the probability of 
survival to the O-4 or O-5 promotion board. This procedure is used to contol for possible 
sample selection bias in the estimated coefficients of the accession program variables.The 
idea behind the Heckman procedure is that officers who leave as O-3 or O-4 do so 
because their fitrep scores may be poorer than those who stay to the promotion point. Put 
another way, officers who made O-3 or O-4 but who did not stay to O-4 and O-5 
promotion board may not be a representative sample of all officers. The Heckman 
procedure obtains an ‘Inverse Mills ratio’ for each observation in the survival sample. 
The Inverse Mills ratio, or λ  represents the probability that an observation survives to the 
given promotion point. The procedure requires that the first-stage survival equation 
include at least one instrumental variable that is related to retention, but not related to the 
Performance Index. As Table 5.8 displays, MOS groups and commissioning age are used 






Table 5.8. Two-Step Heckman Selection Model for O-3 and O-4 (PI). 
   1.  Survival to O-4/O-5 = ƒ (Marital Status (at O-3, O-4), Commissioning Age, 
Gender, Ethnicity Group, TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile, MOS Group, Prior 
Enlisted Service, Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year) 
   2.    O3PI / O4PI = ƒ (Marital Status (at O-3, O-4), Gender, Ethnicity Group, Joint_O-4 
(O4PI model only), TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile, Prior Enlisted Service, 
Commissioning Source, Commissioning Fiscal Year, Inverse Mills ratio) 
 
2. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables 
The primary assumption is that the commissioning programs that provide longer 
and more intensive pre-commissioning acculturation, or that credit enlisted service 
experience, will be associated with better performance. Therefore, OCC and PLC 
programs are expected to be negatively associated with higher PI at each grade, whereas 
MECEP, ECP and MCP graduates and officers with prior enlisted experience are 
expected to be associated with higher PI (relative to USNA). The effects of minority 
status and MOS type is not clear, in priori, while we expect that married officers will be 
associated with higher PI scores. The models assume that serving in combat or joint 
duties result in better fitreps. The commissioning fiscal years are expected to be 
positively associated with PI due to grade inflation over time. The model also assumes 
that the Inverse Mills ratio will be negative since the officers who leave earlier are 
expected to have lower average PI scores.  Table 5.9 summarizes the hypothesized effects 










Table 5.9. Hypothesized Effects of the Explanatory Variables on PI. 
Variable Name Expected Sign 
Personal Characteristics  
    Married (at O-1,O-2,O-3,O-4)           +    (Compared to not married) 
    Commissioning Age          + 
    Female           ?    (Compared to male) 
    White                 Base Ethnicity Group 
    African American          ?  
    Hispanic           ? 
    Other Race           ? 
Cognitive Human Capital  
    TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile           +  
Affective Traits  
    Prior Enlisted Service           +  (Compared to no prior enlisted experience)  
    USNA                Base Commissioning Source 
    NROTC           ?   
    PLC          - 
    OCC          - 
    MECEP           + 
    ECP          + 
    MCP          + 
    Combat MOS               Base MOS Group  
    Ground Support MOS          ? 
    Service MOS          ? 
    Aviation MOS          ? 
    Aviation Support MOS          ? 
Commissioning Fiscal Year          + 
 Lambda ( λ )          -  
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter described the model specifications for the five basic performance 
variables used in the study. The TBS and PI models use OLS regression to analyze the 
dependent class rank percentiles and PI scores. Logistic regression is the technique used 
to analyze retention behavior. Finally, the O-4 and O-5 promotion models apply bivariate 
probit with sample selection to correct for possible sample selection bias. The model 
specifications are based on the findings of prior studies and availability of the variables in 
the data set. All models include the six commissioning programs, –and MCP when 
available– as the focus variables. The rest of the explanatory variables are chosen from 
the three categories (personal characteristics, cognitive human capital, and affective 
skills) depending on the dependent performance variable used.  
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VI. RESULTS OF THE MULTIVARIATE MODELS 
This chapter contains regression results for each of the five performance measures 
for which there were significant differences in means among the commissioning 
programs in Chapter IV. Each section below presents descriptive statistics for the 
variables used in the models. Then, regression results are presented in the second part of 
each section for two different models. Except for the TBS models, the second models add 
TBS class rank and MOS variables to the first specification.  
A.  PERFORMANCE AT TBS ESTIMATES 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
The models analyze data on 27,532 officers from 20 cohorts accessed between FY 
1980 and 1999. Table 6.1A contains the sample means for the variables used in the OLS 
estimations for each commissioning source. As the table shows, officers from PLC 
account for 36.6 percent of the total sample and PLC and OCC combined account for 
more than 60 percent. The three enlisted programs account for less than 8 percent, while 
USNA and NROTC graduates make up the remaining 30 percent. Sample means are 
listed in the regression results table below. 
 
Table 6.1A.  Sample Means by Commissioning Source. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP 
TBS Overall Class Rank Perc. 53.54 54.79 47.36 43.45 73.08 56.98 62.71 
TBS Academic Class Rank Perc. 54.92 55.07 47.05 43.85 68.73 55.17 59.45 
TBS Leadership Class Rank Perc. 50.41 53.14 48.04 45.45 72.57 57.61 63.15 
Married at Accession 0.159 0.216 0.273 0.290 0.758 0.576 0.770
Commissioning Age 22.33 22.28 22.78 24.43 26.71 26.09 27.08 
Female 0.049 0.055 0.009 0.097 0.059 0.016 0.038
White 0.848 0.913 0.881 0.839 0.821 0.850 0.679
African American 0.070 0.043 0.046 0.076 0.091 0.093 0.158
Hispanic 0.044 0.020 0.040 0.050 0.058 0.033 0.105
Other Race 0.039 0.024 0.033 0.035 0.030 0.024 0.057
Aviation Option 0.800 0.018 0.452 0.227 0 0 0 
Law Option 0 0 0.059 0.026 0 0 0 
Prior Enlisted  0.018 0.031 0.066 0.369 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 N  0.112 0.188 0.366 0.252 0.038 0.036 0.008
Number 3,072 5,181 10,085 6,948 1,036 1,001 209 
 
The sample size falls to 21,610 in the second model when GCT information is 
included. The second sample excludes all observations in TBS class years 1980, 1981, 
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1990, and 1999 (a total of 5,378) since GCT information is missing for almost one third 
of each of these cohorts. In addition, 544 observations missing GCT scores across the 16 
remaining cohorts are deleted. Table 6.1B contains mean values of TBS overall, 
academic, leadership class rank percentiles, GCT thirds and prior enlisted by 
commissioning programs. Mean comparisons between the two samples (Tables 6.16A 
and 6.1B) for TBS measures and prior enlisted reveal that second sample means are 
consistent with the first sample.  GCT information provides background information for 
officers from the seven commissioning programs. More than 50 percent of USNA 
graduates and 40 percent of NROTC and MECEP graduates are in the top one-third on 
the GCT test. On the other hand, 57 percent of MCP, more than 40 percent of ECP, PLC, 
and OCC graduates are in the bottom one-third on the GCT test. 
 
Table 6.1B. Sample Means by Commissioning Sourcea. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP 
TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile 53.21 54.68 47.70 43.54 73.46 56.73 62.58 
TBS Academic Class Rank Perc. 54.78 55.10 47.14 43.92 69.01 54.77 61.03 
TBS Leadership Class Rank Perc. 50.06 52.97 48.37 45.54 72.95 57.55 62.62 
GCTbotthird 0.136 0.239 0.408 0.442 0.218 0.439 0.569
GCTmidthird 0.325 0.359 0.379 0.359 0.369 0.333 0.271
GCTtopthird 0.539 0.402 0.213 0.199 0.413 0.228 0.160
Prior Enlisted  0.016 0.032 0.064 0.385 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 N  0.114 0.189 0.363 0.257 0.036 0.034 0.007
Number 2,456 4,093 7,854 5,550 780 733 144 
a Reduced sample when GCT added, N=21,610. 
 
2.  OLS Regression Estimates  
Table 6.2 shows variable means, coefficients, standard errors and P-values from 
the OLS regressions on TBS overall class rank. Model 2 shows the results after GCT is 
added to the first specification. Using 27,532 observations, model 1 explains 11.3 percent 
of the variation in TBS overall class rank. Adding GCT information in model 2 increases 
the R2 to 18.1 percent. In both models, most of the explanatory variables are statistically 
significant.   
Model 1 results find that officers from MECEP and ECP programs have 17.4 and 
9.4 percentile points higher class standing relative to USNA graduates, respectively, 
while the effect of ECP is not significant. On the other hand, PLC and OCC graduates 
have nearly 7.5 to 10 percentile points lower class rank (compared to USNA). NROTC 
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graduates have a one percentile point advantage in TBS overall class rank, but it is not 
statistically significant. 
When GCT is included in model 2, NROTC and ECP become significant, while 
the PLC program becomes insignificant. As Table 6.1B explains, officers from these 
three commissioning sources have lower GCT scores relative to USNA.  Controlling for 
GCT scores, model 2 reveals that NROTC and ECP graduates have 2.7 to 4.1 percentile 
points higher TBS overall class ranks (compared to USNA). On the other hand, the 
reason that PLC becomes insignificant in model 2 can be attributed to the addition of 
GCT, which creates a significant difference between PLC and USNA. Similarly, 
controlling for GCT reduces OCC’s negative coefficient in model 2; however, the 
difference cannot be explained only by GCT since its coefficient is still significant. The 
second model also supports the significantly higher success rates of officers from the 
enlisted commissioning programs. In both models, officers with four years of active prior 
enlisted service are positively associated with TBS overall class rank.  
Other variables that have significant and positive associations with overall TBS 
class rank are being married, law program, and GCT score. Controlling for GCT also 
makes aviation variable insignificant, and reduces but does not eliminate the negative 
impact of minority status on TBS overall class rank. Officers in the top one-third on the 
GCT test have 20.5 percentile points higher TBS overall class rank compared to those in 
the bottom one-third. 
The results of the models of TBS class ranking in leadership, academic and 
military areas are presented in Appendix D. The OLS results for these three estimates are 
generally consistent with the findings of the overall class rank model in Table 6.2. 
Enlisted commissioning programs and officers with prior enlisted service are 
significantly and positively associated with all of the three performance measures at TBS. 
However, some coefficients have different signs from the overall class rank regression 
results, while some are not significant. Since GCT information increases the explanatory 
power of the models by 5 to 7 percentage points, results for the second models from 
Appendix D estimates are reviewed below, focusing on the differences with the TBS 
overall class rank model.  
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The regression results show that being married is not significant in explaining 
leadership class rank, whereas aviation and law program participants have nearly three 
points lower leadership class ranks percentiles. While NROTC is not significant, MECEP 
graduates have the highest class rank as they did in the overall rank model –16.3 
percentile points higher than USNA graduates. The academic class rank regression 
estimates yield similar effects of commissioning sources, prior enlisted experience and 
minority status. Officers from the law program have 11.6 percentiles points higher 
academic class ranks compared to officers in the ground option. Finally, military class 
rank estimates show that PLC participants have 1.5 percentile points higher military class 
rank and OCC graduates’ academic standing is no different from USNA graduates. 
Females have 12.75 percentile points lower military class ranks compared to males. MCP 
graduates are the top performers in both the academic and military scores. 
 
Table 6.2. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of TBS Overall Class Standing 
Percentile. 










Intercept - 56.316 (2.41) 
< .0001 - 32.94 
(2.68) 
< .0001 
Married_acc 0.287 2.874 (0.38) 
< .0001 0.264 2.041 
(0.43) 
< .0001 
Comm_age 23.35 - 0.051 (0.11) 
.6269 23.36 0.367 
(0.12) 
.0015 
Female 0.047 - 10.873 (0.79) 
< .0001 0.046 - 8.979 
(0.87) 
< .0001 
White (base case) 0.868 -  0.866 -  
Africaname 0.060 - 25.329 (0.70) 
< .0001 0.061 - 19.641 
(0.77) 
< .0001 
Hispanic 0.040 - 13.979 (0.84) 
< .0001 0.041 - 10.607 
(0.91) 
< .0001 
Otherrace  0.032 - 8.368 (0.93) 
< .0001 0.032 - 7.335 
(1.01) 
< .0001 
Avioption 0.316 1.385 (0.43) 
.0012 0.316 -0.400 
(0.47) 
.392 
Lawoption 0.028 4.338 (1.03) 
< .0001 .028 2.212 
(1.12) 
.0473 
Priorenl 0.207 2.583 (0.58) 
< .0001 0.207 3.291 
(0.62) 
< .0001 
USNA (base case) 0.112 - - 0.114 - - 
NROTC 0.188 1.063 (0.71) 




Table 6.2. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of TBS Overall Class Standing 
Percentile (cont.) 
PLC 0.366 - 7.534 (0.59) 
< .0001 0.363 - 0.994 
(0.65) 
.1235 
OCC 0.252 - 9.853 (0.68) 
< .0001 0.257 - 4.884 
(0.75) 
< .0001 
MECEP 0.038 17.367 (1.21) 
< .0001 0.036 16.459 
(1.33) 
< .0001 
ECP 0.036 0.946 (1.20) 
.4300 0.034 4.061 
(1.33) 
.0022 
MCP 0.008 9.352 (2.08) 





  0.349 -  
GCTmidthird -   0.361 10.706 (0.43) 
< .0001 
GCTtopthird -   0.290 20.521 (0.48) 
< .0001 
Dependent Variable 50.0 -  50.0   
 N = 27,532 
R2 =0.113  
P = .0001  N = 21,610  
R2 =0.181  
P = .0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
B.  10 YCS RETENTION MODEL 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
After deleting 2,609 officers who left involuntarily and 837 observations with 
missing data, 13,222 officers who entered between FY 1980 and 1990 are included in the 
sample for the retention model. Cohorts that accessed between after FY 1991 are 
excluded from the sample since they were not eligible for 10-year retention as of 30 
September 2000, which is the end date of data (see Figure 4.4, Chapter IV). Of these 
13,222 observations, 7,305 officers (55.25 percent) remained in service for at least 10 
years, whereas 5,917 (44.75 percent) left voluntarily before 10-year point. Table 6.3 
provides sample means by commissioning source. Sample means are listed in the logistic 
regression results table for 13,222 observations. The share of each commissioning 
program in the sample is almost identical to those in the TBS sample; PLC and OCC 
graduates account for more than 60 percent of the sample, enlisted programs make up 6.7 




Table 6.3. Sample Means by Commissioning Source. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP 
Retained_10YCS 0.562 0.553 0.537 0.503 0.860 0.728 
Married at Accession 0.276 0.280 0.336 0.386 0.786 0.655 
Commissioning Age 22.09 22.01 22.66 24.18 26.44 25.83 
Female 0.034 0.048 0.006 0.099 0.059 0.023 
White 0.861 0.926 0.915 0.885 0.880 0.867 
African American 0.070 0.041 0.033 0.061 0.071 0.099 
Hispanic 0.041 0.016 0.026 0.023 0.039 0.021 
Other Race 0.029 0.017 0.027 0.030 0.010 0.013 
TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile 53.52 56.92 49.26 46.93 73.94 63.17 
COMBAT_MOS 0.321 0.441 0.295 0.311 0.302 0.295 
GRSUPPORT_MOS 0.185 0.187 0.161 0.216 0.246 0.261 
SERVICE_MOS 0.109 0.099 0.152 0.160 0.251 0.179 
AVIATION_MOS 0.331 0.214 0.330 0.237 0.088 0.122 
AVSUPPORT_MOS 0.082 0.080 0.078 0.096 0.147 0.166 
Prior Enlisted  0.012 0.015 0.036 0.161 1.0 1.0 
FY-80 0.110 0.078 0.070 0.081 0.052 0.103 
FY-81 0.075 0.079 0.082 0.086 0.091 0.112 
FY-82 0.088 0.075 0.095 0.137 0.103 0.103 
FY-83 0.110 0.093 0.123 0.207 0.096 0.126 
FY-84 0.096 0.095 0.125 0.069 0.069 0.059 
FY-85 0.096 0.084 0.099 0.062 0.088 0.105 
FY-86 0.094 0.090 0.084 0.056 0.074 0.137 
FY-87 0.095 0.104 0.078 0.107 0.103 0.086 
FY-88 0.108 0.107 0.091 0.035 0.098 0.044 
FY-89 0.068 0.103 0.076 0.095 0.125 0.074 
FY-90 0.059 0.092 0.077 0.066 0.101 0.051 
N 0.113 0.215 0.386 0.220 0.031 0.036 
Number 1,494 2,841 5,099 2,906 407 475 
 
2. Logit 10-Year Retention Estimates 
Table 6.5 below contains a list of variables used in the logit model, the sample 
means for each variable, and the coefficients, standard errors (in parentheses), and 
marginal effects obtained from the two logit models. The Pseudo R-squared is 0.047 and 
0.088, respectively. Table 6.4 shows that model 2 predicts 62.9 percent of the retention 
decisions correctly. Note that this exceeds the ‘naïve’ model that would predict everyone 
stays and would therefore correctly classify 55 percent of the observations. 
 
Table 6.4. 10-Year Retention Model Classification Table. 
                            Predicted  
Retained_10YCS Observed  
0 1 
Percentage Correct 
Retained_10YCS 5,917 0 3,257 2,660 55.0 
7,305 1 2,251 5,054 69.2 
              Overall Percentage  62.9 
a The cut off value is .500 
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In both models, PLC and OCC programs have a negative and significant effect on 
retention. On the other hand, officers from MECEP and those with prior enlisted service 
are positively associated with retention, whereas NROTC and ECP are not statistically 
significant. Other significant variables are female, married at accession, commissioning 
age, and commissioning fiscal year dummies. 
Controlling for TBS and MOS groups in model 2 eliminates the differences 
among ethnic groups; however, the coefficient for female turns out to be positively 
associated with retention, which is contrary to expectations. The coefficients for the 
commissioning sources also decrease slightly, but they are highly significant. The Wald 
Test for the joint exclusion of the fiscal year dummies rejects the null that coefficients of 
the commissioning fiscal year variables equal zero with a p-value of less than 0.01 in 
both models. Compared to the fiscal year 1980 cohort, retention decreased with a 
decreasing rate over time. Columns four and six contain the partial derivatives (dp/dx) 
that yield the percentage point change in the retention rate due to a one-unit increase in 
each explanatory variable.  
The retention rate for the base group –at mean values for the continuous variables 
and zero for the binary variables– is 0.608 in model 2. The results indicate that officers 
from MECEP have 17.2 percentile points higher retention rates (compared to USNA), 
which is in addition to 7.93 percentage points difference for prior enlisted. This brings the 
predicted retention rate for MECEP officers to 86 percent. On the other hand, PLC and 
OCC graduates have 3 and 9 percentage points lower 10-year retention rates relative to 
USNA graduates.  Another significant variable positively affecting retention is TBS 
overall class rank. One percentile increase in overall class rank is associated with 0.16 
percentage points increase in retention rate. The small size of the effect is deceiving when 
a comparison between a top performer at TBS and one at the 50th percentile is performed: 
the former has eight percentage points higher retention rate. Married officers have 7.7 
percentage points higher retention rates compared to single ones, whereas being one year 
older at commissioning point increases 10-year retention by 1.95 points. All MOSs, 
except aviation, negatively affect retention compared to combat MOS group. The 
negative effect of ground support, service and aviation support MOSs on retention varies 
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between 2.1 and 6.2 percentage points. Consistent with the model’s expectations, pilots 
have 15.6 percentage points higher retention rates relative ground combat MOS. 
Compared to the 10-year retention model results of O’Brien (2002) who analyzed 
retention using 5,712 observations from four cohorts (1980,1983,1986,1989), both model 
results in Table 6.5 find exactly the same associations between the commissioning 
sources and 10-year retention. O’Brien’s results also indicate the positive impact of being 
married at accession, and TBS performance on retention. However, O’Brien find no 
significant effect of minority status on 10-year retention, whereas Model 2 find a positive 
effect of African American, which is marginally significant at the 10-percent level and 
increases 10-year retention by 3.3 percentage points. Also, commissioning age, female, 
and prior enlisted were omitted from O’Brien’s model but found to positively and 
significantly affect 10-year retention here.    
 
Table 6.5. Logit Estimates of Retention to 10 YCS. 
Model 1 Model 2 








Intercept - - 0.941 (0.292) 
- - 1.798 
(0.301) 
- 








Female 0.041 - 0.198** (0.092) 
- 4.55 0.169** 
(0.096) 
3.96 
White (base case) 0.902     
Africaname 0.049 - 0.209*** (0.084) 
- 4.82 0.140* 
(0.087) 
3.29 








TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 52.14 
N.A.  0.007*** 
(0.001) 
0.16 
Combat_MOS (base case) 0.333 N.A.    
Grsupport_MOS 0.187 N.A.  - 0.248*** (0.052) 
- 6.04 
Service_MOS 0.141 N.A.  - 0.253*** (0.060) 
- 6.17 
Aviation_MOS 0.270 N.A.  0.735*** (0.049) 
15.58 
Avsupport_MOS 0.088 N.A.  -0.088* (0.067) 
-2.11 
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Table 6.5. Logit Estimates of Retention to10 YCS (cont.) 




USNA (base case) 0.113     




PLC 0.386 - 0.170*** (0.061) 
-3.89 - 0.125** 
(0.062) 
-3.02 
OCC 0.220 -  0.445*** (0.071) 
-10.52 - 0.362*** 
(0.073) 
- 8.87 








FY-80 (base case) 0.079     












































N = 13,222  
-2 Log L =17,550.94 
 P = <.0001 
N = 13,222   
-2 Log L =16,972.06 
P = <.0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
C.  O-4 PROMOTION MODEL 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
The analysis sample includes 15,627 officers from 11 cohorts accessed between 
fiscal years 1980 and 1990 after deleting observations missing for data used in the 
analysis. Cohorts after 1990 are not included in the sample since they were not eligible 
for O-4 promotion as of the end date of the MCCOAC file. Of these 15,627 officers, 
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7,181 (46.59 percent) survived to O-4 board, while 8,346 (53.41 percent) left. Table 6.6 
presents the sample means by commissioning source used in the O-4 promotion models 
for 7,181 individuals who stayed until O-4 promotion board. The proportion of each 
commissioning source in the sample is similar to those in the TBS and retention samples 
–PLC and OCC account for 60 percent; enlisted programs make up nine percent; USNA 
and NROTC are 31 percent of the total. Overall sample means are presented in the 
regression results table below. The binary dependent “prom_O4” variable represents 
whether or not an observation promoted to O-4.  
 
Table 6.6  Sample Means by Commissioning Source 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP 
Prom_O4 0.720 0.711 0.735 0.771 0.733 0.731 
Married at O-3 0.638 0.654 0.660 0.679 0.879 0.793 
Commissioning Age 22.08 22.05 22.74 24.42 26.44 25.95 
Female 0.028 0.038 0.004 0.094 0.058 0.024 
White 0.873 0.932 0.919 0.891 0.891 0.855 
African American 0.059 0.037 0.029 0.056 0.063 0.101 
Hispanic 0.043 0.013 0.025 0.021 0.035 0.027 
Other Race 0.026 0.018 0.027 0.032 0.012 0.018 
TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile 56.65 58.77 52.60 51.63 75.66 66.88 
COMBAT_MOS 0.315 0.446 0.258 0.269 0.305 0.284 
GRSUPPORT_MOS 0.132 0.145 0.125 0.195 0.250 0.254 
SERVICE_MOS 0.082 0.080 0.121 0.154 0.241 0.157 
AVIATION_MOS 0.426 0.276 0.445 0.309 0.097 0.151 
AVSUPPORT_MOS 0.067 0.072 0.062 0.093 0.138 0.175 
Prior Enlisted  0.018 0.022 0.055 0.179 1.0 1.0 
FY-80 0.108 0.090 0.081 0.098 0.052 0.112 
FY-81 0.059 0.072 0.076 0.113 0.081 0.139 
FY-82 0.074 0.068 0.072 0.127 0.092 0.092 
FY-83 0.106 0.088 0.101 0.186 0.098 0.110 
FY-84 0.079 0.087 0.108 0.059 0.060 0.068 
FY-85 0.088 0.082 0.092 0.053 0.083 0.107 
FY-86 0.108 0.091 0.095 0.062 0.081 0.130 
FY-87 0.097 0.114 0.085 0.084 0.103 0.071 
FY-88 0.116 0.101 0.099 0.036 0.101 0.047 
FY-89 0.093 0.112 0.098 0.108 0.132 0.074 
FY-90 0.072 0.096 0.093 0.076 0.118 0.050 
N 0.113 0.215 0.379 0.198 0.048 0.046 
Number 821 1,568 2,762 1,444 348 338 
 
2. O-4 Promotion Estimates 
As discussed in Chapter V, two different promotion models--simple and bivariate 
probit with sample selection correction--are estimated. Table 6.7 contains the results of 
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both the simple probit and bivariate probit with sample selection for model 1, which 
excludes TBS overall class rank and MOS groups.  
Model 1 probit results find that all commissioning sources, except MECEP, have 
higher O-4 promotion rates compared to USNA. Unlike the model’s expectations, PLC 
and OCC graduates have 7 to 10.5 percentage points higher O-4 promotion probabilities 
relative to USNA, respectively. NROTC is significant and increases O-4 promotion by 
4.5 percentage points. While prior enlisted variable is not significant, ECP is associated 
with 5.7 percentage points higher O-4 promotion probabilities at the 10-percentge point 
significance level. Promotion probabilities rose for each cohort, which is expected 
considering the decreasing retention rates over these years. African Americans have five 
percentage points lower promotion probabilities, whereas females have 6.74 percentage 
points higher O-4 promotion rates. Marital status at O-3 is very significant, and increases 
the O-4 promotion probability by four percentage points. 
Columns five and six of Table 6.7 contain bivariate probit results for Model 1. As 
Table 6.7 shows, ‘rho’ term is significant and negative that indicates a negative 
correlation between the error terms of survival and promotion models. In other terms, the 
results of the logistic regression for Model 1 have downward bias because the officers 
who left before the O-4 promotion board would have had lower promotion rates if they 
had stayed in service to be considered by O-4 boards. The bivariate probit model results 
show that all commissioning sources that are significant in the simple probit model are 
significant in the bivariate probit model too. PLC and OCC graduates have 10 to 14 
percentage points higher O-4 promotion rates. Similarly, NROTC and ECP increase O-4 
promotion rate by 7.5 to 9 percentage points.  Controlling for sample selection bias 
eliminates the negative effect of minority, bivariate probit results find that female is still 






Table 6.7. Estimates of O-4 Promotion for Model 1. 
Model 1 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate Probit with 








Intercept -           








White (base case) 0.907     
Africaname 0.045 - 0.151** (0.075) 
- 4.97 - 0.092 
(0.075) 
- 




Otherrace  0.025 - 0.056 (0.103) 
- - 0.035 
(0.101) 
- 
Priorenl 0.157 0.052 (0.071) 
- - 0.003 
(0.071) 
- 
USNA (base case) 0.113     




















FY-80 (base case) 0.089     


































Table 6.7 Estimates of O-4 Promotion for Model 1 (cont.) 
Model 1 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate Probit with 
















rho  -  - 0.295*** 
(0.061) 
 
Dependent Variable 0.735 -    
 N = 7,281   
-2 Log L =8,357.59 
P = <.0001 
N = 7,281 
-2 Log L = 14,051.26 
P = <.0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table 6.8 contains the results of the second promotion model, which includes 
TBS overall class rank and MOS groups. As noted, both simple and bivariate probit 
regressions are estimated. The simple probit results of Table 6.8 show that controlling for 
TBS overall class rank and MOS in model 2 increases the explanatory power of the 
models, eliminates the effect of minority status and makes some commissioning 
programs insignificant or negative (compared to simple probit model 1 results above). 
Simple probit estimates of model 2 reveal that only PLC and OCC graduates have 
significantly higher O-4 promotion rates relative to USNA. NROTC that had a positive 
association in model 1 is negative, but marginally significant. Also, insignificant in 
Model 1, MECEP is negative and significant in model 2.  On the contrary, ECP that was 
marginally significant in model is not significant in Model 2.  
The second part of Table 6.8 contains bivariate probit results for Model 2. The 
bivariate probit corrects for sample selection via the first-stage survival model, which is 
presented in Appendix E. As in model 1, ‘rho’ term is significant and negative, which 
explains that Model 2 simple probit results had a downward bias. The bivariate probit 
makes NROTC insignificant, while ECP stays insignificant in both models. MECEP 
graduates have 1.61 percentage points lower O-4 promotion rates. In addition prior 
enlisted is negative and decreases O-4 promotion by two percentage points. The negative 
impact of MECEP should be added to the negative effect of prior enlisted, since all 
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MECEP graduates are prior enlisted. In other terms, MECEP has a significant and 
negative association with O-4 promotion on top of prior enlisted variable’s negative 
effect. Other than commissioning programs, being married or female, TBS overall class 
rank, aviation and ground support MOS’s increase O-4 promotion significantly. 
Surprisingly, bivariate probit results indicate that pilots have 10 percentage points lower 
O-4 promotion rates. As model 1 results indicated, bivariate probit estimates find that the 
O-4 promotion rates of the FY 1981 through 1990 cohorts increased by 9.4 to 21 
percentage points over time compared to the FY 1980 cohort.  
 
Table 6.8. Estimates of O-4 Promotion for Model 2. 
Model 2 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 2 
(Bivariate Probit with 








Intercept      -  -   








White (base case) 0.907     








Otherrace  0.025 - 0.077 (0.105) 
- - 0.054 
(0.101) 
- 







Combat_MOS (base case) 0.311     








Aviation_MOS 0.349 - 0.339*** (0.039) 
-10.95 - 0.365*** 
(0.039) 
-9.84 




Priorenl 0.157 - 0.046 (0.072) 
- - 0.130** 
(0.071) 
- 2.01 
USNA (base case) 0.113     
NROTC 0.215 - 0.067* (0.052) 




Table 6.8. Estimates of O-4 Promotion for Model 2 (cont.). 
Model 2 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 2 
(Bivariate Probit with Sample 
















MECEP 0.048 - 0.196** (0.111) 
- 6.33 - 0.179** 
(0.109) 
-1.61 




FY-80 (base case) 0.089     








































rho  - - - 0.425*** (0.065) 
 




N = 7,281  
-2 Log L =8,116.29 
 P = <.0001 
N = 7,281  
-2 Log L =4,058.77 
 P = <.0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
D. O-5 PROMOTION MODEL 
1. Descriptive Statistics 
5,954 observations from the FY 1980 through 1983 cohorts are included in the O-
5 promotion analysis after deleting 752 observations missing other data used in the 
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models and MCP graduates due to their insufficient numbers. Of these 5,954 
observations, 1,785 (29.98 percent) survived to the O-5 promotion board and 1,206 
(20.25 percent of the analysis sample, 67.56 of the surviving sample) were promoted to 
O-5. Table 6.8 includes sample means by commissioning sources. Overall sample means 
are listed in the regression results table below. The lowest mean TBS overall class rank 
for surviving O-4’s is 54.6, which supports the significance of TBS class rank as a good 
performance predictor. The number of MECEP and ECP graduates is quite low, and may 
reflect the effect of retirement eligibility on officers with prior enlisted service.  
 
Table 6.9. Sample Means by Commissioning Source. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP 
Prom_O5 0.747 0.717 0.671 0.652 0.588 0.598 
Married at O-4 0.912 0.891 0.891 0.849 0.971 0.876 
Commissioning Age 22.24 21.87 22.55 24.32 26.03 25.25 
Female 0.033 0.058 0.005 0.085 0.029 0.052 
White 0.885 0.945 0.967 0.924 0.824 0.907 
African American 0.055 0.026 0.016 0.047 0.088 0.041 
Hispanic 0.033 0.010 0.006 0.017 0.088 0.021 
Other Race 0.028 0.019 0.011 0.011 0.0 0.031 
TBS Overall Class Rank Percentile 62.26 62.72 55.50 54.61 82.85 73.51 
COMBAT_MOS 0.253 0.482 0.299 0.234 0.618 0.412 
GRSUPPORT_MOS 0.088 0.180 0.192 0.204 0.059 0.196 
SERVICE_MOS 0.088 0.090 0.125 0.197 0.206 0.144 
AVIATION_MOS 0.528 0.206 0.328 0.297 0.088 0.144 
AVSUPPORT_MOS 0.071 0.074 0.070 0.087 0.059 0.113 
Prior Enlisted  0.006 0.003 0.052 0.061 1.0 1.0 
FY-80 0.308 0.289 0.215 0.189 0.177 0.217 
FY-81 0.159 0.232 0.236 0.212 0.177 0.320 
FY-82 0.231 0.215 0.241 0.253 0.294 0.206 
FY-83 0.302 0.264 0.309 0.346 0.353 0.258 
N 0.102 0.174 0.354 0.296 0.019 0.054 
Number 182 311 632 529  34  97 
 
2. O-5 Promotion Estimates 
Table 6.10 presents the variables, overall means, simple and bivariate probit with 
sample selection correction results for Model 1. The log-likelihood test indicates that the 
set of the explanatory variables jointly does not equal zero in both models. 
The simple probit results find that minority status and being female made no 
difference in O-5 promotion probabilities. Married officers at O-4 had 13.56 percentage 
points higher promotion rates, whereas prior enlisted had much lower promotion 
probabilities (40 percent). NROTC have a marginal and positive effect on O-4 promotion, 
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whereas PLC and OCC are not significant. Both MECEP and ECP are significant and 
increase O-4 promotion by 18.5 to 21 percentage points.  
Bivariate probit results of Model 1 show that rho is negative and significant. 
Controlling for sample selection in Model 1 does not make any significant variable from 
simple probit insignificant. In the contrary, PLC and NROTC become significant at the 
five-percent level.  
 
Table 6.10 Estimates of O-5 Promotion for Model 1. 
Model 1 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate Probit with Sample 





































(0.160) - 26.76 
- 0.806*** 
(0.163) - 27.46 


































Table 6.10 Estimates of O-5 Promotion for Model 1 (cont.). 
Model 1 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 1 
(Bivariate Probit with Sample 


















rho  - - - - 0.185** (0.084)  
Dependent Variable 0.676 -    
 N = 1,785   
-2 Log L =1,111.82 
P = .0002 
N = 1,785 
-2 Log L = 4.410.88 
P = P = .0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Table 6.11 includes Model 2 results estimated by simple and bivariate probit 
techniques. Simple probit results of Model 2 show that five variables are significant at the 
10-percent or better significance level. Minority status, female, and the cohort dummies 
have no impact on O-5 promotion. Prior enlisted is still very significant, and reduces O-5 
promotion probability by 45 percent (29.9 percentage points). TBS overall class rank is 
highly significant as in the previous models. Aviation support is the only significant 
MOS, and positively impacts O-5 promotion by 10.4 percentage points. The simple 
probit results find that only ECP is significant and associated with 14.3 percentage points 
higher O-4 promotion rates relative to USNA.  
Like the previous Bivariate probit models, Model 2 results corrected by bivariate 
probit find that incorporated from the survival to O-5 promotion board model, rho is 
negative and significant at the 5-percent level (The first-stage bivariate probit retention 
results are presented in Appendix E). This indicates that the coefficients from simple 
probit Model 2 have downward bias. Bivariate probit results find that in addition to ECP, 
MECEP has a significant effect on O-5 promotion probability. Officers from MECEP and 
ECP have 14 to 18 percentage points higher O-5 promotion rates, but the considerable 
negative effect of prior enlisted should be kept in mind when evaluating the effects of 
prior enlisted programs on O-5 promotion. Prior enlisted officers from any source (that 
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account for 11 percent of the officers staying to O-5 board) have 45 percent less O-5 
promotion rates. However, MECEP and ECP eliminate 46 to 61 percent of this negative 
effect. Other commissioning programs do not significantly affect O-5 promotion rates.  
 
Table 6.11. Estimates of O-5 Promotion for Model 2. 
Model 2 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 2 
(Bivariate Probit with 








Intercept -     








White (base case) 0.936     








Otherrace  0.015 - 0.268 (0.252) 
- - 0.234 
(0.268) 
- 







Combat_MOS (base case) 0.319     
















Priorenl 0.111 - 0.836*** (0.162) 
- 29.93 - 0.895*** 
(0.163) 
- 30.46 
USNA (base case) 0.102     








OCC 0.296 - 0.113 (0.098) 
 - 0.018 
(0.111) 
- 









Table 6.11 Estimates of O-5 Promotion for Model 2. (cont.) 
Model 2 
(Simple Probit ) 
Model 2 
(Bivariate Probit with 
















-  0.069 
(0.089) 









rho -   - 0.176** (0.086) 
 




N = 1,785  
-2 Log L =1,088.81 
 P = <.0001 
N = 1,785   
-2 Log L = 
P =  
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
E. PERFORMANCE INDEX (PI) MODELS 
1. PI Models Using Old Fitreps 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.12 contains sample means for PI, prior enlisted, and female, as 
well as the number of officers from each commissioning source and their percentages in 
the O-1 through O-4 samples. The other explanatory variables in the models are not 
included since there is not much change in variable means from those provided in 
descriptive statistics above in the TBS, retention, and promotion samples. MCP is not 
included in the O-3 and O-4 samples due to an insufficient number of observations. As 
Table 4.15 in Chapter IV illustrated, the number of cohorts included in each sample 
decreased for the higher grades because some cohorts were too junior to have reached 
senior grades (O-4) as of the end date of MCCOAC file. For example, the FY 1980 
through 1997 cohorts are included in the analysis of PI for O-1’s, whereas observations 





Table 6.12. Sample Means by Commissioning Source. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP Overall 
O1 PI Sample         
O1 PI  96.70 96.53 95.93 96.13 97.93 96.74 99.54 96.310 
Prior Enlisted 0.020 0.032 0.065 0.352 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.199 
Female 0.046 0.056 0.004 0.110 0.063 0.017 0.012 0.048 
Number of Observations 2,171 4,136 6,888 4,772 727 784  81 19,559 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.111 0.212 0.352 0.244 0.037 0.040 0.004 
- 
O2 PI Sample         
O2 PI  97.93 97.86 97.37 97.36 98.72 97.46 99.35 97.575 
Prior Enlisted 0.018 0.027 0.056 0.285 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.163 
Female 0.036 0.051 0.005 0.097 0.068 0.018 0.0 0.042 
Number of Observations 2,171 4,277 8,260 4,961 681 719  25 21,261 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.110 0.201 0.389 0.233 0.032 0.034 0.001 
- 
O3 PI Sample         
O3 PI  98.72 98.83 98.48 98.23 99.09 98.51  98.56 
Prior Enlisted 0.013 0.016 0.043 0.154 1.0 1.0  0.126 
Female 0.032 0.045 0.007 0.098 0.060 0.025  0.039 
Number of Observations 1,346 2,276 4,013 2,090 385 397  10,507 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.128 0.217 0.382 0.199 0.037 0.038 
 - 
O4 PI Sample         
O4 PI  99.83 99.70 99.67 99.77 99.54 99.55  99.708 
Prior Enlisted 0.005 0.003 0.056 0.064 1.0 1.0  0.126 
Female 0.031 0.063 0.007 0.089 0.082 0.046  0.047 
Number of Observations 196 335 699 550  61 109  1,950 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.101 0.172 0.359 0.282 0.031 0.056 
 - 
 
b. O-1 and O-2 PI Estimates 
Table 6.13 includes variable means, coefficients, and standard errors (in 
parentheses) from the O1 and O2 PI regressions for model 1 and model 2. As in the 
previous models, TBS and MOS groups are included in model 2.  
For each grade, Model 1 explains 19 and 22 percent of the variation in the 
dependent variable. The results show that all variables are significant except female, 
ECP, and MCP.  Officers from NROTC, PLC, OCC and ECP are negatively associated 
with O1 and O2 performance compared to USNA, whereas MECEP graduates have 0.35 
to 0.44 percentage points higher average PI scores as O-1 and O-2. Minorities have 
between 0.4 to 1.6 percentage points lower PI scores. Commissioning age is another 
factor that negatively affects O1 and O2 PI scores, while prior enlisted and being married 
increase PI between 0.48 and 0.21 percentage points. Officers who received at least one 
combat fitrep as O1 or O2 had between 0.32 and 0.59 percentage points higher PI. 
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The R2 increases to 0.307 and 0.246 after including TBS and MOS 
information in model 2 of O1 and O2 PI, respectively. TBS overall class rank is very 
significant, and a one percentile point increase in TBS class rank is associated with 0.047 
and 0.029 percentage point increase in O1 and O2 PI, respectively. Controlling for TBS 
performance and MOS groups make female significant and positive, while the negative 
correlation with minority status loses its significance except for African Americans, 
which are associated with 0.25 and 0.80 percentage point lower O1 and O2 PI average 
scores, respectively.  Model results also show that all commissioning sources have lower 
average PI at O-1 and O-2 compared to USNA. Married and prior enlisted are positive 
and significant in Model 2, too, and increase PI. All MOS groups except aviation support 
are negatively associated with O2 PI relative to ground combat MOS. Increasing values 
of fiscal year coefficients indicate that the average PI scores of officers have increased 
over time compared to the FY 1980 cohort. This is another example of grade inflation in 
the old fitrep system. 
 
Table 6.13. OLS Estimates of O1 and O2 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps. 
   O-1 PI O-2 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 




















































Combat Fitrep    









TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 49.96 N.A. 
0.047*** 
(0.001) 50.27 N.A. 
0.029*** 
(0.001) 
Combat_MOS (base case) 0.377   0.323   





Table 6.13. OLS Estimates of O1 and O2 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps 
(Cont.). 
   O-1 PI O-2 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Service_MOS 0.138 N.A. 0.155** (0.087) 0.140 N.A. 
- 0.183*** 
(0.070) 
Aviation_MOS 0.191 N.A. 0.025 (0.078) 0.276 N.A. 
- 0.133*** 
(0.056) 














USNA (base case) 0.111   0.110   



































MCP 0.004 - 0.034 (0.461) 






Comm_FY1980 (base case) 0.039   0.053   






















































































Table 6.13. OLS Estimates of O1 and O2 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps 
(Cont.). 
   O-1 PI O-2 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 





















Comm_FY 1996 0.052 6.405*** (0.193) 
6.464*** 
(0.183)    -   
Comm_FY 1997 0.033 6.439*** (0.216) 
6.458*** 
(0.204) -   
PI 96.310   97.575   
  N= 19,559 R 2 =0.222  
N= 19,559 
R 2= 0.307  
N=21,261 
R 2 =0.193  
N=21,261 
R 2 =0.246 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
c. O-3 and O-4 PI Estimates 
Table 6.14 contains variables means and results from the two-step 
Heckman Procedure for O3 and O4 performance. Columns three and seven contain 
simple probit estimates of retention at O-3 and O-4 grades. The log-likelihood test 
indicates that the set of the explanatory variables used in the retention models jointly do 
not equal zero. In both models MOS and commissioning age instrumental variables are 
significant at the 10-percent or better levels. Unlike the 10-year retention models above, 
the retention at O-3 results show that after making O-3 USNA graduates’ retention is 
significantly lower than that of all other commissioning sources. The retention at O-4 
results find similar negative association between other commissioning sources and 
retention at O4. However, only NROTC, PLC, and MECEP are statistically significant. 
OLS estimates of O-3 and O-4 PI models without sample selection correction are 
presented in Appendix F.  
OLS regression models for PI include Inverse Mills ratio and are obtained 
from the first-stage probit. They exclude MOS and commissioning age variables from the 
first stage survival equation. O3 and O4 PI regression estimates explain 13.2 and 2.2 
percent of the variation in the dependent variable. Since there is not much variation in the 
dependent O4 PI, the explanatory power of the O4 PI model is lower. Note that the 
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coefficients from OLS regression that are included in columns four and seven are very 
small (ranges between -1 and +2) when compared to the dependent PI variable’s range 
between 0 and 100. For example the effect of one of the biggest coefficients in O3 PI 
model, which is  - 0.706 for MECEP, has a 0.7 percentage point negative effect on the 
average O3 PI score for MECEP graduates (-0.706/99.09). Similarly, another significant 
variable, being married at O-4 creates a 0.17 percent increase on the average O4 PI of 
99.71 (0.164/99.71). However, when the inflated PI scores in the old fitreps are 
considered –average O3 PI is 98.56, and O4 PI is 99.71– the coefficients make sense and 
the regression models indicate that these small digits are significant. 
O3 PI OLS results find that most variables are significant. The Inverse 
Mills ratio ( λ ) is negative and significant at the 10-percent level, which shows that 
officers leaving before the promotion point are negatively associated with O3 PI 
compared to those who stay. The model results show that all commissioning sources have 
negative associations with O3 PI compared to USNA. MECEP and ECP have the largest 
negative association with PI; the OLS results also show that MECEP and ECP have 0.71 
percentage points lower PI compared to USNA.  Other than commissioning sources, 
married at O3 and TBS overall class rank have a significant positive impact on O3 PI. 
Minorities are negatively associated with PI at O3, but only African American is 
significant (PI is lower by 0.28 percentage points). When the results are compared to 
OLS models that do not control for selection (See Appendix F) we find that the 
coefficients of the commissioning programs were biased toward zero, in which the 
negative effects of the programs were understated. This may occur because those who 
stay from non-USNA programs have few civilian opportunities. 
Similarly, O4 PI estimates find that the Inverse Mills ratio (λ ) is negative 
but not significant. This indicates that there is no selection bias among O-4’s. The 
preliminary ANOVA test found (see Table 4.16) that differences in O4 PI means among 
commissioning sources is significant at the 10-percent level. However, controlling for 
sample selection by the Heckman procedure in the first stage improves the results and 
reveals that PLC and ECP graduates have 0.1 to 0.3 percentage points lower O4 PI 
compared to USNA graduates. Prior enlisted is not significant as in the O3 PI model. 
Officers who served in joint duties have 0.16 percentage points higher O4 PI scores, 
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whereas married at O4 increases PI by 0.16 percentage points. Neither the minorities nor 
the fiscal year dummies are significant. 
Table 6.14. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps. 
O-3 PI O-4 PI 
Retention 
at O-3 Model 1 Model 2 
Retention 




































Comm_age 23.06 0.013* (0.010) N.A. N.A. 23.17 
- 0.041* 
(0.027) N.A. N.A. 















































Joint_O4 - N.A. N.A N.A 0.172 N.A 0.161*** (0.060) 
0.162*** 
(0.060) 
TBS Overall Class 









Combat_MOS(base)  0.306    0.305    
Grsupport_MOS 0.157 - 0.064* (0.041) N.A. N.A. 0.177 
- 0.005 
(0.128) N.A. N.A. 
Service_MOS 0.141 - 0.304*** (0.043) N.A. N.A. 0.146 
- 0.358*** 
(0.131) N.A. N.A. 
Aviation_MOS 0.337 0.087*** (0.033) N.A. N.A. 0.315 
- .408*** 
(0.106) N.A. N.A. 
Avsupport_MOS 0.075 0.038 (0.053) N.A. N.A. 0.077 
- 0.005 
(0.170) N.A. N.A. 











USNA (base case) 0.128    0.101    

























































0.094    0.227    
 
109 
Table 6.14. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps 
(Cont.). 




























































   





   





   





   





   





   





   
Lambda  (λ) 0.518    - - 4.746*** (0.319) 
-1.510*** 





Retention at O-3/ 
O-4  0.686 
   0.894    




-2 Log L = 
12,444.39 
N= 10,507 
R 2= 0.112 
N= 10,507
R 2= 0.132  
N= 1,950 





R 2 =0.022 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
2. PI From New Fitreps 
a. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.15 provides the variable means by commissioning sources for PI, 
prior enlisted, female, and number of officers from each commissioning source and their 
percentages in O-1 through O-4 samples. The majority of new fitreps in the data file were 
submitted in 1999 and 2000 (see figure 4.3). During these two years, some cohorts in the 
MCCOAC file received the fitrep as an O-1, while some were evaluated as an O-4. 
Therefore, the PI models use observations from certain cohorts. For example, only the FY 
1997 through 1999 cohorts are included in the new O1 PI sample, since earlier cohorts 
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were evaluated via the old fitreps. Similarly, the new O3 PI sample includes observations 
from the FY 1988 through 1996 cohorts that were evaluated as O-3’s via the new fitrep. 
Officers used in each sample may have had one or more observed new fitreps at one 
grade, and the average PI derived from these fitreps does not reflect an officer’s PI 
average for that grade because the rest of his or her fitreps are via old fitreps. However, 
as Table 6.15 displays, the matching of observations in the MCCOAC file with the new 
fitrep data produced a sufficient number of observations to analyze the new PI for each 
commissioning source. In general, distribution of the samples by commissioning sources 
is similar to the samples used in the above performance samples: USNA is 10 to 11 
percent; NROTC is 15 to 20 percent; PLC and OCC account for 60 percent; and enlisted 
commissioning programs are 7 to 11 percent. 
 
Table 6.15. Sample Means by Commissioning Source. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP Overall 
O1 PI sample         
New O1PI  44.78 43.98 41.29 41.86 45.56 44.01 44.35 42.87 
Prior Enlisted 0.099 0.066 0.191 0.639 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.467 
Female 0.046 0.131 0.028 0.100 0.063 0.022 0.067 0.083 
Number of Observations 203 275 356 748 144 90 90 1,906 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.107 0.144 0.187 0.393 0.076 0.047 0.047  
O2 PI sample         
New O2PI  48.01 49.11 47.10 48.36 51.80 50.51 54.59 48.55 
Prior Enlisted 0.023 0.059 0.156 0.657 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.401 
Female 0.095 0.095 0.020 0.133 0.042 0.016 0.058 0.077 
Number of Observations 400 508 1,021 1,115 190 189 104 3,527 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.113 0.144 0.290 0.316 0.054 0.054 0.030  
O3 PI sample         
New O3PI  53.41 54.54 50.97 53.17 56.59 53.68  52.78 
Prior Enlisted 0.042 0.058 0.118 0.561 1.0 1.0  0.257 
Female 0.043 0.045 0.009 0.075 0.059 0.013  0.037 
Number of Observations 622 1,066 2,116 1,105 254 154  5,317 
Percentage of each comm. 
source in the total 0.117 0.201 0.398 0.208 0.048 0.029   
O4 PI sample         
New O4PI  62.27 61.07 59.92 60.37 61.01 59.26  60.51 
Prior Enlisted 0.009 0.022 0.041 0.165 1.0 1.0  0.120 
Female 0.029 0.032 0.003 0.101 0.025 0.013  0.033 
Number of Observations 451 898 1,798 891 122 151  4,311 
Percentage of each comm. 






b. O-1 and O-2 PI Estimates 
Table 6.16 includes new O1 and O2 PI estimates for model 1 and model 2 
using 1,906 and 3,527 observations, respectively. O1 and O2 regression model results 
reveal robust associations between variables using the new PI scores, which are now 
distributed normally.  
Model 1 explains 8 and 6.6 percent of the variation in O1 and O2 PI. All 
variables are significant at the 10-percent or better level (except for commissioning age 
and some commissioning sources). Officers from PLC have 3.5 percentage points lower 
O1 PI, and one percentage point lower O2 PI, compared to USNA. OCC is associated 
with 2.59 percentage points lower O1 PI score, but it does not have any significant effect 
on O2 PI. MECEP, ECP, MCP, and NROTC graduates have between 0.95 to 5.7 
percentage points higher O2 PI (relative to USNA), while none is significant in the O1 PI 
model. Prior enlisted positively affects O1 and O2 PI, but it is not significant in the O1 PI 
model. Both models find that married and female officers have significantly higher O1 
and O2 PI scores.   
Adding TBS performance and MOS in model 2 improves the explanatory 
power of the models by 4 and 13 percentage points. Model 2 finds that ethnicity does not 
affect O1 PI and O2 PI, except for the variable African American. Model 2 shows that 
being female and married positively affect PI. On the other hand, officers who had a 
combat fitrep (either as O-1 or O-2) had more than 7 percentage points higher average PI 
scores. A one percentage point increase in TBS class rank improves average O1 PI and 
O2 PI more than 0.05 percentage points. PLC and OCC graduates have significantly 
lower O1 PI scores. MECEP and ECP are the only significant commissioning programs 
that affect O2 PI. MECEP graduates have 1.85 percentage points higher O2 PI compared 










Table 6.16. OLS Estimates of O1 and O2 Performance Index Based on New Fitreps. 
   New O-1 PI New O-2 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 




























White (base case) 0.766   0.795   




























TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 48.65 N.A. 
0.056*** 
(0.007) 49.55 N.A. 
0.062*** 
(0.006) 
Combat_MOS (base case) 0.389   0.337   
Grsupport_MOS 0.285 N.A. 0.263 (0.482) 0.246 N.A. 
- 0.340 
(0.402) 
Service_MOS 0.197 N.A. 2.659*** (0.557) 0.175 N.A. 
2.173*** 
(0.457) 
Aviation_MOS 0.036 N.A. - 0.930 (1.033) 0.144 N.A. 
- 9.526*** 
(0.479) 














USNA (base case) 0.107   0.113   










































Comm_FY1995 (base case 
for O2 model) - 
  0.175   
Comm_FY 1996  -   0.331 - 1.164*** (0.473) 
- 1.798*** 
(0.438) 
Comm_FY 1997 (base 
case for O1 model) 0.337 




Table 6.16. OLS Estimates of O1 and O2 Performance Index Based on New Fitreps 
(Cont.) 
New O-1 PI New O-2 PI 





Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 











PI 42.868   48.545   
 
 N= 1,906 R2 =0.080  
N= 1,906 
R2= 0.119  
N=3,527 
R2 =0.046  
N=3,527 
R2 =0.187 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
c. O-3 and O-4 PI Estimates 
Table 6.17 includes model 1 and model 2 estimates for O3 and O4 PI, as 
well as the variable means for 5,317 and 4,311 observations, respectively. Model 1 
explains 6 percent of the variation in O3 PI, and 13.3 percent of the variation in O4 PI. 
Married  (at O-3 or O-4) and being female positively affect PI at both grades. 
Commissioning age and prior enlisted have a significant impact on O3 PI, but not on O4 
PI. Officers who were one year older at accession had 0.17 percentage point lower O3 PI, 
whereas prior enlisted officers had 1.5 percentage points higher average O3 PI score. O3 
and O4 model 1 results show that PLC, OCC and ECP graduates have significantly lower 
average PI, but ECP is not significant in the O-3 model. MECEP graduates have 1.5 
percentage points higher O3 PI relative to USNA, but the difference is not significant in 
the O-4 model. Other than African Americans, ethnicity does not affect O3 or O4 PI: 
African Americans had lower O3 and O4 PI scores.    
Model 2 explains 12 and 15 percent of the variation in O3 and O4 PI. 
Model 1 results for marital status, female, minority, commissioning age, and prior 
enlisted are consistent with the findings of Model 2.  Being married and being female 
positively affect PI , whereas being African American has a negative association. 
Commissioning age and prior enlisted are still significant in model 2 of O3 PI, and not 
significant in O4 PI. Model 2 also show that officers who had at least one combat fitrep 
as O3 or O4 or who served in joint duties as O4 had significantly higher PI scores. The 
negative impact of PLC and OCC stays significant in Model 2. In addition, Model 2 also 
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finds that officers from other commissioning sources have lower O3 and O4 PI’s 
compared to USNA. However, NROTC and MECEP are not significant in the O3 PI 
model.  
 
Table 6.17. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on New Fitreps. 
New O-3 PI New O-4 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 



























































Joint_O4 -   0.087 7.198*** (0.556) 
7.054*** 
(0.552) 
TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 52.08 N.A. 
0.053*** 
(0.005) 55.25 N.A. 
0.052*** 
(0.006) 
Combat_MOS (base case) 0.277   0.295   
Grsupport_MOS 0.151 N.A. 1.096*** (0.440) 0.176 N.A. 
0.003 
(0.462) 
Service_MOS 0.135 N.A. 1.075** (0.463) 0.135 N.A. 
1.354*** 
(0.517) 
Aviation_MOS 0.367 N.A. -5.079*** (0.357) 0.321 N.A. 
- 1.447*** 
(0.396) 














USNA (base case) 0.117   0.105   






























Table 6.17. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on New Fitreps 
(Cont.) 
New O-3 PI New O-4 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 







Comm_FY 1980 (base case 
for O4 model) - 
  0.019   
Comm_FY 1981  -   0.031 0.500 (1.412) 
0.899 
(1.398) 
Comm_FY 1982  -   0.078 1.305 (1.240) 
1.737* 
(1.227) 
Comm_FY 1983 -   0.155 2.517** (1.179) 
2.548** 
(1.167) 
Comm_FY 1984 -   0.121 2.271** (1.197) 
2.366** 
(1.184) 
Comm_FY 1985 -   0.121 1.820* (1.197) 
1.843* 
(1.184) 
Comm_FY 1986 -   0.129 1.376 (1.192) 
1.503 
(1.179) 
Comm_FY 1987 -   0.116 0.396 (1.204) 
0.583 
(1.191) 
Comm_FY 1988 (base case 
for O3 model) 0.014 
  0.102 - 0.428 (1.215) 
- 0.052 
(1.203) 






































PI 52.775   60.505   
  N= 5,317 R2 =0.061  
N= 5,317 
R2= 0.126  
N=4,311 
R2 =0.133  
N=4,311 
R2 =0.154 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This Chapter presented the multivariate regression results of the five performance 
measures. The findings indicate that commissioning source is an important determinant 
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of performance in the Marine Corps. TBS and PI models are estimated by OLS 
regression, whereas Heckman two-step procedure is applied in O3 and O4 PI analyses. 
The results of TBS academic, leadership, and military class rank OLS regression are 
included in Appendix D. The Heckman model estimations show that captains and majors 
(O-3 and O-4) who do not stay until the promotion point had lower PI scores based on the 
old fitreps, but the difference is not significant for majors. The Heckman procedure is not 
used in the new PI models because the new fitrep data set provides records for only two 
years –1999 and 2000- which is not enough to analyze retention decisions at O-3 and    
O-4 ranks. The logit model is used to estimate retention to the 10-year point. O-4 and O-5 
promotion models are estimated both by simple probit and bivariate probit with sample 
selection techniques. The bivariate probit model finds that officers who left before the  O-
4 and O-5 promotion point are associated with lower promotions rates, and simple probit 
models have downward bias. Controlling for survival to O-5, bivariate probit results 
indicate that MECEP and ECP officers who leave earlier have significantly lower O-5 
promotion rates. The next chapter includes a summary of the study, presents conclusions, 
and provides recommendations.   
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VII. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The study attempts to identify and evaluate the effects of officer commissioning 
programs on the career development of U.S. Marine Corps officers. The study also 
analyzes the effects of other groups of factors on career success, including personal 
characteristics, cognitive human capital, and affective skills. Chapter II describes the 
Marine Corps officer accession programs, the Basic School (TBS), and the Marine 
Corps’ promotion and performance evaluation system, which was completely changed in 
1999. Literature on performance at TBS, retention, and promotion is reviewed in Chapter 
III. Prior studies have generally focused on the effects of minority status and graduate 
education on these success criteria. On the other hand, most of these studies also have 
included officer accession sources often grouped into a few categories. However, I think 
that each commissioning program is unique in the way that pre-entry military 
acculturation is provided, and such groupings may conceal significant associations 
between each commissioning program and various success criteria. 
Three data files used in the study are described in Chapter IV. Prepared by CNA, 
the MCCOAC file is an event-based data set derived from longitudinal Marine Corps 
officer data files, and includes more than 28,000 Marines accessed between FY 1980 and 
1999. The MCCOAC file provides the major data for this study. Old and new fitrep data 
are merged with the MCCOAC file by matching SSN’s. Chapter IV describes samples for 
the five basic performance models analyzed in the study: performance at TBS; retention 
to 10 YCS; O-4 promotion; O-5 promotion; Performance Index (PI). Derived from old 
and new fitreps, PI is used as a performance measure in the study and captures average PI 
at O-1 through O-4 grades. Also in Chapter IV, dependent and explanatory variables are 
introduced and analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests are conducted to find any significant 
difference in performance measures among officers from seven accession sources. 
Results indicate that the differences in mean TBS class rank, retention to 10-year, O-4 
and O-5 promotion rates, and Performance Index scores among the accession sources are 
statistically significant.  
118 
Chapter V includes multivariate model specifications and establishes 
hypothesized relationships between explanatory and dependent variables. Performance at 
TBS and Performance Index models use ordinary least squares (OLS) techniques. The  
O-3 and O-4 PI models apply Heckman two-step procedure to correct for sample 
selection bias. Retention to 10-year is estimated via a non-linear logit equation. Both 
simple probit and bivariate probit with sample selection correction are used to estimate 
the O-4 and O-5 promotion models. The bivariate probit models correct for any sample 
selection bias that might arise from the possibility that officers who left before the 
promotion point are not a representative sample of the remaining officer group. Chapter 
VI contains the regression results of the models for each performance measure.  
B. CONCLUSIONS  
Chapter VI includes results of the 18 regression models for the five basic 
performance measures. The results show that some variables are highly significant in all 
models. On the other hand, the signs and significance of some variables change from one 
model to another, which makes generalization more difficult. To make interpretation 
easier, this section compiles the sign, magnitude, and significant key variables. In doing 
so, the performance criteria are placed in an order to be in line with the career 
progression of a Marine officer, which is TBS performance, O2 PI, retention to 10-year, 
O-3 PI, O-4 promotion, O4 PI, O-5 promotion. 
As Chapter VI explained, including TBS class rank and MOS information in 
model 2 for the retention, promotion, and PI models increased the models’ explanatory 
power. Similarly, model 2 for TBS performance included GCT information, which 
increased R2 5 to 10 percentage points. Therefore, Tables 7.2 and 7.3 below include 
coefficients and derivatives from model 2 explained in Chapter VI. However, we know 
that commissioning source significantly affects TBS performance. So, in model 2 we 
expect coefficients of commissioning sources to be smaller (because it only reflects the 
direct effect of commissioning source). In model 1, we expect coefficients of 
commissioning sources to be larger because they reflect both the direct and indirect effect 
of source.  Since the focus of this study is to analyze the effect of commissioning source, 
model 1 results serve this purpose better. Therefore, Table 7.1 contains coefficients and 
derivatives from model 1 from Chapter VI.  In the tables, the values below the retention 
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column (col. 3) and promotion columns (col. 5 and 7) represent derivatives (dp/dx) from 
non-linear estimations. O-4 and O-5 promotion results are obtained from the bivariate 
probit with sample selection models. The PI columns (col. 2, 4, 6) contain old and new 
fitness report results, the first lines coming from the old report estimates, and the second 
lines from the new fitness reports.  
Table 7.1 includes the effects of commissioning sources. Prior enlisted is also 
included in Table 7.1 because it is directly related to enlisted commissioning programs 
(MECEP, ECP, and MCP), and should be interpreted together with them. 
 


















USNA (base case) - - - - - - - 





  PLC - 1.0* - 0.52*** - 1.03** -3.9** 
- 0.77*** 
- 2.71*** 10.0*** 
- 0.12* 
- 1.61*** 6.3** 
  OCC - 4.9*** - 0.46*** N.S. - 10.5*** 
- 0.85*** 
- 1.33*** 13.9*** 
N.S. 
- 1.23** N.S. 









- 2.84*** 25.0*** 
  MCP 13.7*** N.S. 5.72*** N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 




N.S. - 27.5*** 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level;  **  Significant at the 0.05 level;  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
Perc. Points = Percentage Points; N.S.= Not Significant; N.A.= Not Applicable    
 
The results indicate that NROTC graduates’ performance is not much different 
from USNA graduates’ performance. NROTC graduates have higher TBS overall class 
ranks, whereas their O2 through O4 PI scores are slightly lower. NROTC does not affect 
10-year retention, but increases O-4 and O-5 promotion rates by 7.5 and 9.4 percentage 
points, respectively (relative to USNA).  
Compared to USNA and NROTC, PLC graduates have a lower career 
performance profile except for O-4 and O-5 promotion. They have significantly lower 
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TBS overall class rank, average PI scores at O-1 through O-4 grades, and 10-year 
retention probabilities. The two points where PLC officers out-perform USNA graduates 
are O-4 and O-5 promotions, which favors PLC by 10 and six percentage points, 
respectively.   
OCC graduates’ performance profile is similar to but below that of PLC 
graduates. OCC graduates consistently perform poorer than USNA graduates at all career 
points except at O-4 promotion. OCC graduates’ 10-year retention rate is 10.5 percentage 
points lower than USNA and 6.5 percentage points lower than PLC graduates. However, 
like PLC, OCC has a positive effect on O-4 promotion. OCC graduates have 14 
percentage points higher O-4 promotion rates (relative to USNA).  
MECEP graduates perform significantly better than USNA graduates at TBS 
having a 16.5 percentile points higher overall class rank. MECEP graduates also have 
better PI scores as O-1’s and O-2’s, and their 10-year retention rate is also the highest 
among all commissioning sources (22 percentage points higher when combined with the 
effect of being prior enlisted).  However, based on old fitreps, they have 1.8 percentage 
points lower PI scores as captains (when combined with the prior enlisted effect). 
MECEP does not make any difference on O-4 promotion probability. As O-4’s, MECEP 
graduates do not perform differently from USNA graduates; however, their O-5 
promotion probability is 6.5 percentage points lower than USNA graduates (when 
combined with the effect of being prior enlisted).  
ECP graduates’ performance at TBS is better than that of USNA graduates. Their 
10-year retention rate is also higher (via the positive effect of prior enlisted). The results 
indicate some interesting findings for ECP after this point. Officers from ECP 
consistently have lower average PI scores at grades O-1 through O-4. However, their 
lower fitrep grades do not appear to damage their O-4 and O-5 promotion success. ECP 
graduates’ O-4 promotion rate is nine percentage points higher than USNA graduates, 
while they have the smallest negative association with O-5 promotion as an enlisted 
commissioning source graduate group.  
The analysis for MCP is limited to TBS performance and PI at O-1 and O-2  
(because of insufficient observations). The results show that MCP graduates are more 
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successful at TBS and obtain 5.7 percentage points higher average O-2 PI scores based 
on new fitreps. 
In conclusion, the study results show that USNA graduates do not perform as well 
as enlisted commissioning program graduates at TBS. USNA is also negatively 
associated with O1 and O2 PI as well as 10-year retention compared to MECEP and ECP. 
However, Academy graduates receive better performance marks at O-3 and O-4 grades 
relative to all other commissioning program graduates. In spite of other commissioning 
program graduates’ (except for MECEP) lower performance before the O-4 promotion 
board, the results find that these commissioning programs have significantly higher O-4 
promotion rates.  
As the North and Goldhaber study (1995) indicates, TBS performance is a very 
significant career performance predictor. The results here show that higher TBS class 
rank is associated with better performance in all models. Table 7.2 summarizes the model 
2 regression results for TBS overall class rank as a predictor of later career outcomes. 
The results reveal that an officer who graduated at the top of his class at TBS has 2.5 to 3 
percentage points higher PI scores based on new fitreps. Also, a one-percentile point 
increase in the TBS class rank increases O-4 and O-5 promotion rates by more than 0.25 
percentage points; the difference is almost 10-percentage point between a top performer 
at TBS and one at the 50th percentile. Note that as TBS class rank regression results 
indicated, officers from enlisted commissioning programs are positively associated with 
higher TBS class ranks, whereas OLC and PLC have negative associations. Therefore, 
when used as an explanatory variable, TBS performance brings an indirect effect into 
these success models that favor enlisted commissioning programs.  
Table 7.2 also incorporates the effect of being married on the performance 
measures in the second row. The results find that marital status is another variable that is 
consistently associated with higher career performance. Married officers had two 
percentage points higher TBS class rank, and 0.8 to 5.5 percentage points better PI scores 
based on the new fitrep at O-2 through O-4 grades. Being married at accession improves 
retention by 7.7 percentage points. Also, married officers had 2.7 and 7.2 percentage 
points higher O-4 and O-5 promotion rates, respectively. 
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TBS Overall Class 
Rank - 
0.03*** 
0.06*** 0.16 *** 
0.02*** 
0.05*** 0.30 *** 
0.002*** 
0.05*** 0.26 *** 
  Married 2.04 *** 0.30 *** 0.78*** 7.69*** 
0.28*** 
1.17*** 2.72 *** 
0.16** 
5.47 *** 7.23** 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level;  **  Significant at the 0.05 level;  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 Perc. Points = Percentage Points  
 
Table 7.3 summarizes the regression results for minority status and gender. The 
results show that minorities are negatively associated with performance at TBS, even 
after controlling for GCT. African Americans’ 10-year retention rates are 3.3 percentage 
points higher relative to majority officers. In all models, controlling for TBS performance 
and MOS type eliminates the negative effect of minority status. However, African 
Americans still have significantly lower O-2 and O-3 PI scores. Similar to minorities, 
females perform poorer than their male counterparts at TBS. However, the results show 
that female officers’ performance is significantly better in all subsequent phases except 
for O-5 promotion. Being female is positively associated with PI based on new fitreps (by 
1.4 to 2 percentage points). Females also have four percentage points higher 10-year 
retention, and 5.9 percentage points higher O-4 promotion rates.  
 
Table 7.3. Multivariate Regression Results for Minority Status. 
















White (base case)         
African American -19.65*** - 0.80***- 1.40*** 3.29* 
- 0.28** 
- 1.01** N.S 
N.S. 
- 1.05* N.S. 














2.05 * N.S. 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level;  **  Significant at the 0.05 level;  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
 Perc. Points = Percentage Points; N.S.= Not Significant  
Figure 7.1 includes observed average career progression rates of Marine officers 
by commissioning source. The sample size is limited to the FY 1980-1983 (N= 5,954) 
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cohorts in order to capture the O-5 promotion point. As the figure shows, the retention 
rates of enlisted commissioning program graduates to the O-4 point are 10 to 25 
percentage points higher than other sources. After the O-4 promotion point, nearly 30 
percent of the entry cohorts of USNA, NROTC, PLC and OCC graduates remain in 
service, whereas 45 percent of MECEP and ECP graduates remain. However, MECEP 
graduates’ retention at O-4 is lower than that of the other accession programs. 22 percent 
of the MECEP entrants do not stay to the O-5 promotion point, while other 
commissioning programs lose 4 to 5 percent at O-4. At the O-5 point, USNA, NROTC, 
PLC, and OCC graduates lose nearly eight percent of the their entry cohort. Figure 7.1 
shows that 23 percent of USNA graduates remain in service as O-5’s. Losing between 10 
and 15 percent at O-5 promotion, MECEP and ECP entry cohort drops to 14 and 24 
percent at O-5 point.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Career Progression of Marine Officers By Commissioning 
Source/Observed. 
 
Figure 7.2 displays the predicted probabilities at career progression points for 
each commissioning source. Note that the base case in the estimations includes USNA 
graduate, white, and single officers from the FY 1980 cohort.  The derivatives obtained 
from model 1 promotion estimations from Chapter VI are added to the base case 
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predicted probabilities to calculate the progression rate for each commissioning source. 
The survival to O-4 model underestimates retention relative to the actual rates. Note that 
10 to 20 percent difference between retention to O-4 and O-4 promotion points indicates 
the significance of O-4 promotion as the ‘up or out point’ for all groups. MECEP 
decreases retention rates at O-4 by almost 50 percent.  The results reveal that for 100 
entrants from NROTC and ECP programs the yield is 29 O-5’s. The yield rate for PLC 
and OCC programs are 25 and 26 percent, respectively, whereas 23 out of 100 USNA 
graduates make O-5. Finally, enlisted commissioning program graduates, especially 
MECEP graduates are more likely to stay to O-4 board, and less likely to promote to field 
grades.     
 




The study results find that MECEP graduates’ 10-year retention rates are 17 
percentage points higher than USNA graduates. The difference gets bigger when the 
positive effect of being prior enlisted is added (21.7 percentage points). However, the 
bivariate probit results show that MECEP graduates O-4 promotion rates are not different 
than USNA graduates. The negative impact of prior enlisted is considerably high, 27.5 
percentage points (40 percent) at O-5 promotion point. However, MECEP and ECP have 
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a positive and significant effect at O-5 promotion that reduces the negative impact of 
prior enlisted. MECEP and ECP graduates have 6.5 and 2.5 percentage points lower O-5 
promotion rates compared to USNA, but 31 and 37 percent higher compared to prior 
enlisted officers from other commissioning sources.  
Finding similar association between enlisted commissioning programs and O-5 
promotion, North and Goldhaber (1995, p. 48) points out to a couple of reasons. One of 
them is related to promotion boards: “ …board members [O-5] may not want to take a 
chance on an officer who may retire.”12 However, the bivariate O-4 and O-5 promotion 
model results of this study indicate two points: (1) Prior enlisted officers are 41 percent 
less likely to be promoted to O-5; (2) enlisted commissioning programs have an 
additional effect on O-5 promotions that reduces the first negative impact. Another 
reason for the negative effect of prior enlisted service is that being eligible for retirement 
prior enlisted officers may have lower motivation to perform at field grades. However, as 
Table 7.1 summarized, although ECP is negatively associated with O-4 PI scores 
compared to USNA, MECEP and prior enlisted officers do not have lower fitness report 
grade averages than OCC or PLC graduates. Finally, as O-4’s all officers will be eligible 
for retirement even if they are not promoted to O-5 (As noted in Chapter II, O-4’s are 
allowed to stay until 20 years point if not promoted to O-5). The Marine Corps might 
consider further research to examine the negative association between both enlisted 
commissioning programs, and prior enlisted officers and the O-5 promotion process.  
Another point that is related to field grade promotion process is the significant 
and positive effect of PLC and OCC programs on O-4 promotion. In concert with 
expectations, PLC and OCC graduates, who have relatively less military training and less 
exposure to military life, are expected to perform poorly at junior grades compared to 
USNA and enlisted commissioning program graduates. As the results indicate they do; 
however, as opposed to their lower average O-3 PI scores, PLC and OCC graduates have 
10 and 14 percentage points higher O-4 promotion rates. As noted before, these two 
sources provide approximately 60 percent of each cohort and the promotion models 
                                                 
12 The authors find that “officers with military experience before commissioning were no or less likely 
to be promoted [to O-4] (1995, p. 97). However their O-5 promotion results do not include a variable 
indicating prior enlisted experience.    
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explain 5-6 percent of the variation in dependent variable. Hence, other factors that the 
models omit may explain such a positive association. Future researchers and the Marine 
Corps may find it valuable to identify the factors correlated with PLC and OCC 
graduates’ higher O-4 promotion rates. 
The PI regression results find that USNA graduates have higher PI scores at all 
grades between O-1 and O-4 compared to officers from other commissioning sources 
(except for MECEP at O1 and O2 PI). However, USNA graduates have the lowest third 
TBS overall class rank order, before PLC and OCC graduates. Although USNA graduates 
are exposed to military life more extensively than NROTC and PLC graduates, NROTC 
officers have 2.7 percentile points higher class ranks at TBS (compared to USNA 
graduates), and the difference between USNA and PLC graduates is slight. In addition, 
the multivariate results show that there is an unexplained negative association between 
minorities and TBS performance. The TBS regression results support the findings of 
North and Smith (1993) on the negative effect of minority status at TBS. The results 
show that both females and minorities have 7 to 20 percentage points lower overall TBS 
class ranks even after background characteristics (e.g., GCT score) are controlled. The 
Marine Corps might be interested in examining the reasons for USNA graduates’ and 
minorities’ poor performance at TBS (for one explanation see Finley, 2002).   
Expecting that retention decisions are associated with career performance, the PI 
and promotion models used Heckman and Bivariate probit models with sample selection. 
The O-3 and O-4 PI model assume that officers who leave as O-3’s or O-4’s have lower 
fitness report marks compared to those who stay to the O-4 and O-5 promotion boards. 
The results find that the Inverse Mills ratio (λ) is negative in both models but not 
significant in the O-5 PI model. When we compare the Heckman model results to the 
OLS results that do not control for selection (See Appendix F) we see that the 
coefficients of commissioning programs are understated in the latter model, as we 
expected.  
Another technique to correct for sample selection bias via retention decisions is 
bivariate probit model, which is used in the O-4 and O-5 promotion models. In both 
promotion models, the rho term is significant which indicates a negative correlation 
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between the error terms of the retention and promotion equations. The significant rho also 
reveals that O-4 and O-5 promotions estimated by simple probit are biased. Controlling 
for sample selection bias, the bivariate probit results find that coefficients of 
commissioning sources get larger and more significant. In other words, the coefficients 
estimated by simple probit are biased downward.  
D. LIMITATIONS 
The MCCOAC file is a comprehensive personnel file that includes 28,058 
Marines from the FY 1980 through 1999 cohorts. However, prior enlisted information is 
not included in the data set. Prior enlisted information obtained from the Marine Corps 
did not include branch of Service, which prior studies here found to be significant in 
explaining TBS performance. The second deficiency in the data set is the absence of  
college major, SAT and GCT information. More than 6,000 observations have ‘no 
college major indicated.’ Missing GCT scores also lead to exclusion of four cohorts from 
the TBS performance analysis. Also postgraduate education records that include PME 
and master’s degrees would improve the quality of research in officer performance.    
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APPENDIX C.  DIVISION OF MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL 
SPECIALTIES INTO CATEGORIES  
Ground Combat MOS Group 
03XX Infantry 08XX Artillery 
13XX Combat Engineer, Construction, Facilities and Equipment 18XX Tank and Assault Amphibian Vehicle 
Ground Support MOS Group 
02XX Intelligence 06XX Command and Control Systems 
21XX Ordnance 23XX Ammunition and Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal 
25XX Operational Communications 26XX  Signals Intelligence / Ground 
Electronics Warfare  
30XX Supply Administration and Operations 35XX Motor Transport 
57XX Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 58XX Military Police and Corrections 
Service MOS Group 
01XX Personnel and Administration 04XX Logistics 
11XX Utilities 34XX Financial Management 
40XX Data Systems 41XX Marine Corps Exchange 
43XX Public Affairs 44XX Legal Services 





Aviation MOS Group 
75XX Naval Pilots / Naval Flight Officers SEP 
MOS’s 
9965, 9967, 9969 
Aviation Support MOS Group 
59XX Electronics Maintenance  60XX Aviation Maintenance 
63XX Avionics 66XX Aviation Supply 
72XX Air Control/Air Support/Anti-air Warfare 
/Air Traffic Control 
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APPENDIX D.  TBS ACADEMIC, LEADESHIP AND MILITARY 
CLASS RANK MULTIVARIATE REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
RESULTS  
Table D.1. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of TBS Leadership Class Standing 
Percentile. 










Intercept - 47.363 < .0001 - 37.871 < .0001 
Married_acc 0.287 0.545 
(0.39) 
< .164 0.264 - 0.186 
(0.68) 
0.683 
Comm_age 23.35 0.305 
(0.11) 
.0048 23.36 0.505 
(0.12) 
< .0001 
Female 0.047 - 7.715 
(0.81) 
< .0001 0.046 -6.865 
(0.92) 
< .0001 
White (base case) 0.868   0.866   
Africaname 0.060 - 16.974 
(0.71) 
< .0001 0.061 -14.868 
(0.815) 
< .0001 
Hispanic 0.040 - 11.095 
(0.86) 
< .0001 0.041 - 9.780 
(0.97) 
< .0001 
Otherrace  0.032 - 9.063 
(0.95) 
< .0001 0.032 -8.429 
(1.07) 
< .0001 
Avioption 0.316 - 1.759 
(0.44) 
< .0001 0.316 -2.816 
(0.50) 
< .0001 
Lawoption 0.028 - 2.100 
(1.06) 
< .0466 0.028 -2.992 
(1.19) 
.0117 
Priorenl 0.207 3.251 
(0.59) 
< .0001 0.207 3.459 
(0.66) 
< .0001 
USNA (base case) 0.112   0.114   
NROTC 0.188 1.063 
(0.71) 
.6621 0.189 0.835 
(0.81) 
.3048 
PLC 0.366 - 4.098 
(0.60) 
< .0001 0.363 - 1.331 
(0.69) 
.0527 
OCC 0.252 - 7.374 
(0.70) 
< .0001 0.257 - 5.518 
(0.79) 
< .0001 
MECEP 0.038 16.367 
(1.24) 
< .0001 0.036 16.282 
(1.41) 
< .0001 
ECP 0.036 1.120 
(1.23) 
.3621 0.034 2.203 
(1.41) 
.1188 
MCP 0.008 8.763 
(2.13) 
< .0001 0.007 9.717 
(2.53) 
< .0001 
GCTbotthird (base case) -   0.349   
GCTmidthird -   0.361 4.015 
(0.46) 
< .0001 
GCTtopthird -   0.290 7.216 
(0.51) 
< .0001 
Leadership Class Rank Perc. 50.0 -  50.0   
  N = 27,532 
R2 =0.068 
P =.0001  N = 21,610  
R2 =0.074 
P = .0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table D.2. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of TBS Academic Class Standing 
Percentile. 










Intercept - 64.686 
(2.44) 
< .0001 - 37.672 
(2.66) 
< .0001 
Married_acc 0.287 4.192 
(0.39) 
< .0001 0.264 3.400 
(0.43) 
< .0001 
Comm_age 23.35 - 0.398 
(0.11) 
.0002 23.36 0.070 
(0.12) 
.5433 
Female 0.047 - 7.125 
(0.80) 
< .0001 0.046 -4.249 
(0.86) 
< .0001 
White (base case) 0.868   0.866   
Africaname 0.060 - 21.556 
(0.71) 
< .0001 0.061 -14.605 
(0.76) 
< .0001 
Hispanic 0.040 - 11.121 
(0.85) 
< .0001 0.041 - 7.173 
(0.90) 
< .0001 
Otherrace  0.032 - 5.162 
(0.94) 
< .0001 0.032 -3.898 
(1.00) 
< .0001 
Avioption 0.316 1.138 
(0.43) 
< .0084 0.316 -1.105 
(0.46) 
.0172 
Lawoption 0.028 13.930 
(1.04) 
< .0001 0.028 11.579 
(1.11) 
< .0001 
Priorenl 0.207 1.962 
(0.58) 
< .0008 0.207 2.714 
(0.61) 
< .0001 
USNA (base case) 0.112   0.114   
NROTC 0.188 -0.063 
(0.71) 
.9296 0.189 1.705 
(0.76) 
.0247 
PLC 0.366 - 9.466 
(0.59) 
< .0001 0.363 - 2.160 
(0.64) 
.0007 
OCC 0.252 -10.569 
(0.69) 
< .0001 0.257 - 4.879 
(0.74) 
< .0001 
MECEP 0.038 12.658 
(1.22) 
< .0001 0.036 11.244 
(1.32) 
< .0001 
ECP 0.036 -0.782 
(1.21) 
.5196 0.034 2.616 
(1.32) 
.0470 
MCP 0.008 5.822 
(2.10) 
< .0057 0.007 12.252 
(2.36) 
< .0001 
GCTbotthird (base case) -   0.349   
GCTmidthird -   0.361 4.015 
(0.46) 
< .0001 
GCTtopthird -   0.290 7.216 
(0.51) 
< .0001 
Academic Class Rank Perc. 50.0 -  50.0   
  N = 27,529 
R 2 =0.092 
P = .001  N = 21,610  
R2 =0.196 
P = .001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
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Table D3.A includes variables means for TBS military class rank analysis sample. 
The FY 1980 through 1982 cohorts are excluded from the sample since these cohorts are 
missing TBS military class rank data in the MCCOAC file.  
 
Table D3.A. Sample Means by Commissioning Source a. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP 
TBS Military Class Rank 
Percentile 
56.60 52.69 48.87 43.92 65.31 52.69 59.43 
Married at Accession 0.091 0.163 0.228 0.249 0.746 0.566 0.783 
Commissioning Age 22.35 22.33 22.83 24.53 26.80 26.32 27.16 
Female 0.049 0.055 0.010 0.099 0.059 0.006 0.039 
White 0.848 0.910 0.868 0.821 0.817 0.838 0.680 
African American 0.070 0.043 0.050 0.082 0.091 0.098 0.158 
Hispanic 0.045 0.022 0.045 0.058 0.060 0.038 0.103 
Other Race 0.037 0.026 0.037 0.039 0.032 0.026 0.059 
Aviation Option 0.766 0.018 0.446 0.193 0 0 0 
Law Option 0 0 0.070 0.030 0 0 0 
Prior Enlisted  0.019 0.036 0.073 0.431 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 N  0.111 0.188 0.367 0.251 0.040 0.035 0.009 
Number 2,606 4,400 8,595 5,888 932 816 203 
a    Reduced sample for TBS Military Class Rank Analysis, N=23,440 
 
Table D3.B below includes mean values for TBS military class rank, GCT third 
groups, and prior enlisted variables for TBS military class rank analysis after GCT is 
included. In addition to cohorts missing military class rank data from 1980 through 1982, 
the FY 1990 and 1999 cohorts are also removed from the sample because these cohorts 
are missing GCT data for more than one-third of their cohort sizes. The analysis sample 
has 20,087 observations from the 15 cohorts. 
 
Table D3.B. Sample Means by Commissioning Source b. 
Variable USNA NROTC PLC OCC MECEP ECP MCP 
TBS Military Class Rank 
Percentile 
53.77 52.38 49.30 44.44 64.97 52.32 59.20 
GCTbotthird 0.140 0.241 0.417 0.450 0.219 0.454 0.566 
GCTmidthird  0.328 0.365 0.375 0.359 0.380 0.325 0.273 
GCTtopthird 0.532 0.395 0.207 0.191 0.402 0.221 0.161 
Prior Enlisted  0.018 0.031 0.066 0.369 1.0 1.0 1.0 
 N  0.114 0.192 0.363 0.253 0.036 0.034 0.007 
Number 2,305 3,850 7,298 5,090 727 674 143 





Table D.4. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates of TBS Military Class Standing 
Percentile. 










Intercept - 55.206 
(2.60) 
< .0001 - 33.677 
(2.82) 
< .0001 
Married_acc 0.243 2.836 
(0.45) 
< .0001 0.243 2.172 
(0.47) 
< .0001 
Comm_age 23.43 - 0.116 
(0.11) 
.3093 23.38 0.261 
(0.12) 
.0316 
Female 0.047 - 13.978 
(0.86) 
< .0001 0.046 -12.752 
(0.911) 
< .0001 
White (base case) 0.857   0.862   
Africaname 0.063 - 24.555 
(0.74) 
< .0001 0.062 -19.398 
(0.80) 
< .0001 
Hispanic 0.045 - 11.888 
(0.87) 
< .0001 0.042 -  8.988 
(0.95) 
< .0001 
Otherrace  0.035 - 6.555 
(0.97) 
< .0001 0.034 -5.836 
(1.04) 
< .0001 
Avioption 0.301 6.392 
(0.47) 
< .0001 0.311 4.760 
(0.50) 
< .0001 
Lawoption 0.032 - 3.534 
(1.05) 
< .0008 0.030 - 6.145 
(1.14) 
< .0001 
Priorenl 0.227 1.962 
(0.58) 
< .2167 0.216 1.458 
(0.64) 
< .0234 
USNA (base case) 0.111   0.115   
NROTC 0.188 1.701 
(0.76) 
.0260 0.192 3.552 
(0.80) 
< .0001 
PLC 0.367 - 4.854 
(0.64) 
< .0001 0.363 1.518 
(0.68) 
.0254 
OCC 0.251 - 6.257 
(0.75) 
< .0001 0.253 - 0.993 
(0.79) 
.2102 
MECEP 0.040 14.333 
(1.30) 
< .0001 0.036 13.371 
(1.40) 
< .0001 
ECP 0.035 1.291 
(1.32) 
.3277 0.034 4.398 
(1.40) 
.0017 
MCP 0.009 10.437 
(2.14) 
< .0001 0.007 14.559 
(2.44) 
< .0001 
GCTbotthird (base case) -   0.355   
GCTmidthird -   0.362 10.045 
(0.46) 
< .0001 
GCTtopthird -   0.283 17.721 
(0.51) 
< .0001 
Military Class Rank Perc. 50.0 -  50.0   
  N = 23,440 R 
2 =0.1031 
P = .0001  N = 20,087  
R2 =0.1499 
P = .0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
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APPENDIX E.  BIVARIATE PROBIT WITH SAMPLE SELECTION 
RESULTS FOR SURVIVAL TO O-4 AND O-5 PROMOTION 
BOARDS 










Intercept -    
 
Married_Acc 0.344 0.181*** (0.024) 0.546 
0.146*** 
(0.037) 
Comm_age 23.04 - 0.011*** (0.024) 23.00 
- 0.039*** 
(0.004) 
Female 0.039 0.062 (0.055) 0.043 
0.042 
(0.092) 
White (base case) 0.895  0.924  
Africaname 0.052 0.060 (0.487) 0.045 
- 0.020 
(0.097) 
Hispanic 0.027 - 0.061 (0.670) 0.016 
0.099 
(0.156) 
Otherrace  0.026 - 0.032 (0.066) 0.015 
0.127 
(0.145) 






Combat_MOS (base case) 0.326 N.A. 0.307  
Grsupport_MOS 0.187 - 0.140*** (0.031) 0.191 
- 0.070* 
(0.053) 
Service_MOS 0.137 - 0.096*** (0.035) 0.133 
0.001 
(0.061) 
Aviation_MOS 0.281 0.320*** (0.027) 0.313 
- 0.176*** 
(0.046) 
Avsupport_MOS 0.089 - 0.106*** (0.039) 0.072 
0.011 
(0.073) 
Nopromote 0.033 - 0.738*** (0.077) 0.039 
- 0.817*** 
(0.141) 
Accpromote 0.084 0.823*** (0.039) 0.154 
0.863*** 
(0.047) 
Priorenl 0.119 0.274*** (0.050) 0.086 
0.513*** 
(0.111) 
USNA (base case) 0.105  0.100  
NROTC 0.197 -  0.029 (0.039) 0.164 
- 0.031 
(0.070) 
PLC 0.406 - 0.205*** (0.037) 0.373 
- 0.019 
(0.064) 














MECEP 0.028 0.500*** (0.096) 0.025 
-  0.898*** 
(0.171) 
ECP 0.036 - 0.034 (0.082) 0.041 
-  0.214* 
(0.149) 
FY-80 (base case) 0.076  0.192  
FY-81 0.079 - 0.171*** (0.049) 0.204 
- 0.068 
(0.055) 
FY-82 0.100 - 0.374*** (0.048) 0.264 
- 0.204*** 
(0.054) 
FY-83 0.131 - 0.259*** (0.046) 0.340 
- 0.187*** 
(0.052) 
FY-84 0.097 - 0.205*** (0.050)  
 
FY-85 0.084 - 0.110** (0.052)  
 
FY-86 0.083 0.039 (0.052)  
 
FY-87 0.101 - 0.182*** (0.051)  
 
FY-88 0.083 - 0.018 (0.053)  
 
FY-89 0.090 0.068* (0.053)  
 
FY-90 0.075 0.082*** (0.054)  
 
rho  - 0.425*** (0.065)  
- 0.176** 
(0.086) 
Survivad_O-4Brd/ O-5 Brd 0.466  0.300  
 N = 15,627  
-2 Log L =17,550.94 
 P = <.0001 
N = 5,954   
-2 Log L =16,972.06 
P = <.0001 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
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APPENDIX F.  OLS ESTIMATES OF O3 AND O4 PI MODELS 
Table F.1. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps. 
O-3 PI O-4 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 




















































Combat Fitrep    









Joint_O4 - N.A. N.A 0.134 0.289*** (0.099) 
0.302*** 
(0.099) 
TBS Overall Class Rank 
Percentile 52.72 N.A. 
0.022*** 
(0.001) 56.08 N.A. 
0.005*** 
(0.001) 
Combat_MOS (base case) 0.305   0.335   
Grsupport_MOS 0.162 N.A. 0.040 (0.085) 0.161 N.A. 
0.097 
(0.099) 
Service_MOS 0.136 N.A. -0.042 (0.093) 0.134 N.A. 
0.116 
(0.112) 
Aviation_MOS 0.336 N.A. -0.026 (0.070) 0.311 N.A. 
0.201*** 
(0.083) 














USNA (base case) 0.113   0.098   






































Table F.1. OLS Estimates of O3 and O4 Performance Index Based on Old Fitreps 
(Cont.) 
O-3 PI O-4 PI 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 Variable Mean 




Value Coefficient (Std. Error) 
Coefficient 
(Std. Error) 
Comm_FY 1980 (base case) 0.091   0.220   























































PI 98.247   99.405   
  N = 12,488 R 2 =0.107 
N=  12,488 
R 2= 0.140  
N= 2,802 
R 2 =0.065  
N= 2,802 
R 2 =0.072 
*  Significant at the 0.10 level,  **  Significant at the 0.05 level,  ***  Significant at the 0.01 level 
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